Class Action Defense Blog

Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment for Defense in Class Action by Engineers, Employed by Firms Working under Contract for County, because Engineers were not “Common Law Employees” of County California State Court Holds

Plaintiff-engineers filed a putative class action against the County of Los Angeles alleging that they had been designated improperly as employees of the independent contractors hired to perform work for the County, rather than as employees of the County itself. Holmgren v. County of Los Angeles, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, 613 (Cal.App. 2008). As authorized by the California Government Code, Los Angeles outsourced engineering work to two firms: “The engineers were employees of the contracting firms and paid by the contracting firms, and all signed written acknowledgements that they were not employees of the County and not entitled to any of the benefits available to County employees.” Id., at 612. Nonetheless, plaintiffs filed the class action complaint alleging that they were “common law employees” of the County and, as such, entitled to benefits under the County’s retirement plan. Id., at 612-13. The “theme” of the class action complaint was that even though plaintiffs were paid by the independent contractor and designated as a contract employees, they had been “screened, interviewed, and effectively hired by the County; worked solely on County business; had [their] salary fixed by the County; [were] subject to the direct supervision and control of the County; and used County facilities, equipment and supplies to perform County business.” Id., at 613-14. The class action further alleged that plaintiffs performed the same work as, and worked side-by-side with, “recognized County employees,” but for lower pay and without receiving the benefits of County employees. Id., at 614. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class action treatment of the lawsuit, id., but decided three critical “threshold” issues in favor of the County that effectively eviscerated the class action, see id., at 614-15. Accordingly, plaintiffs stipulated to entry of judgment in favor of the County and appealed, id., at 615. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the engineers were not County employees.

The facts underlying the class action claims were as follows: The County entered into “Master Agreements” with two firms for engineering services pursuant to which each firm would supply the County with the firm’s own employees, bill the County for work performed, and receive payment from the County. The Master Agreement provided that each firm was “solely liable” for the compensation and benefits of their employees, and expressly prohibited the County from soliciting the firms’ engineers. Holmgren, at 613. The named plaintiffs in the putative class action each acknowledged, in writing, that they were not County employees and that they “do not have and will not acquire any rights or salary benefits of any kind from the County of Los Angeles by virtue of my performance of work [for the County].” Id. and n.1. The class action alleged that plaintiffs were “temporary” or “leased” employees, entitled to County benefits, id., at 613.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Holmgren v. County of Los Angeles: California State Court Affirms Judgment Adverse To Class Action Plaintiffs Holding Engineers Of Firms Under Contract With County Were Not Common Law Employees Of County" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Derivative Claims Challenging Severance Package Paid by HP to Former CEO Dismissed for Failure to Make Requisite Demand on Board and Failure to Establish Futility California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Hewlett-Packard, its former chief executive officer, Carleton Fiorina, and various other individual defendants challenging the severance package HP paid Fiorina. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Dunn, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. March 28, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The class action complaint outlined Fiorina’s role in HP’s merger with Compaq, over board member Walter Hewlett’s vigorous opposition, and alleged that Fiorina and HP used knowingly false financial projections to secure approval of the merger. Id., at 2-3. The class action also alleged that after the merger was characterized as a failure, HP fired Fiorina and paid her more than $40 million in benefits, including a $21.4 million severance package that, plaintiffs allege, was aimed at “mak[ing] sure that Fiorina kept quiet about the Compaq merger debacle.” Id., at 3. The second amended class action complaint charges that Fiorina’s severance package were ‘far in excess” of “the express terms of the Company’s Severance Policies,” id. The gravamen of the complaint was that Fiorina termination was “involuntarily” and, accordingly, “she was not entitled to any accelerated vesting of payments under HP’s Long-Term Performance Cash (‘LTPC’) Program.” Id., at 3-4. Defense attorneys for HP and the individual defendants moved to dismiss the class action; the district court granted the motion.

The defense motion to dismiss the class action advanced two main arguments. First, defense attorneys argued that the class action complaint’s derivative claims failed because plaintiffs never made the requisite demand on HP’s board of directors. Dunn, at 8. The district court explained that “[a] shareholder seeking to vindicate the interests of a corporation through a derivative suit must first demand action from the corporation's directors or plead with particularity the reasons why such demand would have been futile.” Id., at 8-9 (citing In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because the laws of the state in which HP is incorporated govern whether it would be futile to make the requisite demand and because HP is incorporated in Delaware, the court analyzed futility under Delaware law. Id., at 9. Based on its detailed factual analysis, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ counter that making the requisite demand on the board would have been futile. See id., at 9-14. The district court also concluded that the business judgment rule insulates the board’s decision to pay Fiorina the $21 million severance. Id., at 14. The court explained at pages 14 and 15 that it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to “allege facts sufficient to rebut a presumption that the decision was a result of a valid exercise of business judgment.” Based on the federal court’s analysis, plaintiffs failed to rebut this presumption, see id., at 15-17, and failed to establish that the board’s acts were ultra vires, see id., at 17-21.

