Class Action Defense Blog

FACTA Class Action Seeking $4.6 Million to $46 Million in Statutory Damages from Restaurant with Net Worth of $40,000 did not Warrant Class Action Treatment because Class Action not “Superior” Method of Resolving Dispute Florida Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Florida state court against Mama Mia, “a local restaurant in Hollywood, Florida, with approximately $40,000 in net assets”; the class action alleged that defendant violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), which requires that merchants truncate credit card and debit card numbers on electronically-printed customer receipts. Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 694 (S.D.Fla. 2009). According to the allegations underlying the class action, the receipts defendant provided to customers “displayed both the expiration date and full number of [the customers’] credit card.” Id. (The district court noted that defendant “ceased this practice, and began truncating customer receipts to merely four (4) card numbers, no later than June 26, 2008.” Id.) The class action complaint sought “statutory and actual damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs,” id. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, id., and plaintiff moved for class certification, arguing a Rule 23(b)(3) class action should be certified, id., at 694-95. Defense attorneys opposed class action certification on the grounds that class action treatment would expose defendant to statutory damages of $4.6 million - $46 million, even though plaintiff concedes he did not suffer any actual economic injury and even though there was no evidence that any member of the putative class suffered actual economic injury. Id., at 695 and n.5. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion.

The district court explained that the class certification motion “turns on two related questions: (1) whether potential class damages are a proper consideration at the motion to certify stage; and, if so; (2) whether the potential class damages in this matter preclude certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).” Leysoto, at 694. Of course, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that class action treatment was warranted, id., at 695 (citations omitted). FACTA provides for recovery of actual damages or statutory damages of “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” Id. (citation omitted). This is important because under Eleventh Circuit authority the district court “may consider potential class damages in adjudicating Plaintiff's Motion, and given the vast disparity between the requested statutory damages and the actual injury caused by Defendant, the class vehicle is not the superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this dispute.” Id., at 694.

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Posted In: Class Actions In The News, Certification of Class Actions, FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Erred in Dismissing FACTA Class Actions based on Conclusion that FCRA’s Statutory-Damages Provision was Unconstitutional Facially and As-Applied, Requiring Reversal of Court Order and Reinstatement of Class Actions Eleventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed two separate class action complaints against Mexican Specialty Foods and Rave Motion Pictures alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), which is part of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); the class action complaints asserted that the defendants willfully violated FACTA by providing customers with “electronically-generated receipt[s] [that] included more than the last five digits of the customer's card number and/or its expiration date.” Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 2009 WL 944201, *1-*2 (11th Cir. 2009). FACTA provides, in pertinent part, that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” Id., at *1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)). Each class action sought statutory damages, punitive damages and attorney fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Id., at *2. Defense attorneys in each class action moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the FCRA’s statutory-damages provision was unconstitutional, id.; the motion was directed toward that provision of the FCRA which authorizes the recovery of statutory damages “of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” Id., at *1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A)). The federal government intervened as a party-plaintiff to argue in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Id., at *2. The district court issued a single order covering both class actions: the court order “declar[ed] the FCRA's statutory-damages provision unconstitutionally vague on its face and unconstitutionally excessive on its face and as applied to the defendants, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.” Id. The district court therefore dismissed both class actions with prejudice, id. The plaintiffs in each class action appealed; the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal and reversed.

Reviewing the district court’s order de novo, the Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether the case “is ripe for adjudication,” that is, whether there is an actual case and controversy. Harris, at *3. This analysis required a determination of whether the district court found the statutory-damage provision unconstitutional on its face or as-applied, id. The Circuit Court held that the matter was ripe as to a facial challenge to the statute’s constitutionality, because the district court held that “the statute provides no guidance for juries in determining whether to award damages at the upper or lower end of the $100 to $1,000 statutory-damages range” thus leaving the amount of damages to be awarded “to the whim of the jury” creating the potential of inconsistent “willy nilly” verdicts. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the matter was not ripe for adjudication as to an as-applied challenge “[b]ecause such a challenge asserts that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied in particular circumstances, it necessarily requires the development of a factual record for the court to consider.” Id. (citation omitted). The district court’s ruling in this regard had been premised on a number of assumptions that the Circuit Court found to be unwarranted “because many of the court's assumptions required the resolution of issues which are directly disputed.” Id., at *4. The Court therefore concluded that an as-applied challenge was not ripe for adjudication, id., at *5.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Erred in Dismissing FACTA Class Action Complaints on Grounds that Statutory Damages Awardable under FCRA were Unconstitutional Facially and As-Applied because As-Applied Challenge not Ripe and because Statute not Unconstitutional on its Face in part because Members of Class Actions may have Suffered Actual Damages Eleventh Circuit Holds

Two separate class action lawsuits were filed, one against Mexican Specialty Foods and one against Rave Motion Pictures, alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), which is part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); specifically, the class action complaints asserted that defendants willfully violated FACTA by including more than the last 5 digits of a customer’s credit or debit card number and/or its expiration date on customer receipts, and sought both statutory damages and punitive damages. Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. April 9, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 5-6]. Defense attorneys in each class action moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statutory damages provision of the FCRA is unconstitutional; the federal government intervened as a party-plaintiff “to defend the constitutionality of the statute.” Id., at 6. By way of background, and in overly broad terms, the FCRA seeks in part to protect consumer privacy by requiring that merchants safeguard credit information. Id., at 3. Toward that end, Congress enacted FACTA, “which is aimed at protecting consumers from identity theft” and which requires that merchants truncate credit/debit numbers on receipts provided to customers at point of sale, id., at 3-4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)). The statutory scheme authorizes private rights of actions for willful violations of the FCRA, including statutory damages of “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” Id., at 4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A)). In a single order covering both class actions, the district court held that the statutory damage provision of the FCRA was “unconstitutionally vague on its face and unconstitutionally excessive on its face and as applied to the defendants, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.” Id., at 6. Accordingly, it dismissed the class action complaints with prejudice, id. The plaintiffs in each class action appealed and the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the class actions, id., at 6-7. The Circuit Court reversed the dismissal of the class action complaints and remanded the class actions to the district court.

After noting that the district court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the FCRA’s statutory damage provision is subject to de novo review, see id., at 7, the Eleventh Circuit turned to whether the case was ripe for adjudication, and it noted that analysis of this issue in facial challenges is different than in as-applied challenges, id., at 8. The Circuit Court readily found that “defendants’ facial challenges to the FCRA are sufficiently ripe for adjudication.” Id., at 9. However, it found the question of whether the as-applied challenge was ripe to be “more problematic.” Id. In connection with its as-applied analysis, the district court assumed that if the class actions succeeded on the merits, then “the plaintiffs would be entitled to monetary awards that would be grossly disproportionate to the harm caused, and that the award would likely bankrupt the defendants.” Id., at 10-11. In the district court’s view, the FCRA mandated a statutory award of $100-$1000 “thus stripping courts of discretion to reduce the verdict below $100 per violation”; as applied, then, the court found that the statutory damage provision of the FCRA would “impose an unconstitutionally excessive penalty” as applied against defendants. Id., at 11. In reversing this finding, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court assumptions were unwarranted. First, the Court found a dispute existed as to whether defendants would contest class action treatment of the actions. Id. Second, “at this early stage in the proceedings” it was unclear whether putative class members had suffered actual damages, id., at 11-12. And third, it was unclear whether defendants’ violation of FACTA was “willful” within the meaning of the FCRA, which is a prerequisite to an award of statutory damages, id., at 12-13. Accordingly, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the as-applied challenge to the FCRA was not ripe for adjudication, id., at 13. The Eleventh Circuit therefore limited its review of the district court order to whether the statute was facially unconstitutional. Id.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank as to Claim Alleging Violation of Federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA) because Bank’s Disclosures were Accurate, but Genuine Issue of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment as to Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law (FAL) Claims Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against JP Morgan Chase alleging violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); plaintiff’s amended class action complaint added claims for alleged violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law (FAL). Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. January 23, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 827]. The class action complaint asserted that plaintiff opened a Chase credit card, subject to a Cardmember Agreement (CMA), and later took advantage of a “balance transfer offer” that promised a promotional fixed 4.99% APR by transferring $10,000 to his Chase card. Id., at 825. According to the allegations underlying the class action, the CMA allowed Chase to increase the interest rate if plaintiff made a late payment to Chase or any other creditor, id. The class action centered on the allegation that Chase charged plaintiff an APR of 28.74% because it maintained that “he was no longer eligible to receive the promotional 4.99% APR,” id., at 825-26; specifically, Chase argued that plaintiff had made a late payment to another creditor three months before he accepted the balance transfer offer from Chase, id., at 826. While Chase would have automatically canceled the balance transfer offer to plaintiff had it discovered the late payment as part of its monthly cardmember account review, which includes reviewing Experian credit reports, Chase claimed that it did not discover the late payment until after plaintiff had accepted the offer to transfer a balance to his credit card. Id. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the class action’s state law claims were preempted by federal law and that plaintiff’s TILA and CLRA claims were defeated by the disclosures in Chase’s CMA. Id., at 827. The district court rejected the preemption argument, but agreed with the defense that plaintiff could not prove Chase knew of the late payment before accepting the balance transfer offer and so plaintiff’s state law claims could not survive. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed as to the UCL and FAL claims for relief.

The Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his FCRA claim and did not appeal from the dismissal of the class action’s CLRA claim; accordingly, the appeal was directed to the grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s TILA, UCL and FAL claims. Hauk, at 827. The Circuit Court devoted most of its attention to the TILA claim. The Ninth Circuit summarized TILA and Regulation Z, see id., at 828-29, and the disclosures made by Chase in conjunction with the balance transfer offer, see id., at 830-31. In pertinent part, Chase may waive its right to increase a cardholder’s APR because of a late payment if it knows of, but does not promptly act on, that default, id., at 830-31; however, Chase does not waive its right to increase the APR “based on a late payment it discovered after it mailed the [balance transfer offer], even if that late payment occurred before it mailed the [balance transfer offer],” id., at 831 (citations omitted). The Circuit Court noted further that “TILA is only a ‘disclosure statute’ and ‘does not substantively regulate consumer credit,’” id. In this case, then, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the class action’s TILA claim because “the injury [plaintiff] suffered neither resulted from any lack of TILA disclosures nor gave rise to a claim under TILA.” Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that “while an inaccurate disclosure that itself breaches a credit agreement may also violate TILA…, the breach of a credit agreement based on conduct independent of the disclosures does not necessarily give rise to a TILA claim.” Id., at 832-33 (citation omitted). In affirming the dismissal of the TILA claim, the Ninth Circuit recognized contrary authority out of the Third Circuit, see id., at 833-34 (citing Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2002)), but rejected that circuit’s “expansive reading of Regulation Z,” id., at 833. Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded at page 835, “We hold that a creditor’s undisclosed intent to act inconsistent with its disclosures is irrelevant in determining the sufficiency of those disclosures under sections 226.5, 226.6, and 226.9 of Regulation Z.” And because defendant’s disclosures complied with TILA and Regulation Z, summary judgment was proper, id.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiff Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Supported by All Responding Parties including Other Class Action Plaintiffs and Countrywide Defendants, but Transfers Class Actions to Western District of Kentucky

Six class actions –three in California, two in Florida, and one in Missouri – were filed against Bank of America and various Countrywide entities, together with other defendants, alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. December 2, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1 and n.2.]. Specifically, the class action complaints alleged that Countrywide failed “to limit access to and/or adequately safeguard private customer information” in violation of the FCRA, id., at 2. Plaintiff in one of the Florida class actions filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Western District of Missouri or the District of Kansas. Id., at 1. All responding parties, which included more than 20 of the 26 plaintiffs in related “tag-along” class action lawsuits, supported centralization, and while some of the class action plaintiffs requested transfer to California, Florida, Missouri, North Carolina or Ohio, the vast majority – including more than 20 plaintiffs tag-along class actions and the Countrywide defendants – supported transfer to the District of Kansas. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits, but rejected each of the district requested by the parties. Id., at 2. The Judicial Panel concluded, “Given that this litigation involves 32 known actions pending throughout the United States, any number of districts would be an appropriate transferee forum.” Id. And without discussion or explanation, the Panel selected the Western District of Kentucky as the transferee court, id.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Putative Class Action Alleging Violations of FACTA not Entitled to Class Action Treatment because Rule 23(b)(3)’s Superiority Requirement for Class Action Certification not Met California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against American Multi-Cinema for violating the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA); specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendant printed not only the last four digits of a consumer’s credit or debit card on the customer’s receipt, but the first four digits as well. Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 647, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Notably, the class action complaint did not allege that plaintiff, or any putative member of the class action, suffered any harm as a result of the violation. Id. Defendant corrected its sales practices within two weeks of the filing the class action, id. Plaintiff moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action; the district court denied the motion on the grounds that Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement had not been met: “The Court found that if certified, the potential statutory damages to be awarded could be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by Plaintiff.” Id. (A copy of the district court order denying plaintiff's initial motion for class action treatment may be found here.) However, the district court denied class action treatment without prejudice pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Soualian v. Int’l Coffee & Tea LLC, CV 07-502-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 4877902 (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2007). Soualian, however, was settled so the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Id. The district court permitted plaintiff to renew his motion for class action certification, and again denied the motion.

After summarizing the legal standard for class action certification under Rule 23, see Bateman, at 648-49, the district court summarized the legislative history of FACTA and the statutory penalties provided for FACTA violations, see id., at 649. The federal court also discussed the 2007 Congressional amendment to FACTA, which clarified that the statute was not intended to provide for private rights of action based solely on the failure of a merchant to include the expiration date of the credit/debit card on the customer’s receipt. See id., at 649-50. The amendment, however, “does not provide Defendant with a safe-harbor for truncating its credit card receipts to eight (8) digits rather than five (5).” Id., at 650. Plaintiff argued that class action treatment was warranted because Congress essentially reaffirmed that the failure to truncate the credit or debit card account numbers supported such lawsuits. Id. But the district court observed that the purpose of the statute was to prevent identity theft, and that “the congressional record also supports an inference that members of Congress were primarily concerned with credit card receipts displaying the entire credit card account number.” Id. Accordingly, the federal court concluded that “it is far from clear whether Congress intended to approve class actions for printing eight (8) digits rather than five (5).” Id. However, the court found persuasive the purpose of the statute – viz., “The purpose of this Act is to ensure that consumers suffering from any actual harm to their credit or identity are protected while simultaneously limiting abusive lawsuits that do not protect consumers but only result in increased cost to business and potentially increased prices to consumers.” Id. (quoting Pub.L. 110-241, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 1565 (June 3, 2008)). Because no one suffered any harm as a result of the technical violation of the statute, the court denied class action treatment. Id.

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Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Two Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Opposed by Illinois Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Actions to Central District of California

Two putative nationwide class actions were filed in the Central District of California and the Northern District of Illinois against Toys “R” Us alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA); specifically, the class action complaints allege that defendant printed “certain credit and debit card information on customer receipts” in violation of FACTA.” In re Toys "R" Us - Delaware, Inc., Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. October 9, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Central District of California; plaintiffs in California class action – which is “significantly more advanced” than the Illinois action – did not oppose the motion, but plaintiffs in the Illinois class action did oppose the motion. Id. The Illinois class action plaintiff argued in part that centralization was unnecessary because there are only two actions pending; the Judicial Panel, however, concluded, “Although only two actions are now pending, they are brought on behalf of nearly identical putative nationwide classes, and there is a risk of inconsistent rulings on class certification.” Id. Even though there were only two actions, centralization was appropriate under Section 1407 because “[it] will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, especially with respect to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” Id. Accordingly, the Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits and agreed that the Central District of California was the appropriate transferee court because the “first-filed action has been pending there for almost two years.” Id., at 1-2.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News, FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiff Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by any Responding Parties, and Transfers Actions to Western District of North Carolina

Three class actions – one in California, Illinois and North Carolina – were filed against LendingTree and other defendants alleging that LendingTree failed to “limit access to and/or adequately safeguard private customer information in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.” In re Lending Tree, LLC, Customer Data Security Breach Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. October 7, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Plaintiff’s lawyer for the North Carolina class action filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Western District of North Carolina; no responding party opposed centralization, but the parties could not agree on the appropriate transferee court. Id. Certain other plaintiffs, and defendants LendingTree and Home Loan Center supported the motion; plaintiffs in the Illinois and California class actions argued for transfer to the Central District of California. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits, id., at 1-2. The Panel also agreed that the Western District of North Carolina was the appropriate transferee court “because (1) LendingTree is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, and parties, witnesses and documents may be found there, and (2) this district has the capacity to handle this docket and, in the past, has been underutilized as a transferee district.” Id., at 2.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Rejects Transferee Court Proposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Class Actions to Central District of California

Three class actions – two in California and one in Illinois – were filed against Make-Up-Art Cosmetics (MAC) alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA); specifically, the class action complaints alleged that MAC printed “certain credit and debit card information on customer receipts” in violation of FACTA. In re Make-Up Art Cosmetics (M.A.C.) Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. June 9, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Central District of California; plaintiffs in the class actions supported the motion but argued for transfer to the Northern District of Illinois. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits, finding that centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery and prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, particularly with respect to class action certification. Id. The Panel agreed also that the Central District of California was the appropriate transferee court because two of the three class actions were pending in that district, “including the first-filed and broadest actions.” Id.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Properly Granted Defense Motion for Summary Judgment in Class Action Alleging Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because Mailer need not Contain Every Material Loan Term and because Offer may be Conditioned on Additional Information such as Verification of Employment and Income Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Home Loan Center, doing business as HomeLoanCenter.com, alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); specifically, the class action alleged that Home Loan Center sent them a mailer for a “SmartLoan mortgage program” but that the mailer was not a “firm offer of credit” and therefore violated the FCRA. Cavin v. Home Loan Center, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. July 2, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The letters referenced in the class action were sent “to thousands of Illinois residents” and stated that the recipient had been “pre-approved to receive HomeLoanCenter.com’s exclusive SmartLoan program.” Id., at 2. The mailers contained a box with the figures of 1.00%/4.27%, adjacent to two columns that listed various monthly payments for various loan amounts. Id. The letters stated that no fees would be charged to get the loan process started, and that defendant could “prequalify [the recipient] right over the phone in minutes and provide [the recipient] with a customized loan program that suits [the recipient’s] needs.” Id. The letter also provided, “This offer may not be extended if, after responding to this offer you do not meet the criteria used in the selection process. Further, HomeLoanCenter.com will verify income and employment, review credit, and analyze debt and your equity position in the subject property prior to final loan approval.” Id., at 2-3. The mailers stated that not all applicants would be approved and reiterated that terms and conditions applied to the offer, id., at 3. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court agreed with defense attorneys that the mailers did not violate the FCRA and accordingly entered judgment in favor of defendant. Id., at 1-2. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The FCRA permits a finance company to obtain an individual’s credit report, but “the company needs to obtain it with the intent of extending a firm offer of credit to the potential customer.” Cavin, at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(I)). Under the FCRA, a “firm offer of credit” is “any offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer except that the offer may be further conditioned…” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l). In this case, class action plaintiffs argued that defendant accessed their credit information “without a permissible purpose” because the mailers sent to them and other members of the putative class did not constitute a firm offer of credit within the meaning of the FCRA. Id., at 3-4. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that material terms of the loan program were not disclosed and/or were not adequately explained, id., at 5. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, explaining at page 5, “The mailer identified the basis for calculating interest, the length of the loan, the possibility of a rate change after thirty days, the minimum payment option with accompanying deferred interest, and the information needed to obtain the loan.” That is all that was required because the FCRA does not require the initial communication “‘contain all of the important terms that must be agreed on before credit is extended.’” Id., at 5 (citation omitted). On the contrary, requiring a financial institution to disclose all material terms would result in the mailer being more difficult for the consumer to understand. Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). The Circuit Court explained that “the proper inquiry in ascertaining whether a letter is a firm offer is whether the offer will be honored, not whether all of the material terms are listed.” Id., at 6.

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases–Cavin v. Home Loan Center: Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In FCRA Class Action Holding Letters Sent To Class Action Plaintiffs Constituted Firm Offers Of Credit" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiff Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 over Defense Objection

Two class action lawsuits – one in Illinois and one in Pennsylvania – were filed in against defendants Texas Roadhouse Holdings LLC and Texas Roadhouse, Inc., for violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), alleging that defendants printed information on credit card and debit card customer receipts that FACTA required be excluded therefrom. In re Texas Roadhouse Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. April 7, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Plaintiff’s lawyer in the Pennsylvania class action filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Northern District of Illinois; plaintiff in the Illinois class action supported the motion. Id. Defense attorneys opposed pretrial coordination, and alternatively filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer the class actions to Kentucky, id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits, explaining at page 1: “Common discovery is likely, as defendants have suggested that discovery related to their credit and debit card receipt policies will be company-wide. Centralization under Section 1407 will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, especially with respect to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” The Judicial Panel also agreed that the Northern District of Illinois was the appropriate transferee court. Id., at 1-2.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Affirming Summary Judgment in Favor of Defense in Class Action Alleging Violations of FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act), Class Action Complaint Properly Dismissed because, as Matter of First Impression, Offer of Credit Satisfies FCRA if Creditor will not Deny Credit to Consumers who Meet Pre-Selection Criteria First Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Greenwood Credit Union alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) arising out of “an unsolicited letter to a consumer about the offering of credit for a home loan.” Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71 (1st Cir. 2008). Greenwood had purchased credit reports for purposes of pre-screening individuals, and then sent home loan offers to “a list of individuals meeting certain minimal credit requirements”: the class action complaint alleged that the unsolicited letters fall within the FCRA and that consumer credit information had been obtained for an improper purpose; defense attorneys argued that the FCRA permits obtaining credit reports for various purposes, including extending a “firm offer of credit.” Id. The First Circuit explained at page 71, “This case is about plaintiff's efforts to collect that statutory penalty for a class of consumers; there is no claim [he] was wrongfully denied credit.” The thrust of the class action claims was that the offer of credit “was based on such minimal criteria and the actual extension of credit was so contingent on other conditions that the letter could not be a firm offer of credit.” Id. Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on the class action complaint, and the district court granted the motion. As a matter of first impression in the First Circuit, the Circuit Court considered the phrase “firm offer of credit” and affirmed.

Defense attorneys argued that Greenwood limited its offer of credit to homeowners “having at least $10,000 in revolving debt and a credit score of 500 or greater.” Sullivan, at 71. Greenwood did not obtain a consumer’s entire credit report; rather, it obtained from the credit reporting agency only contact information for consumers who met these criteria. Id., at 71-72. Greenwood then sent consumers a letter offering them, for a limited time, loans up to 100% of the value of their home at “some of the lowest rates in decades”; however, the letter did not provide the interest rate being offered, nor did it state the duration of the loan. Id., at 72. The letter noted, however, “Limited time offer to customers who qualify based on equity, income, debts, and satisfactory credit. Rates and terms subject to change without notice. Most loan programs require both a satisfactory property appraisal and title exam for final approval.... If at time of offer you no longer meet initial criteria, offer may be revoked.” Id. The letter also informed consumers as to the steps they could take if they wanted to stop receiving prescreened offers of credit. See id. Plaintiff responded to the letter by filing the class action complaint, id. Plaintiff’s theory was that Greenwood had not extended a “firm offer of credit” because the letter “‘is lacking crucial terms for it to be an offer’ and ‘is so vague and lacking in terms as not to constitute an “offer capable of acceptance”.’” Id. The class action complaint sought statutory damages of $1,000 per class member on behalf of approximately 2 million individuals, id.