Continue reading "HP Class Action Defense Cases–Indiana Electrical Workers v. Dunn: California Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Challenging $21.4 Million Severance Package Hewlett-Packard Paid Former CEO Fiorina" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

ERISA Class Action Barred by Plaintiff’s Prior Lawsuit Against IBM thus Supporting Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action New York Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in New York against his former employer’s pension plan and its administrator alleging violations of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) by failing to pay him plan benefits. Adams v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 533 F.Supp.2d 342, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the grounds that res judicata barred plaintiff’s claim “as the result of Adams's prior action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in which the court granted the summary judgment motion filed against Adams by IBM, the only defendant in that action.” Id. Plaintiff’s lawyer argued that res judicata did not bar the current class action because the prior lawsuit was against IBM, not the plan or the plan’s administrator, id. Because the parties in the two actions differed – IBM in the Georgia action, and the Plan and Plan Administrator in the New York action – the only way res judicata would apply would be “if the Court finds either that the Plan and Plan Administrator are ‘privies’ of IBM, or that an exception to the mutuality requirement for res judicata applies.” Id. Because the federal court found that IBM, and the Plan and Plan Administrator, are “closely related,” it held that res judicata applied. Id., at 344. Specifically, the prior action alleged the “same misconduct” and it appears that plaintiff erred in filing his first lawsuit against IBM rather than the plan and its administrator, id. The district court concluded at page 344, “In these circumstances, and particularly where the party seeking to avoid claim preclusion was the plaintiff in the prior action and the sole source of the error in naming the incorrect party, res judicata should bar the plaintiff from gaining a second opportunity to litigate the very same claims, even where complete identity between the parties is lacking.” Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss the class action, id.¸at 345.

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Alleging Fraud Under RICO in Advertising of Light Cigarettes Fails to Satisfy Prerequisites for Class Action Certification Under Rule 23 because Individual Issues Predominate Second Circuit Holds

Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York certified a class action against Philip Morris USA, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Ligget Group, American Tobacco Co., Altria Group, and British American Tobacco; the underlying class action complaint alleged the tobacco companies duped smokers into believing that “light” cigarettes were less harmful to them. <i>See Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.</i>, 449 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). We have previously reported on the district court’s 540-page opinion in that class action, and a copy of that summary may be found here. The theory underlying the class action was that defendants deceived smokers “by convincing them that smoking ‘light’ cigarettes was safer for their health.” 449 F.Supp.2d at 1018. As the Second Circuit explained, the class action claims were “brought as based in fraud under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)…, but under RICO, each plaintiff must prove reliance, injury, and damages.” McLaughlin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. April 3, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 4]. Accordingly, the Circuit Court reversed class action certification, finding that “Plaintiffs’ putative class action suffers from an insurmountable deficit of collective legal or factual questions.” Id.

The district court based its certification of the class action on its belief that there was “evidence of fraud on the class appears to be quite strong”: “If, as contended by plaintiffs, a huge fraud was perpetrated on tens of millions of people causing them billions of dollars in loss—measured largely by the difference between the value people were led to believe they were getting when they bought ‘light’ cigarettes for safety, and what they received, a non-safe product—recovery dependent on proof should be allowed.” Schwab, at 1021. The district court explained at page 1018:

Continue reading "Cigarette Class Action Defense Cases–McLaughlin v. Philip Morris: Second Circuit Reverses Certification Of Class Action Alleging Deceptive Advertising Of "Light" Cigarettes Holding Individual Questions of Reliance Predominate" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

In Considering Class Action Certification in 28 Labor Law Class Action Lawsuits Centralized by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19 Cases Satisfied Class Action Prerequisites but 9 other Putative Class Actions would Require Individualized Inquiries Sufficient to Defeat Class Action Treatment Indiana Federal Court Holds

Numerous class action lawsuits were filed against FedEx Ground alleging that the company misclassified its pickup and delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees; the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the class actions in the Northern District of Indiana, and the plaintiffs in the class action cases characterized as “Wave 1,” “Wave 2” and “Wave 3” moved the district court for class action certification. In re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Prac. Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Ind. March 25, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. As the federal court summarized, these class action plaintiffs “assert that although FedEx Ground represents to its drivers that they are only partnering with FedEx Ground and will essentially own their own businesses, all FedEx Ground drivers sign the FedEx Ground Operating Agreement, which actually reserves to FedEx Ground the right to exercise pervasive control over the method, manner, and means of the drivers’ work,” id. FedEx opposed class action treatment, arguing that “the plaintiffs’ claims turn on individualized issues, including whether contractors should be classified as employees under the states’ statutory tests, and whether any individual contractor can meet the high bar for rescission of his individual contract.” Id., at 2. In a 164-page opinion, the district court certified the Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3 cases as class actions with respect to cases involving drivers from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin; the court denied class action treatment for drivers from Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota and Virginia. Id., at 3. The district court noted that it had previously granted class action certification with respect to drivers from Kansas, id., at 9, bringing to 20 the total number of states for which class action treatment has been approved.