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases–Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union: In Case Of First Impression First Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In FCRA Class Action Holding Creditor’s Letter Was A “Firm Offer” Under FCRA" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Defense Evidence in Support of Removal of Class Action to Federal Court Adequately Established Removal Jurisdiction under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in California state court against Polo Ralph Lauren alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Act; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendant requested personal information from customers as part of credit card transactions in violation of California Civil Code § 1747.08. Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1202 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court alleging removal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA); plaintiffs moved to remand the class action to state court on the grounds that defendant failed to establish the requisite diversity or amount in controversy. Id. As the district court explained, “CAFA grants district courts original jurisdiction over civil class actions filed under federal or state law in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from any defendant and the amount in controversy for the putative class members in the aggregate exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). The district court refused to remand the class action to state court, holding that defendant sufficiently established CAFA removal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff first argued that Polo Ralph Lauren did not establish that it was not a citizen of California, Korn, at 1201; the district court rejected this argument, noting that plaintiff is bound by the judicial admission in his complaint that defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, id., at 1203. Accordingly, the federal court held plaintiff “bound by the allegations in his complaint that assert defendant's citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is in Delaware and New Jersey.” Id. Plaintiff next argued that the defense failed to establish the $5,000,000 amount in controversy requirement. Id., at 1201. While the class action complaint did not seek a specific amount of damages, the district court observed that the class action seeks “statutory civil penalties for the alleged violations [of] up to $1000 per violation.” Id., at 1202. Further, as part of the documentation supporting removal of the class action to federal court, defense attorneys had submitted a declaration establishing that Polo Ralph Lauren had “processed more than 5,000 credit card transactions over the last year in the state of California.” Id. The district court held that this was sufficient.

Continue reading "CAFA Class Action Defense Cases–Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren: California Federal Court Denies Motion To Remand Class Action To State Court Holding Defense Established Class Action Alleging Song-Beverly Act Violations Involved More Than $5 Million" »

Posted In: Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), FCRA Class Actions, Removal & Remand, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of FACTA Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and Agrees with Defense Recommendation of Eastern District of Pennsylvania as the Transferee Court

Four class action lawsuits were filed against OSI Restaurant Partners (OSI) alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) based on OSI’s failure to delete certain information from customer credit and debit card receipts. The class actions were pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (two), and the Western District of Pennsylvania and Northern District of Illinois (one each). In re OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC, Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. February 20, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; all parties agreed that pretrial coordination was appropriate, but plaintiffs’ lawyers in two of the class actions argued that the Western District of Pennsylvania was the appropriate transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion for centralization, but agreed with defense attorneys that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the appropriate transferee court. Id.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Three Class Action Lawsuits Involving Six Issues Under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Equally Important to Class Action and Non-Class Action Cases, Grouped Together for Resolution by Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit yesterday issued an opinion that resolved various issues of interest under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) presented by three lower court opinions – the putative class action styled Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., out of the Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 04 CV 7666, the putative class action styled Bruce v. KeyBank N.A., out of the Northern District of Indiana, Case No. 2:05cv330, and the putative class action styled Price v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., out of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Case No. 05-C-947 – explaining that the cases involve “issues that have arisen in numerous suits” and that each of the three cases “presents at least two issues, several of which recur in multiple appeals.” Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 523 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. The Circuit Court organized its discussion around issues, rather than the facts of each appeal, id., so we summarize the opinion without providing an introductory factual summary of the cases. (For the convenience of the reader, the facts underlying the Murray class action may be found in lower court opinion at Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006), the facts underlying the Bruce class action may be found in lower court opinion atBruce v. KeyBank N.A., 2006 WL 3743749 (N.D. Ind. December 15, 2006), and the facts underlying the Price class action may be found in the lower court opinion at Price v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 2007 WL 1521525 (E.D. Wis. May 22, 2007). Additionally, our summary of the district court decision in Murray may be found here.) The issues addressed and conclusions reached by the Seventh Circuit, of importance to class action and non-class action cases alike, are: (1) whether an offer of credit must be valuable to all or most recipients, id., concluding the offer must be “firm” but need not be ‘valuable,” id., at 5, (2) whether an offer of “free” merchandise can constitute an offer of “credit,” id., concluding that it may, id., at 6, (3) whether flyers must contain all material terms of the offer of credit, id., concluding that it need not, id., at 8, (4) whether the fact that the terms of the offer may vary means that the offer is not “firm,” id., concluding that an offer may be firm even though “some matters [are left] for future determination,” id., at 10, (5) whether 6-point type is “conspicuous,” id., concluding that it is not, id., at 12, (6) whether use of 6-point type is a “willful” violation of the FCRA, id., concluding that it would be reckless “today” to do so but was not so at the time the documents in question were prepared, id., at 15.

Must an offer of credit must be valuable to all or most recipients? In Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit held that if one offers a product (such as furniture) along with a “token line of credit,” then the FCRA requires that the credit offer have value to the consumer: “’From the consumer’s perspective, an offer of credit without value is the equivalent of an advertisement or solicitation [for the product rather than the loan].’” Murray, at 3 (quoting Cole, at 726-27). The Circuit Court noted that plaintiffs have twisted Cole to argue that it requires “even a simple offer of credit [to be] valuable enough to justify the use of consumers’ credit files.” Murray, at 3. These efforts must fail, the Seventh Circuit held, because the FCRA “calls for a firm offer of credit but not a valuable firm offer of credit.” Id., at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i)). By contrast, “[t]he problem in Cole was how to disentangle an offer of merchandise from an offer of credit when they are made jointly.” Id. Cole thus does not apply to cases involving “pure offers of credit.” Id., at 5.

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases–Murray v. New Cingular: Seventh Circuit Limits Cole Opinion And Resolves Several Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) Issues Of Importance To Class Action And Non-Class Action Cases Alike" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Complaints Alleging FCRA Violations Erroneously Dismissed because FACTA Amendments Eliminating Private Rights of Action for FCRA § 1681m Violations cannot be Applied Retroactively to Class Action Claims Premised on Violations that Occurred Prior to FACTA’s Effective Date Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiff Linda Killingsworth filed a class action against Household Bank (now HSBC Bank Nevada) alleging that the prescreened credit card offer extended to her by the Bank prior to August 20, 2004 violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and plaintiff Erick Sawyer separately filed a class action against his auto insurance carrier, Ensurance Insurance Services, alleging that in connection with issuing him an auto policy in October 2004 it “violated the FCRA by charging him a higher rate based on negative information in his credit report without giving him notice of that adverse action, and also by using his initial credit information for subsequent renewals of his policy when corrected credit information would have qualified him for a lower rate.” Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2007). The class action complaints were filed in the Northern District of Illinois, and defense attorneys in each class action moved to dismiss the complaint based on Section 311 of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), which amended the FCRA to eliminate certain private rights of action under the FCRA. Id., at 617 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)). In each case, the district court agreed and dismissed the class action complaint, id. Both plaintiffs appealed and the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and issued a single opinion address the question of whether Section 311, which became effective on December 1, 2004, “impairs rights [plaintiffs] possessed prior to the new statute's effective date and therefore has an impermissible retroactive effect if applied to them.” Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Killingsworth’s class action, concluding that the retroactive application of Section 311 was improper as to her claims, but the Circuit Court remanded for further proceedings as to Sawyer’s class action complaint, concluding that “the retroactivity question cannot be decided at the pleading stage because the conduct alleged in his [class action] complaint straddles FACTA's effective date.” Id.