Given the extraordinary length and detail of the district court opinion, we provide here only a broad outline of its holdings. Because it had previously granted class action treatment on behalf of the Kansas drivers, the district court used its prior ruling as a benchmark against which it considered the new class action certification motions. In re FedEx Ground, at 9. The court held that class action complaints containing only former drivers as named-plaintiffs could still proceed as class actions on behalf of former and current drivers because “courts have held that former employees have standing to represent a class consisting of both current and past employees.” Id., at 10 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., id., at 24-25 and 30. But with respect to defense attorney efforts to defeat class action treatment on the ground that individual inquiries would be required to determine whether the Operating Agreements were valid and the manner and extent to which the “right to control” will impact the validity of the Operating Agreements, the federal court rejected this argument with respect to the laws of certain states, see, e.g., id., at 14-16 (Tennessee), 25-27 (Arkansas) and 39-42 (Texas), but agreed with FedEx Ground that common questions would not predominate under the laws of other states, see, e.g., id., at 18-20 (Montana), 20-23 (Mississippi) and 80-84 (Michigan). For example, with respect to the Missouri putative class action, the district court explained that class action certification was not warranted because “Whether FedEx Ground has the right to control its drivers within the meaning of Missouri agency law cannot be resolved by simple reference to the Operating Agreements and corporate policies.” Id., at 105. Rather, “Missouri courts define the ‘right to control’ with reference to the actual exercise of control, [citation], which will require a driver-by-driver, terminal-by-terminal, supervisor-by-supervisor analysis that is unnecessary in most other states.” Id., at 105-06. This presented the primary basis for the difference among states for which the court certified class actions and states for which it denied motions for class certification.

Continue reading "FedEx Class Action Defense Cases–In re FedEx Ground: Indiana Federal Court Grants Class Action Treatment In 19 Labor Law Class Action Cases Alleging Misclassification Of Pickup/Delivery Drivers But Denies Certification In 9 Other Class Actions" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Defendant in Securities Fraud Class Action Failed to Establish Grounds to Transfer Class Action to New York, Particularly in Light of Defendant’s Waiver in Deposit Agreement to Right to Challenge Venue California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action in California federal court against Himax Technologies alleging securities fraud in connection with the initial public offering of Himax stock; a related class action, entitled Oh v. Chan, CV 07-4891 DDP (AJWx), also has been filed, and a motion seeking “to certify a securities class action for substantially similar claims” is pending in that action. Pfeiffer v. Himax Technologies, Inc., 530 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Defense attorneys filed a motion to transfer the class action to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); plaintiffs in both class actions filed a competing motion, seeking to consolidate the putative class actions. Id., at 1123. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to transfer venue, and the Oh plaintiffs filed papers also opposing transfer, id. The district court denied the motion to transfer venue.

By seeking to transfer the class action to New York under § 1404(a), defense attorneys argued that “the convenience of parties and witnesses” warranted transfer, and that such transfer would “promote the interests of justice.” Pfeiffer, at 1123. The district court explained at page 1123, “The parties do not dispute that venue would be proper in this district or in the Southern District of New York, nor do they dispute the Southern District of New York's jurisdiction. The parties contest whether transfer of venue will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and promote the interests of justice.” Preliminarily, the district court agreed that plaintiffs’ “choice of forum” was entitled to “only minimal consideration” in this case, because “[t]his is a purported class action lawsuit where Plaintiffs do not reside in the district, the facts did not occur in the district, and the district does not have a local interest in the action.” Id., at 1124. It thus found that “[t]hese factors weigh in favor of transfer of venue.” Id. The federal court further concluded that “convenience to the witnesses and parties” did not “favor either forum.” Id. Nonetheless, based on the court’s analysis of the various factors implicated by venue transfer motions, see id., at 1123-26, it concluded at page 1126 that “the permissive forum selection clause is insufficient to warrant transfer where the IPO documents specifically contemplate Himax's waiver of any challenges to venue in any state or federal court.” Accordingly, it denied the motion to transfer, id. at 1126.

NOTE: The district court quoted the following language from the deposit agreement: “The Company irrevocably and unconditionally waives to the fullest extent permitted by law, any objection that it may now or hereafter have to the laying of venue of any actions, suits or proceeding brought in any court provided in this Section 7.6, and hereby further irrevocably and unconditionally waives and agrees not to plead or claim in any such court that any such action, suits or proceeding brought in any such court has been brought in an inconvenient forum.” Pfeiffer, at 1125. In conjunction with other language in the deposit agreement, the district court concluded that “the deposit agreement contains a waiver to Himax challenging venue in any such action in federal court by a shareholder.” Id.

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

Class Action Treatment Warranted for Class Action Claims Against Health Clubs based on Violations of State Law but not as to Class Action Complaint’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Pennsylvania Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in Pennsylvania state court against three health clubs (Holiday Universal, Scandinavian Health Spa and Bally Total Fitness) alleging violations of Pennsylvania’s Health Club Act and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL); defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court. Allen v. Holiday Universal, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (E.D. Pa. March 11, 2008) [Slip Opn, at 1]. The class action complaint alleged that plaintiffs entered into “Retail Installment Contract” prepared by defendants that required payment of a membership fee ($632 for one of the named plaintiffs, which she financed at 17.50% interest, and $1275 for the other named plaintiff, which he financed at 13% interest) and monthly dues; the health club memberships renewed automatically. Id., at 3. The theory underlying the class action was that the health clubs charged “grossly excessive initiation fees” in violation of Pennsylvania state law. Id. Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, id., at 2; defense attorneys opposed the motion. The federal court found the elements of Rule 23 satisfied and granted plaintiffs’ request for class action treatment.