The issue before the Seventh Circuit was “whether an amendment to the [FCRA] eliminating private rights of action has an impermissible retroactive effect when applied to FCRA claims that accrued prior to the amendment's effective date.” Killingsworth, at 616. Section 311 of FACTA added subsection (h) to FCRA § 1681m so as to eliminate private rights of action for violations of § 1681m. Killingsworth received an offer of credit prior to August 20, 2004, but did not file her class action lawsuit until October 2005. Id., at 617. Her class action alleged a violation of § 1681m(d), and defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that no private right of action existed based on Section 311’s amendment to the FCRA. Id., at 617-18. The district court agreed and dismissed Killingsworth’s class action, id., at 618. For his part, Sawyer applied for auto insurance in October 2004, his auto policy took effect on December 20, 2004, and it was renewed twice at six-month intervals. Id., at 618. Sawyer also filed his class action lawsuit after the effective date of Section 311; his class action alleged a violation of § 1681m(a). Id. However, the class action alleged further that “Ensurance failed to consider interim changes to his credit rating and instead relied on his initial credit score when subsequently renewing his policy,” thus implicating acts taken after Section 311’s effective date. Id. As in Killingsworth, defense attorneys moved to dismiss Sawyer’s class action on the ground that no private right of action existed; the federal court agreed and dismissed Sawyer’s class action. Id.

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases-Killingsworth v. HSBC: Seventh Circuit Reverses District Court Orders Dismissing Of FCRA Class Action Lawsuits Holding FCRA Amendment Barring Private Rights Of Action Not Retroactive" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Over Objection, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Agrees With Plaintiff's Request to Transfer Class Actions to District of New Jersey

Three class action lawsuits were filed against Boscov’s Department Store alleging violation of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). In re Boscov’s Dep’t Store, LLC, Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 3119372, *1 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. October 17, 2007). Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the District of Maryland. Maryland plaintiffs supported the motion; Pennsylvania plaintiffs agreed pretrial coordination was appropriate but argued that the Western District of Pennsylvania was the appropriate transferee court; and New Jersey plaintiffs opposed centralization but alternatively argued that the District of New Jersey was the appropriate transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class actions but rejected defendant’s request for transfer to Maryland and Pennsylvania plaintiff’s request for transfer there even though Boscov was headquartered in Pennsylvania, id. Rather, the Panel stated that all three forums would be appropriate, and selected New Jersey Illinois because it has “the capacity to handle this litigation and a transferee judge with time and experience to steer this litigation on a prudent course." Id.

NOTE: This case highlights the risk a defendant runs in assuming that they will be successful in choosing a forum by way of MDL centralization.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Allegations in Class Action Complaint that Defendant had been “Repeatedly Informed” of FACTA’s Requirements but Failed to Timely Comply Sufficient to Establish “Willful” Violation of FACTA so as Defeat Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Pennsylvania Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against Lifetime Brands for violating the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands, Inc., 498 F.Supp. 753, 754 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The class action complaint alleged that defendant “willfully” failed to redact credit card information from electronically printed customer receipts, id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action for failure to state a claim, arguing that plaintiff had not pleaded injury in fact and that defendant had not acted willfully, id. The district court disagreed with the defense and denied the motion, holding that the class action complaint adequately pleaded claims under FACTA.

Recognizing that it was entitled to consider exhibits to the class action complaint in ruling upon the defense Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and that it need not accept as true “bald allegations” or “legal conclusions,” Ehrheart, at 755, the district court first held that a claim under FACTA does not require proof of identity theft. The class action alleged that defendant gave plaintiff credit or debit card receipts that violated FACTA because they contained more than the last five digits of card and/.or the expiration date of her credit card. Id. That is all that is required: “FACTA does not require that a plaintiff have suffered actual monetary damages in order to sue for violation of the Act” but, rather, provides for statutory damages irrespective of whether any actual injury is suffered. Id., at 755-56. Accordingly, the court rejected defense arguments challenging the class action complaint for failure to allege actual injury.

Continue reading "FACTA Class Action Defense Cases-Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands: Pennsylvania Federal Court Denies Defense Motion To Dismiss FACTA Class Action Because Class Action Complaint Adequately Alleged Injury And Willful Misconduct" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Rejects Transferee Court Recommendations of Various Plaintiffs Opting Instead to Transfer Class Actions to District of Kansas as Requested by Defense

Six class action lawsuits (followed by “tag-along” class actions) were filed against The TJX Companies for violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) because TJX allegedly included certain information on customer credit card receipts. In re The TJX Cos., Inc., Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., 505 F.Supp.2d 1379, 1379 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2007). Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the District of Kansas. Id. The Kansas class action plaintiffs did not oppose the motion, id. The plaintiffs in the other federal district did not oppose centralization, but argued alternatively for California, Illinois, Massachusetts or Nevada as the transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action litigation and agreed with defense attorneys that the District of Kansas was the appropriate court Id., at 1380.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Opposed by Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Agrees to Transfer Class Actions to Central District of California as Requested by Defense

Two class action lawsuits were filed against Charlotte Russe alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) by failing to block certain credit and debit card information from customer receipts. In re Charlotte Russe, Inc., Fair & Accurate Credit Trans. Act (FACTA) Litig., 505 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1378 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2007). Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Central District of California, id., at 1377.. Plaintiffs’ lawyers in both the California and the Pennsylvania class actions opposed centralization, particularly because the Central District of California had refused to certify FACTA class actions in several cases including in the California plaintiffs’ action. Id., at 1378. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class actions (recognizing that technically only one of them remained a class action) because the statutory requirements have been met: “Each action involves allegations that Charlotte Russe’s printing of certain credit and debit card information on customer receipts violated [FACTA]. Centralization…will eliminate duplicate discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, especially with respect to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” Id. The Panel also agreed that the Central District of California is the appropriate transferee court because the first class action was filed there and because defendant’s headquarters are in California. Id., at *2.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Whether FACTA Class Action Violates Due Process Because Statutory Damages are Grossly Disproportionate to Actual Harm Suffered must be Challenged by Defense at Motion to Certify Class Action Rather than by Defense Motion to Dismiss California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action in California federal court against Adidas alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) for failing to remove credit card expiration dates from receipts given customers following credit card purchases. Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 965, 967-68 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint or to strike the prayer for punitive damages, id., at 968. The district court rejected the defense challenges to the class action complaint.

FACTA is part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and provides in part, “[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). The statute became effective December 4, 2006, and since that time literally hundreds of putative class action complaints have been filed alleging violations of FACTA; indeed, the district court noted that the putative class action before it was “one of as many as 70” FACTA class action lawsuits filed in the Ninth Circuit alone. Arcilla, at 967. The class action allegations in the instant class action complaint “resemble those in the others”: the putative class action alleges that plaintiff purchased merchandise from defendant and received a credit card receipt that disclosed the expiration date of his credit card, id. The class action alleged that defendant provided similar receipts to other customers, and alleged further that some of those receipt included “more than the last five digits of the card numbers,” id., at 968. The class action complaint prayed for statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, and alleges that defendant’s conduct resulted in an “increased risk of identify theft.” Id.

The district court summarized the defense arguments at page 968 as follows: “(1) it could not have willfully violated the FACTA because the statute is vague and ambiguous; (2) the Complaint seeks statutory damages that would be constitutionally excessive and thus violate due process because no actual harm has been suffered; (3) the statutory damages would violate ‘principles of tort law’ because Plaintiff and the potential class members have suffered no actual harm; (4) the request for punitive damages is improper because any such damages would be excessive absent an allegation of actual harm.” The district court disagreed, concluding that the allegations of the class action complaint were sufficient to survive the defense motions, and that certain challenges to the class action had to be brought in response to a motion to certify the litigation as a class action.