The defense first argued that the definition of the proposed class was overly broad because it included within its sweep individuals who suffered no damage because they wanted, accepted and benefited from the health club memberships. Allen, at 6-8. The district court disagreed, holding that if the initiation fees were excessive under Pennsylvania law then every member of the proposed class action suffered damage, regardless of whether they wanted and utilized the health club services, id., at 8. The district court also rejected a claim that the class action’s definition of the class was improper because it created a “‘fail/safe’ class, that is, membership in a portion of the Class depends upon a finding for Plaintiffs’ on the merits.” Id., at 15. In essence, the defense argued that inclusion in the class turned on whether a particular health club was owned by defendant Bally Holding; plaintiffs countered that club ownership was not the “central issue of liability” presented by the class action and, accordingly, there was no improper “fail/safe” class. Id., at 15-16. The district court agreed with plaintiffs, and noted that “the question of whether any particular health club in Pennsylvania is owned by the Health Clubs is a question of fact not central to the question of liability and easily answered through further discovery.” Id., at 16. However, the federal court made it clear that it “expect[ed] the parties to promptly clarify any remaining confusion as to this issue.” Id. (The court also rejected a “ratification” argument, but that is not summarized here. See id., at 8-15.)

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases–Allen v. Holiday Universal: Pennsylvania Federal Court Certifies Class Action Against Health Clubs Alleging Excessive Membership Fees In Violation Of State Law But Denies Class Action Treatment Of Unjust Enrichment Claim" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Securities Class Action Claims Pending in California Paralleled Class Action Claims in Delaware and Colorado River Factors Supported Stay of California Class Action California Federal Court Holds

Several class action lawsuits were filed against Countrywide Financial Corp. and others alleging violations of various state and federal securities laws, including class action complaints that were filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2-3]. Last Friday, the California district court addressed three separate motions that “generally relate to the series of cases before [it] and other courts involving Countrywide…, Bank of America…, and several current and former Countrywide directors and officers.” Id., at 1. The district court summarized four separate categories of class action lawsuits that had been filed in state and federal courts against Countrywide prior to the announced merger with Bank of America, see id., at 3-6, as well as the various state and federal class action complaints filed immediately after the announced merger, see id., at 7-8. One of the pre-merger series of class action lawsuits “consolidated under Arkansas Teachers, No. CV-07-06923,” were filed in the California federal court “alleging that Countrywide directors engaged in an extensive pattern of misconduct in disregard of their fiduciary duties to the corporation,” id., at 6, and plaintiffs a 200-page amended consolidated class action complaint after the announcement of the merger to add class action claims against Bank of America, id., at 8-9.

The district court first addressed the defense motion to stay Arkansas Teachers in favor of litigation pending in Delaware. In re Countrywide, at 9. The court concluded that “the federal and state class action merger claims are substantially similar,” id., at 10-11; accordingly, “the ‘parallelism requirement for a [Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)] stay is easily met due to the striking similarity of the class action claims in Arkansas Teachers and Freedman,” id., at 11. The federal court next held that partial stays are permissible under Colorado River, id., at 12-13, and that it would issue such a stay in this case because “while the class action claims are sufficiently parallel, the Delaware case does not contain the derivative claims present in this case,” id., at 11-12. The court’s Colorado River analysis may be found at pages 14 through 16 of the slip opinion.

Continue reading "Countrywide Class Action Defense Cases--In re Countrywide: California Federal Court Stays Class Action Claims Against Countrywide And Denies Plaintiffs' Motion For Constructive Trust/Preliminary Injunction And Plaintiffs' Request For Expedited Discovery" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) Class Action Claims did not Warrant Interlocutory Appeal Minnesota Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Seagate, alleging age discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Peterson v. Seagate U.S. LLC, 534 F.Supp.2d 996, 2008 WL 398968, *1 (D.Minn. 2008). The putative class action also sought “declaratory relief relating to the enforceability of a purported release and waiver that was signed by many of the plaintiffs upon the termination of their employment with Seagate.” Id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action as to “the claims of those named plaintiffs that signed a release and waiver”; the district court denied the motion, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Id. Defense attorneys requested that the district court certify the issue for interlocutory appeal, id. The district court denied the motion.

Defense attorneys sought certification on two grounds: “1) whether nineteen plaintiffs who failed to file an EEOC charge properly exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to their age discrimination claims; and 2) whether the SIRP Release that plaintiff Paul Calcagno signed in connection with Defendants' 2004 voluntary early retirement program is valid and enforceable.” Peterson, at *1. The district court noted that such certification is only appropriate if the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). The court concluded that this test was not satisfied.

Continue reading "ADEA Class Action Defense Cases-Peterson v. Seagate: Minnesota Federal Court Denies Motion To Certify Interlocutory Appeal Of Order Denying Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Claims In Age Discrimination Class Action" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Defense Motion for Summary Judgment in Labor Law Class Action Properly Granted because Employee Incentive Compensation Plan did not Violate California law by Providing for Forfeiture of Stock for Following Resignation or Termination for Cause During Plan’s Two-Year Vesting Period California State Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against their employer, Citigroup, alleging violations of California’s Labor Code; specifically, the class action alleged that the financial brokerage company’s voluntary incentive compensation plan - which “allows participants the option of using a portion of their annual earnings to purchase shares in the company's stock at a price below the stock's publicly-traded market price” but provides further that “[i]f the participating employee resigns or is terminated for cause within a two-year vesting period, the employee forfeits the stock as well as the money used to purchase it” - violates California law because the money used to purchase the shares were wages and their forfeiture constituted a conversion of wages. Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 159 Cal.App.4th 10, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 776, 778 (Cal.App. 2008). Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the class action. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The appellate court framed the issue as follows: “Do the forfeiture provisions of this voluntary incentive compensation plan violate Labor Code sections 201 and 202, which require an employer to pay its employee all earned but unpaid compensation following the employee's discharge or his or her voluntary termination of employment?” Schachter, at 778 (footnote omitted). In brief, the Plan permitted employees to purchase company stock “at a 25 percent discount below the stock's then-current market price,” but the stock “could not be sold, transferred, pledged or assigned during a two-year period, which commenced on the date the stock was initially acquired.” Id., at 779. During this two-year vesting period, the employees received any stock dividends and exercised the right to vote their shares. At the end of the two-year period, the stock fully vested in the employee, but if “the employee voluntarily terminated his or her employment or was terminated for cause during the two-year period, he or she forfeited the shares, as well as the money used to purchase them.” Id. The employee could contribute from 5-25% of their compensation to the program, id. n.4, and employees who retired or were involuntarily terminated without cause were not subject to the forfeiture provisions of the Plan, id. n.7. The appellate court concluded at page 778, “As a matter of economic reality, employees who elect to participate in the plan's stock-purchase program are paid all the wages they designate to invest in company stock. Thus, the plan's forfeiture provisions do not violate the Labor Code; and the trial court in this case properly granted summary judgment in favor of the brokerage company.”

Continue reading "Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases-Schachter v. Citigroup: California State Court Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In Labor Law Class Action Challenging Forfeiture Provisions Of Voluntary Employee Incentive Compensation Plan" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Trial Court Erred in Holding that Class Action Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) Alleging Failure to Disclose Artificial Coloring of Farm Raised Salmon was Preempted by Federal Law because Congress Allows “Identical” State Laws and did not Preclude Private Rights of Action to Enforce such State Laws California Supreme Court Holds

Class action lawsuits were filed against various grocery stores alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) by “[selling] artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing to consumers the use of color additives”; ultimately, the separate class actions were coordinated and in March 2004 a coordinated class action complaint was filed. Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.4th ___, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 116 (Cal. 2008). The coordinated class action complaint that alleged “fish farmers feed farm-raised salmon the chemicals astaxanthin and canthaxanthin to obtain a color of flesh resembling that of wild salmon,” that without these chemicals the farm-raised salmon would appear “grayish,” and that “consumers believe the color of salmon is an indication of its origin, quality, freshness, flavor, and other characteristics.” Id. According to the class action allegations, consumers are misled into believing that colored farm-raised salmon is actually wild salmon, id. The class action further alleged that artificially colored salmon raises health concerns, and that state and federal laws “require food labeling to state that farmed salmon is artificially colored and defendants failed to comply with those requirements.” Id. Defense attorneys demurred to the class action complaint in part on the ground that the state law claims were preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which precludes private enforcement; the trial court agreed and dismissed the class action. Id., at 116-17. The Court of Appeal also held that plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted by the FDCA because they are “predicated on a violation of the FDCA”; it therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. Id., at 117. The California Supreme Court reversed.

After summarizing that the FDCA prohibits the misbranding of any food, and that “a food is…deemed misbranded if ‘[i]t bears or contains any ... artificial coloring ... unless it bears labeling stating that fact ....,’” the Supreme Court noted that “FDA regulations permit the use of the chemical substances astaxanthin and canthaxanthin in ‘the feed of salmonid fish’ as color additives ‘to enhance the pink to orange-red color of the flesh of salmonid fish.’” Farm Raised Salmon, at 117 (citations omitted). The FDA provides various means of disclosing the existence of these chemicals, the presence of which “must be declared as prescribed by the FDA,” id., at 117-18 (citations omitted). Congress also enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) “to create uniform national standards regarding the labeling of food and to prevent states from adopting inconsistent requirements with respect to the labeling of nutrients.” Id., at 118 (citation omitted). The NLEA thus expressly preempts state laws that affect “any food in interstate commerce,” including “any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by section ... 343(k) of this title that is not identical to the requirement of such section,” id. (citation omitted). Thus, state laws impliedly “may establish their own requirements pertaining to the labeling of artificially colored food so long as their requirements are identical to those contained in the FDCA in section 343(k).” Id.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Farm Raised Salmon Cases: California Supreme Court Holds Class Action Concerning Artificially Colored Salmon Not Preempted By Federal Law And Reverses Dismissal Of Class Action" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Defense Judgment in Class Action for Kickback and Markup Violations of RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) Proper because Increased Credit Report Fee Requested by Lender was Passed through to Borrowers and no Additional Business was Given in Exchange for New Pricing Policy Requested by Lender Eleventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Countrywide Home Loans and Landsafe Credit (each subsidiaries of Countrywide Financial) alleging violations of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA); the class action complaint alleged that Countrywide obtained virtually all of its credit reports from Landsafe, that prior to August 2002 Landsafe charged Countrywide $25 per credit report, and that Countrywide passed this fee on to borrowers who “locked in” or obtained a loan from Countrywide, but absorbed the fee if the loan did not go through. Krupa v. Landsafe, Inc., 514 F.3d 1153, 1154-55 (11th Cir. 2008). The class action alleged further that Countrywide asked Landsafe to modify its pricing policy in order to allow Countrywide to avoid absorbing credit report fees; specifically, “Countrywide asked Landsafe to change its pricing policy to charge more for the cost of credit reports on applicants who locked in loans and nothing for the reports on applicants who did not.” Id., at 1155. Landsafe modified its pricing schedule in August 2002, charging $35 for the credit report if a loan closed, and nothing if the loan did not; Countrywide passed the $35 fee on if a loan closed. Id. The class action alleged that this modification violated the anti-kickback and anti-markup provisions of RESPA; defense attorneys moved for and obtained summary judgment, with the district court agreeing that the challenged conduct was not improper. Id., at 1155. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