Continue reading "FACTA Class Action Defense Cases-Arcilla v. Adidas: California Federal Court Rejects Defense Challenge To Constitutionality Of FACTA And Permits Class Action To Proceed Past Pleading Stage" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Class Action Requirement not met Where Financial Impact on Defendant for Technical Violation of FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act) would be Disproportionate to any Harm to the Class California Federal Court Holds

Within hours of purchasing an item at Cost Plus with her credit card, plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging a technical violation of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) in that her receipt truncated her credit card number but failed to omit the expiration date of the card. Spikings v. Cost Plus, Inc., Case No. CV-06-8125-JFW (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Plaintiff filed a motion for certification of class action treatment; defense attorneys objected arguing in part that the prerequisite Rule 23(b)(3) finding of superiority did not exist thus barring class action certification. Id., at 2. The district court agreed with the defense and refused to certify the litigation as a class action.

FACTA requires that no more than the last 5 digits of a credit card number be shown on customer receipts, and that the expiration date of the credit card not be disclosed on the receipt. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). Plaintiff purchased an item at Cost Plus on December 19, 2006, and within four (4) business hours filed her putative class action complaint. Spikings, at 2. Plaintiff served the class action complaint on December 26, 2006, defendant deleted the expiration date from credit card receipts in all but three of its stores by January 11, 2007, and completed the process of deleting the expiration date from all customer credit card receipts by January 29, 2007. Id. Nonetheless, plaintiff pursued the class action, alleging that defendant’s violation of FACTA was “willful” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, thus entitling the class to statutory damages of $100-$1000 per violation, as well as punitive damages and attorney fees. Id. Plaintiff also moved the court to certify the litigation as a class action, id., at 1.

Continue reading "FACTA Class Action Defense Cases-Spikings v. Cost Plus: Certification Of Class Action Rejected For Technical Violation Of Fair And Accurate Credit Transactions Act Because Class Action Treatment Would Subject Defendant To Disproportionate Liability" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Putative Class Action Alleging FACTA Violation for Inclusion of Credit Card Expiration Date on Customer Receipts did not Warrant Class Action Treatment Because Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement not Satisfied California Federal Court Holds, Particularly as Defendant’s Act in Correcting the Violation Immediately on Receipt of Plaintiff’s Complaint Established its Good Faith and “Nullified Any Deterrence Benefit”

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against International Coffee & Tea alleging that it violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) because it provided customers with credit card receipts that included the last five digits of the credit card and the card’s expiration date. Soualian v. International Coffee & Tea, LLC, Slip Opn., at 1 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2007). Plaintiff filed a motion to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys objected that Rule 23(b)(3)’ superiority test had not been met. Id. The district court agreed and refused to permit the litigation to proceed as a class action.

FACTA provides that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last five digits of the card number of the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). Plaintiff’s putative class action sought to represent “the class of individuals who made purchases at Defendant’s stores…and who received receipts on which Defendant printed more than the last five digits of the person’s credit card or debit card number, or on which Defendant printed the expiration date of the person’s credit or debit card.” Soualian, at 1. The district court outlined the elements required for class certification under Rule 23(a), but focused its analysis on whether Rule 23(b)(3) had been satisfied, id.

Continue reading "FACTA Class Action Defense Cases-Soualian v. International Coffee & Tea: California Federal Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion To Certify Class Action In Fair And Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Suit" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

In Seminal FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Class Action Cases, Supreme Court Holds (1) “Willful” Failures Under FCRA § 1681n(a) Include Acts of “Reckless Disregard,” (2) “Adverse Action” in Determining Insurance Premiums Includes Setting First-Time Insurance Rates, (3) Review of Credit Report must have Impacted Rate Charged Consumer, and (4) Insurers did not Violate FCRA

Plaintiffs filed two separate putative class action lawsuits against GEICO and Safeco Insurance, respectively, alleging willful failure to give notice of adverse actions under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in violation of § 1681m(a). Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, __ U.S. __, 2007 WL 1582951 (June 4, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 4]. The questions before the United States Supreme Court in the consolidated cases were “whether willful failure covers a violation [of the FCRA] committed in reckless disregard of the notice obligation, and, if so, whether … Safeco and GEICO committed reckless violations.” Id., at 1. The Supreme Court held that a “willful” violation of the FCRA included “reckless disregard,” but that neither GEICO nor Safeco recklessly violated the FCRA, id., at 1-2.

The class action complaints were filed by individuals who purchased car insurance from GEICO and Safeco, each of which rely upon credit reports in setting insurance premiums. Safeco, at 4-5. In these consolidated class actions, defendants allegedly offered plaintiffs auto insurance at rates that were higher than the most favorable rates offered by the companies. Id., at 4. However, the insurers did not send plaintiffs notices of adverse action, id., at 4-5. The FCRA requires that “any person [who] takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report” must provide notice to the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a). For these purposes, an “adverse action” includes “a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for.” § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). The Supreme Court explained that these notices “must point out the adverse action, explain how to reach the agency that reported on the consumer’s credit, and tell the consumer that he can get a free copy of the report and dispute its accuracy with the agency.” Safeco, at did not allege actual damages; rather, it sought statutory and punitive damages under § 1681n(a). Id.

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases-Safeco Insurance v. Burr: U.S. Supreme Court Holds Willful Misconduct Under Fair Credit Reporting Act Includes Reckless Disregard But Insurers Did Not Violate FCRA" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

As Matter of First Impression, Seventh Circuit Holds that FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Requires Consumer Reporting Agency to do More than Make Accurate Disclosures because Statute Requires that Disclosures also be “Clear”

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against credit reporting agency Equifax Information Services alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Gillespie v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 484 F.3d 938, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). The class action complaint asserted that Equifax’s disclosures failed to comply with the FCRA; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that consumers could not properly calculate the date by which negative credit information must be removed from their reports. Id. Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the information it provided to consumers was clear and accurate. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defense; based on this ruling, the court found it unnecessary to address plaintiffs’ motion to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The Seventh Circuit reversed.

Plaintiff Heather Gillespie opened a credit account with Direct Merchants Bank in 1999 and defaulted on the account in 2001; plaintiff Angela Cinson opened an account with Sears in 1993 and defaulted on the account in 1996 or 1997. Gillespie, at 939. The delinquent accounts were sold to a collection agency, and information on the delinquencies made it to the Equifax credit files of each plaintiff, id. In 2004, each plaintiff requested their credit file from Equifax and Equifax complied. Gillespie, at 939. Plaintiffs objected to the “Date of Last Activity” entry in their credit files. Id. The court explained at page 939 the manner in which the field is completed:

Continue reading "FCRA Class Action Defense Cases-Gillespie v. Equifax: Seventh Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In FCRA Class Action Holding Disclosures Were Accurate But Not Clear" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Mortgage-Offer Mailer Constituted a "Firm Offer of Credit" Under the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Warranting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defense Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Home Loan Center for alleged violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) alleging that impermissibly accessed credit reports for purposes of mailing out "pre-approval" mortgage flyers, three of which were mailed to plaintiffs. Cavin v. Home Loan Center Inc., 469 F.Supp.2d 561, 2007 WL 92509, *1 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Plaintiffs did not respond to the loan offers. Id., at *2. Defense and plaintiffs attorneys filed cross-motions for summary judgment; defense attorneys argued that the mailers constituted "firm offers of credit" under the FCRA thus entitling Home Loan Center to obtain the credit reports; plaintiffs argued that mailers did not constitute firm offers because they are too vague. Id., at *3. The district court granted the defense motion, denied the plaintiffs' motion, and entered judgment in favor of Home Loan Center on the class action complaint.