In discussing the pricing change, the Eleventh Circuit noted at page 1155, “The price point was set so that the new pricing policy would be ‘revenue-neutral,’ and it achieved that goal: Landsafe's revenues from the credit reports it sold to Countrywide were the same after the new policy was implemented as they had been before.” Nonetheless, plaintiffs complained that Landsafe was giving Countrywide “free credit reports” in connection with loan transactions that did not close. Krupa, at 1155. The district court had held “that the revised pricing policy did not violate RESPA's anti-kickback provision because it is undisputed that: (1) Landsafe made no more or less money as a result; and (2) Countywide purchased the same percentage (virtually all) of the credit reports it needed from Landsafe as it had before the change”; and the Circuit Court agreed. Id. RESPA prohibits paying a kickback in return for referral of business, but here Landsafe already received virtually all of Countrywide’s business: “In order for there to have been a forbidden kickback, there would have to have been an agreement between the two that Countrywide would give Landsafe more of its credit reporting business than it was giving Landsafe before the agreement, or at least an agreement that it would not give Landsafe any less of that business.” id., at 1156. Even if Countrywide received “value” by the changed pricing schedule, it could not constitute a forbidden kickback unless Countrywide promised Landsafe that it would receive business in return. Id. As plaintiffs conceded that this was not the case, the district court did not err in concluding that the class action kickback claim failed as a matter of law. Id.

Continue reading "Countrywide RESPA Class Action Defense Cases-Krupa v. Landsafe: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In RESPA Class Action Holding No Kickback Or Markup Violations Occurred" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

Products Liability Class Action should have been Filed in Minnesota, not Illinois, and Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens Illinois State Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a products liability class action in Illinois state court against Sears Roebuck after he sustained injuries while using a Craftsman GT 5000 Riding Lawnmower. The class action complaint alleged that plaintiff’s right foot got caught in the lawnmower’s blade while he was using it at his home in Minnesota, and that plaintiff had purchased the lawnmower in Minnesota. The class action further alleged that plaintiff had been treated for his injuries at a hospital in Minnesota, and that he received further treatment in Illinois. Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., ___ N.E.2d ___, 2007 WL 4562890 (Ill.App. December 26, 2007). Plaintiff identified as witnesses two individuals who lived in Minnesota. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action based on interstate forum non conveniens, see Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill.2d R. 187). The defense argued the class action should be dismissed because the lawnmower was purchased in Minnesota, plaintiff lives in Minnesota, the accident occurred in Minnesota, and plaintiff’s initial medical treatment was performed in Minnesota. Defense attorneys also argued that no witnesses lived in Cook County, and that the Cook County court’s docket is more congested than the court in Hennepin County. The trial court denied the motion “concluding that defendants had not made a strong factual showing that trying the case in Cook County, as opposed to Minnesota, would be more costly or inconvenient or pose a hardship.” The defense petitioned the appellate court for leave to appeal; the appellate court granted the petition and reversed.

The sole issue on appeal was “whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss based upon interstate forum non conveniens.” The appellate court began by noting that Electrolux Home Products, a co-defendant and the manufacturer of the lawnmower in question, was based in South Carolina and the lawnmower had been manufactured in South Carolina. Sears, on the other hand, has its principal place of business in Illinois, and its laboratory and marketing department, as well as corporate records, are in Illinois, but it did not test the lawnmower in Illinois. The defense argued that the class action should have been filed in Minnesota, and that the trial court “accorded undue weight to the location of Sears' corporate headquarters in [Illinois], especially when none of the personnel or documents relevant to this case are located there.” The appellate court agreed.

Continue reading "Sears Class Action Defense Cases-Berbig v. Sears: Illinois State Court Holds Trial Court Erred In Denying Motion To Dismiss Products Liability Class Action On Grounds Of Forum Non Conveniens" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Opposed by Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of 4 Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, but Transfers Actions to Eastern District of Tennessee

Four class action lawsuits, 2 in the Middle District of Tennessee and 2 in the Eastern District of Tennessee, were filed against various defendants alleging antitrust violations for failing to “compete for the purchase of raw Grade A milk produced, marketed and processed in the Southeast United States.” In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. January 7, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys in all four class actions moved the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) for centralization of the class action litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Middle District of Tennessee. Id. Plaintiffs in the class actions pending in the Middle District of Tennessee supported the defense motion, as did plaintiffs for one of the class actions pending in the Eastern District of Tennessee, id. Plaintiff’s lawyer in the other Eastern District class action opposed pretrial coordination, and argued alternatively for transfer to the Eastern District. Id. The Judicial Panel rejected the argument that “discovery will likely be straightforward” so centralization was unnecessary, id., at 1-2. And while the Panel supported all voluntary efforts to coordinate the various class actions, this did not defeat the motion, id., at 2. But even though the Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits, and though it agreed that either district court would be workable as a transferee court, it noted that there were “[v]arious conflict and caseload concerns within the Middle District [that] made transfer there difficult.” Id. Accordingly, it granted the defense motion and transferred the class action litigation to the Eastern District of Tennessee.

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Federal Securities Class Action Satisfied Rule 23 Requirements for Class Action Treatment but Duration of Class Period must be Limited as Requested by Defense District of Columbia Federal Court Holds

Several federal securities class action lawsuits were filed against various defendants Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and its former accountant KPMG, as well as various officers and directors of Fannie Mae alleging that they “intentionally manipulated earnings and violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (‘GAAP’), causing losses to investors.” In re Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n Securities, Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 247 F.R.D. 32, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2008) (footnote omitted). The class actions were consolidated, and the consolidated class action complaint alleged accounting discrepancies at Fannie Mae in violation of GAAP and inadequate internal controls, id., at 34-35. The class action cited to an SEC investigation and to the Paul Weiss report, each of which confirmed accounting problems at Fannie Mae. Id., at 35-36. The class action alleged that Fannie Mae was ordered to restate its financial statements, and that concerns with these financial reports caused the stock to drop dramatically. Id., at 35. Plaintiffs moved for certification of the litigation as a class action and for appointment of class counsel, id., at 33. Defense attorneys apparently did not oppose class certification per se, id., at 36, but rather objected to the proposed duration of the class period (April 2001 to September 2005) and the identity of the putative class members, id., at 33-34. The district court granted the motion in part.

In addressing whether to grant class action treatment, the district court noted that “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(a) are so clearly met in this case that the defendants raise no opposition to this requirement being satisfied.” In re Federal Nat’l Mortgage, at 37. Defense attorneys did oppose, however, the relevant class period: The parties (other than KPMG) agreed that the start date was April 17, 2001, but while plaintiff sought an end date of September 27, 2005, the defense (except KPMG) sought an end date of December 22, 2004. Id. The defense argued that after December 22, 2004, “it was unreasonable, as a matter of law, for any investor to rely on Fannie Mae's financial statements as a basis to allege that they were a victim under a fraud on the market theory.” Id., at 37-38. The defense selected that date because Fannie Mae issued a corrective disclosure warning on December 22, 2004 that disavowed its earlier financial reports; accordingly, the defense argued that “any purchasers who acquired stock after December 22, 2004, cannot rely on that presumption because Fannie Mae's corrective disclosure cured the fraud on the market and thus rebutted the presumption of reliance, leaving only individual issues of reliance to predominate thereafter.” Id., at 38. The district court agreed.

Continue reading "ERISA Class Action Defense Cases-In re Federal National Mortgage: District Of Columbia Federal Court Grants Motion To Certify Securities Class Action Against Fannie Mae and KPMG But Grants Defense Request To Limit Class Period" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

Class Action Alleging Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Preempted by Federal Law because Class Action Claims were Premised on Alleged Violations of Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for Conduct Governed by HOLA (Home Owners’ Loan Act) and Implementing OTS Regulations Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action in California state court against E*Trade Mortgage alleging violations of the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL); the gravamen of the class action complaint was that E*Trade failed to refund loan rate lock-in fees following the exercise of a right of rescission under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs alleged that they paid a $400 fee to lock in an interest rate but subsequently exercised their 3-day right to rescind the loan transaction under TILA; E*Trade refused to reimburse the $400 fee, and the class action alleged that it was corporate policy not to refund lock-in fees following such rescissions. Id. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and then moved to dismiss the class action complaint on the ground that federal law preempted the UCL claims. Id. The agreed with the defense and dismissed the class action, id.; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Preliminarily, the Ninth Circuit held that the general presumption against federal preemption did not apply to this case because it involved a field long-regulated by the federal government. Silvas, at 1004. Congress enacted the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA) for the purpose of restoring public confidence in federal savings and loan associations, and the Ninth Circuit previously has “described HOLA and its following agency regulations as a ‘radical and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state system,’ and ‘so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control.’” Id., at 1004-05 (citation omitted). Congress provided the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) “broad authority to issue regulations governing thrifts,” and these, too, are afforded preemptive effect. Id., at 1005. Because E*Trade is subject to HOLA and the OTS regulations, see id., at 1006 n.2, and because the false advertising and other UCL claims are expressly preempted by federal law, see id., at 1006-07, the district court did not err in dismissing the class action.

Continue reading "E*Trade TILA Class Action Defense Cases-Silvas v. E*Trade: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of UCL Class Action Premised On TILA Violations For Failure To Refund Loan Lock-In Fees Holding Federal Law Preempted Class Action Claims" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

ERISA Class Action Failed to Establish Violation of Anti-Cutback Rule or Breach of Contract or Fiduciary Duties because Industry-Related Disability Pension was a Welfare Benefit Plan and an Ancillary Benefit Second Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs, as recipients of an Industry-Related Disability Pension (IRD), filed a putative class action against the Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Robinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat’l Pension Fund, Plan A, ___ F. 3d ___, 2008 WL 302610, *1 (2d Cir. February 5, 2008). After the district court certified the litigation as a class action, plaintiff and defense attorneys presented the matter to the federal court for resolution on a stipulated record. Id. We do not here discuss the facts underlying the litigation, see id., at *1-*3; we note only that the Plan expressly provided that the Trustees had “‘the sole and absolute power, authority and discretion’ to interpret and apply the Plan,” id., at *1, and that the district court expressly found “that the IRD is a welfare benefit plan, not a pension plan, as those terms are used in ERISA” and “that the IRD is an ancillary benefit, not an accrued benefit,” id., at *3. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defense, and plaintiffs appealed, id. The Circuit Court affirmed.

The Second Circuit addressed three issues: (1) that the Plan’s earnings limitations violate ERISA’s “anti-cutback” rule; (2) that the earnings limitations constitute a breach of contract; and (3) that the earnings limitations constitute a breach of fiduciary duties. Robinson, at *3. The Circuit Court disagreed. As to the first issue, the Circuit Court “concur[red] completely” with the district court’s conclusion that the IRD is a welfare benefit plan and that it is an ancillary benefit, and noted that “[e]ither of these findings would suffice to exempt the IRD from ERISA's anti-cutback rule.” Id. As to the breach of contract claim, which focused on whether the Plan required “lifetime” benefits be provided, the Circuit Court conducted a detailed analysis of the various definitions in the Plan and the discretion afforded the Trustees to modify the Plan, and concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the Trustees did not breach the contract. Id., at *3-*5. Specifically, the Second Circuit held at page *5, “Read in context, then, the ‘lifetime’ language does not give [plaintiffs] a contractual and absolute right to continue receiving the IRD for their lives.” Finally, as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Second Circuit observed that it is “derive[d] from the contract claim, the ERISA claim, or both,” and so “its survival [depends] on the validity of these latter claims.” Robinson, at *3. Because the district court properly rejected the anti-cutback and breach of contract claims, the breach of fiduciary duty claim could not stand. Id., at *5. (The appeal was dismissed as to one of the named plaintiffs and “those class members over the age of fifty-five” for reasons we do not here discuss. See id., at *5 and n.4.)

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Order Allocating $6.875 Million in Attorney Fees to 79 Class Action Plaintiff Lawyers Following Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Required Reversal because District Court “Abdicated its Responsibility to Ensure that the Individual Awards Recommended by the Fee Committee were Fair and Reasonable” Second Circuit Holds

Various plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against Shell Oil alleging that its Louisiana refineries “produced contaminated gasoline that was purchased and used by thousands of motorists, damaging, inter alia, their fuel gauges.” In re High Sulfur Content Gas. Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 2008 WL 287347, *1 (5th Cir. 2008). The class actions were “consolidated in a federal class action,” id. Shell initiated a program to repair damaged fuel gauges, id. Eventually, the parties agreed to the terms of a class action settlement under which Shell agreed to expand its repair program, pay $3.7 million in damages for class members, and pay $6.875 million in attorney fees and costs: The trial court approved the class action settlement, and “appointed a five-member Fee Committee to allocate the fee award among approximately thirty-two law firms and seventy-nine plaintiffs' attorneys who worked on the case.” Id. The Fee Committee presented its recommendations at an ex parte status conference - none of the other 74 class action plaintiff attorneys knew of the hearing and, also without their knowledge, the proposed order not only discussed allocation of attorney fees but “(a) placed under seal the document prepared by the Fee Committee listing each attorney's fee award…; (b) prohibited each plaintiffs' attorney from disclosing to anyone, including his clients and other attorneys, the amount of his award under penalty of sanctions to be imposed by the court; (c) required fees, costs, and expenses to be ‘distributed immediately;’ (d) mandated that fee award checks bear a full and final release; and (e) established the district court's process for dealing with any objections to fee awards.” Id., at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). The ex parte hearing on allocation of the attorney fees under the class action settlement lasted 20 minutes; the court signed the proposed order “apparently without modification” and sealed the transcript of the hearing on the motion, id., at *3. Some of the attorneys, disgruntled that approximately half of the attorney fee award went to the law firms of the five members of the Fee Committee, requested that the district court reconsider its ruling and unseal the hearing transcript; that failing, they appealed the fee award. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed.

As this case involves the narrow issue of the allocation of attorney fees only, we do not discuss it at length. We note simply that the court order is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and that the appeal involved but a single issue - “the procedures the district court used to allocate the $6.875 million lump-sum attorneys' fee award among plaintiffs' counsel.” In re High Sulfur Content, at *3. The Fifth Circuit reversed the fee allocation order, agreeing with the appellants that the district court “used flawed procedures to award individual attorneys' fees and to review objections to those fees.” Id., at *4. The Circuit Court explained at page *4, “For all practical purposes the five-member Fee Committee controlled the allocation of attorneys' fees in this case.” And while the federal court was entitled to appoint a committee to recommend allocation of attorney fees, “the appointment of a committee does not relieve a district court of its responsibility to closely scrutinize the attorneys' fee allocation, especially when the attorneys recommending the allocation have a financial interest in the resulting awards.” Id. In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that “the district court abdicated its responsibility to ensure that the individual awards recommended by the Fee Committee were fair and reasonable.” Id.

Continue reading "Attorney Fee Awards in Class Action Cases-In re High Sulfur Content Litigation: Fifth Circuit Reverses Portion Of District Court Class Action Settlement Order Allocating Attorney Fees Among Class Action Plaintiff Lawyers For Procedural Defects" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

In an Unpublished Opinion, California Appellate Court Holds that Trial Court did not Abuse Discretion in Denying Petition to Compel Arbitration of Labor Law Class Action on Ground that Defense Attorneys Failed to Prove that Plaintiffs Signed Arbitration Agreement

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, BLH Construction alleging labor law wage and hour claims. Aguilar v. BLH Construction Co., 2007 WL 4418105, *1 (Cal.App. December 19, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration, but the court opinion is silent on the arbitration clause purported to bar class actions or whether the defense sought to enforce a class action arbitration waiver. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs had not signed the arbitration agreement, id. The defense appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion “by not continuing the hearing to permit oral testimony and cross-examination of