We do not summarize here all of the language contained in the mailers or the details of the loan program at issue. Class action defense attorneys facing FCRA claims should review the opinion in its entirety in order to understand its full scope. Briefly, the mailers advertised a "SmartLoan" program and stated "This 'prescreened' offer of credit is based on information in your credit report indicating that you meet certain criteria." Cavin, at *1. The mailers set forth "sample loan payments for loans ranging from $100,000 to $600,000." Id. The reverse side of the mailers stated, "This offer may not be extended if, after responding to this offer, you do not meet the criteria used in the selection process. Further, HomeLoanCenter.com will verify income and employment, review credit, and analyze debt and your equity position in the subject property prior to final loan approval." Id. Additionally, the mailers stated, "This advertisement does not constitute an offer to enter into an interest rate and/or discount prior agreement." Id. The mailers were not firm commitments to make a loan, expressly stating "Not all applicants will be approved."

In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the federal court observed that the parties did not dispute whether Home Loan Center had "express permission to access [plaintiffs'] credit reports," Cavin, at *2. The class action turned "on whether the SmartLoan mailers constituted a 'firm offer of credit'" under the FCRA. Id. Plaintiffs urged that the mailers were "vague and totally lacking in terms," failed to "inform the consumer what is being offered," and failed to disclose that the mortgage is a negative amortization loan. Id., at *2-*3. The defense countered that the mailers "offered a valuable and popular home mortgage loan worth hundreds of thousands of dollars" and that any missing terms were because mortgage loans "have features and terms that cannot be fixed in advance based solely upon data obtained from prescreening programs." Id., at *3. Defense attorneys also argued that plaintiffs could not prove actual damages because they never sought or obtained a loan based on the mailers.Id.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Defense Attorneys Urged to Advise Clients about FACTA Requirements

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), enacted by Congress to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, will become effective in only a matter of days. FACTA requires that credit card receipts provided to customers be modified so that the credit card number shown on the receipt is truncated and so that the expiration date is omitted. Defense attorneys and in-house counsel are encouraged to ensure compliance with FACTA; the author predicts class action lawsuits will be filed alleging FACTA violations within months of its effective date.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News, FCRA Class Actions

Rule 23 Requirements Met in Class Action Alleging FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Violations Against E*Trade Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against E*Trade alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) arising out of a solicitation mailer he received stating that he was pre-approved for a home equity loan and stating that "[i]nformation from a consumer credit report was used in connection with this offer." Murray v. E*Trade Fin, Corp., 240 F.R.D. 392, 2006 WL 3354039, *1 (N.D. Ill. November 20, 2006). Defense attorneys filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the claim for relief in the class action complaint that E*Trade violated the FCRA's disclosure requirements; the district court granted the motion agreeing with the defense that no private right of action exists for such violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d). Id. The court denied defense efforts to obtain dismissal of the balance of the class action complaint. Plaintiff's lawyer then moved the court to certify the lawsuit as a class action; the court rejected defense arguments in opposition to the motion and granted class action certification, finding that the requirements of Rule 23(a) were met and that the class action satisfied also the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

The district court analyzed each of the Rule 23 requirements for certification of a class action, but " E*Trade refutes only the adequacy of Murray as class representative," Murray, at *2, so we do not here discuss the court's analysis supporting its finding that numerosity, commonality and typicality were met. See id., at *2-*4. With respect to the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), a district court must examine the adequacy of both the proposed class representative and the proposed class counsel, and determine whether "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class." Id., at *5. The court readily concluded that proposed class counsel would adequately represent the class based on the firm's class action experience, and noted that even E*Trade "praised" its experience. Id.

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Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Defense Attorneys Urged to Advise Clients about FACTA Requirements

As we previously noted, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) is scheduled to take effect in December, 2006. Congress requires that credit card receipts provided to customers be modified so that the information contained on them no longer serves as a ready source for credit card fraud or identity theft. Under FACTA, the credit card number shown on the customer copy of the credit card receipt must be truncated and the expiration date must be omitted. Class action defense attorneys are encouraged to be proactive in warning their clients about the statute before the law becomes effective.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News, FCRA Class Actions

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. To make it perfectly clear that Congress intended to achieve its goals for the FCRA, it specifically enacted legislation prohibiting companies from avoiding the effects of the law, providing in Section 1681x:

§ 1681x. Corporate and technological circumvention prohibited

The Commission shall prescribe regulations, to become effective not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this section, to prevent a consumer reporting agency from circumventing or evading treatment as a consumer reporting agency described in section 1681a(p) of this title for purposes of this title, including—

(1) by means of a corporate reorganization or restructuring, including a merger, acquisition, dissolution, divestiture, or asset sale of a consumer reporting agency; or

(2) by maintaining or merging public record and credit account information in a manner that is substantially equivalent to that described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1681a(p) of this title, in the manner described in section 1681a(p) of this title.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress enacted legislation concerning the disposal of records as follows:

§ 1681w. Disposal of records

(a) Regulations

(1) In general.

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission with respect to the entities that are subject to their respective enforcement authority under section 1681s of this title, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in coordination as described in paragraph (2), shall issue final regulations requiring any person that maintains or otherwise possesses consumer information, or any compilation of consumer information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose to properly dispose of any such information or compilation.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. In addition to the statutory provision discussed earlier concerning disclosure of consumer information to the FBI for counterintelligence purposes, Congress enacted rules governing disclosure of such information to governmental agencies for counterterrorism purposes:

§ 1681v. Disclosures to governmental agencies for counterterrorism purposes

(a) Disclosure.

Notwithstanding section 1681b of this title or any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish a consumer report of a consumer and all other information in a consumer' s file to a government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, international terrorism when presented with a written certification by such government agency that such information is necessary for the agency' s conduct or such investigation, activity or analysis.

(b) Form of certification.

The certification described in subsection (a) shall be signed by a supervisory official designated by the head of a Federal agency or an officer of a Federal agency whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(c) Confidentiality.

No consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent of such consumer reporting agency, shall disclose to any person, or specify in any consumer report, that a government agency has sought or obtained access to information under subsection (a).

(d) Rule of construction.

Nothing in section 1681u of this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section.

(e) Safe harbor.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any consumer reporting agency or agent or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or other information pursuant to this section in good-faith reliance upon a certification of a governmental agency pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be liable to any person for such disclosure under this subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for class action defense attorneys who defend against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress enacted special rules governing the disclosure of consumer information to the FBI for purposes of counterintelligence, as set forth in Section 1681u which provides:

§ 1681u. Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes

(a) Identity of financial institutions.

Notwithstanding section 1681b of this title or any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the names and addresses of all financial institutions (as that term is defined in section 3401 of Title 12) at which a consumer maintains or has maintained an account, to the extent that information is in the files of the agency, when presented with a written request for that information, signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director' s designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field office designated by the Director, which certifies compliance with this section. The Director or the Director's designee may make such a certification only if the Director or the Director's designee has determined in writing, that such information is sought for the conduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

(b) Identifying information.

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1681b of this title or any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying information respecting a consumer, limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when presented with a written request, signed by the Director or the Director's designee, which certifies compliance with this subsection. The Director or the Director' s designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field office designated by the Director may make such a certification only if the Director or the Director' s designee has determined in writing that such information is sought for the conduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

Illinois Federal Court Grants in Part Motion to Certify Class Action but Dismisses FCRA § 1681m Disclosure Violation Claim

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Home Loan Center alleging that it violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., by accessing their credit. Cavin v. Home Loan Center, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The plaintiffs’ lawyer filed a motion for class certification, together with a motion to compel discovery; defense lawyers argued inter alia that FCRA does not permit private rights of action for alleged violations of the disclosure requirements imposed by FCRA § 1681m. The district court granted in part and denied in part both motions. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1681m claim, agreeing with defense attorneys that no such claim could be maintained.

The lawsuit arose out of three letters sent to plaintiffs by Home Loan Center concerning a “‘prescreened’ offer of credit [that] is based on information in your credit report indicating that you meet certain criteria.” Unless authorized by the consumer, the FCRA prohibits credit reporting agencies from disclosing consumer information unless “the request is in connection with a ‘firm offer of credit.’” Cavin, at 390 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)). Plaintiffs alleged that the letters were not “firm offers of credit” and, accordingly, the lender violated § 1681n, and they alleged further that the letters violated the disclosure requirements contained in § 1681m. Id. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which the district court granted for reasons summarized in the Note below.

Continue reading "Cavin v. Home Loan Center-Class Action Defense Cases: Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) Prohibits Private Right Of Action For Violations Of § 1681m’s Disclosure Requirement Illinois District Court Holds" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress provided for the relation to State laws in Section 1681t as follows:

§ 1681t. Relation to State laws

(a) In general.

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, or for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.

(b) General exceptions.

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State

(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under

(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b of this title, relating to the prescreening of consumer reports;

(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in a consumer' s file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996;

(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m of this title, relating to the duties of a person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;

(D) section 1681m(d) of this title, relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;

(E) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in consumer reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996;

(F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply

(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996); or

(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996);

(G) section 1681g(e) of this title, relating to information available to victims under section 1681g(e) of this title;

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for class action defense attorneys who defend against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress specifically addressed the issue of the sharing of consumer information among affiliates, providing as follows in Section 1681s-3:

§ 1681s-3. Affiliate sharing

(a) Special Rule for Solicitation for Purposes of Marketing

(1) Notice.

Any person that receives from another person related to it by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control a communication of information that would be a consumer report, but for clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of section 1681a(d)(2)(A) of this title, may not use the information to make a solicitation for marketing purposes to a consumer about its products or services, unless—

(A) it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be communicated among such persons for purposes of making such solicitations to the consumer; and

(B) the consumer is provided an opportunity and a simple method to prohibit the making of such solicitations to the consumer by such person.

(2) Consumer Choice

(A) In general.

The notice required under paragraph (1) shall allow the consumer the opportunity to prohibit all solicitations referred to in such paragraph, and may allow the consumer to choose from different options when electing to prohibit the sending of such solicitations, including options regarding the types of entities and information covered, and which methods of delivering solicitations the consumer elects to prohibit.

(B) Format.

Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the notice required under paragraph (1) shall be clear, conspicuous, and concise, and any method provided under paragraph (1)(B) shall be simple. The regulations prescribed to implement this section shall provide specific guidance regarding how to comply with such standards.

(3) Duration

(A) In general.

The election of a consumer pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) to prohibit the making of solicitations shall be effective for at least 5 years, beginning on the date on which the person receives the election of the consumer, unless the consumer requests that such election be revoked.

(B) Notice upon expiration of effective period.

At such time as the election of a consumer pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) is no longer effective, a person may not use information that the person receives in the manner described in paragraph (1) to make any solicitation for marketing purposes to the consumer, unless the consumer receives a notice and an opportunity, using a simple method, to extend the opt-out for another period of at least 5 years, pursuant to the procedures described in paragraph (1).

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for class action defense attorneys who defend against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress outlined in detail the responsibilities of those who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies in Section 1681s-2 as follows:

§ 1681s-2. Responsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies

(a) Duty of Furnishers of Information to Provide Accurate Information

(1) Prohibition

(A) Reporting information with actual knowledge of errors.

A person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate.

(B) Reporting information after notice and confirmation of errors.

A person shall not furnish information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if

(i) the person has been notified by the consumer, at the address specified by the person for such notices, that specific information is inaccurate; and

(ii) the information is, in fact, inaccurate.

(C) No address requirement.

A person who clearly and conspicuously specifies to the consumer an address for notices referred to in subparagraph (B) shall not be subject to subparagraph (A); however, nothing in subparagraph (B) shall require a person to specify such an address.

(D) Definition.

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate” means having specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information.

(2) Duty to correct and update information.

A person who

(A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to one or more consumer reporting agencies about the person's transactions or experiences with any consumer; and

(B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency information that the person determines is not complete or accurate, shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency of that determination and provide to the agency any corrections to that information, or any additional information, that is necessary to make the information provided by the person to the agency complete and accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any of the information that remains not complete or accurate.

(3) Duty to provide notice of dispute.

If the completeness or accuracy of any information furnished by any person to any consumer reporting agency is disputed to such person by a consumer, the person may not furnish the information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that such information is disputed by the consumer.

(4) Duty to provide notice of closed accounts.

A person who regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a consumer who has a credit account with that person shall notify the agency of the voluntary closure of the account by the consumer, in information regularly furnished for the period in which the account is closed.

(5) Duty to Provide Notice of Delinquency of Accounts

(A) In general.

A person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a delinquent account being placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action shall, not later than 90 days after furnishing the information, notify the agency of the date of delinquency on the account, which shall be the month and year of the commencement of the delinquency on the account that immediately preceded the action.

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. The FCRA specifically addresses the question of information needed in connection with overdue child support obligations as follows:

§ 1681s-1. Information on overdue child support obligations

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall include in any consumer report furnished by the agency in accordance with section 1681b of this title, any information on the failure of the consumer to pay overdue support which

(1) is provided

(A) to the consumer reporting agency by a State or local child support enforcement agency; or

(B) to the consumer reporting agency and verified by any local, State, or Federal government agency; and

(2) antedates the report by 7 years or less.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. The article sets forth the statutory provisions concerning administrative enforcement of the FCRA by the Federal Trade Commission:

§ 1681s. Administrative enforcement

(a) (1) Enforcement by Federal Trade Commission. Compliance with the requirements imposed under this title shall be enforced under the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.] by the Federal Trade Commission with respect to consumer reporting agencies and all other persons subject thereto, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this title is specifically committed to some other government agency under subsection (b) hereof. For the purpose of the exercise by the Federal Trade Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation of any requirement or prohibition imposed under this title shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. § 45(a)] and shall be subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission under section 5(b) thereof [15 U.S.C. § 45(b)] with respect to any consumer reporting agency or person subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this subsection, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission shall have such procedural, investigative, and enforcement powers, including the power to issue procedural rules in enforcing compliance with the requirements imposed under this title and to require the filing of reports, the production of documents, and the appearance of witnesses as though the applicable terms and conditions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were part of this title. Any person violating any of the provisions of this title shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act as though the applicable terms and provisions thereof were part of this title.

(2) (A) In the event of a knowing violation, which constitutes a pattern or practice of violations of this title, the Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person that violates this title. In such action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $2,500 per violation.

(B) In determining the amount of a civil penalty under subparagraph (A), the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), a court may not impose any civil penalty on a person for a violation of section 1681s-2(a)(1) of this title unless the person has been enjoined from committing the violation, or ordered not to commit the violation, in an action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, and has violated the injunction or order, and the court may not impose any civil penalty for any violation occurring before the date of the violation of the injunction or order.

(b) Enforcement by other agencies.

Compliance with the requirements imposed under this title with respect to consumer reporting agencies, persons who use consumer reports from such agencies, persons who furnish information to such agencies, and users of information that are subject to subsection (d) of section 1681m of this title shall be enforced under

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Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for class action defense attorneys who must defend against actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. The statutory provisions concerning obtaining information under false pretenses and concerning unauthorized disclosure by officers or employees are set forth in Sections 1681q and 1681r, respectively, as follows:

§ 1681q. Obtaining information under false pretenses

Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

§ 1681r. Unauthorized disclosures by officers or employees

Any officer or employee of a consumer reporting agency who knowingly and willfully provides information concerning an individual from the agency's files to a person not authorized to receive that information shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules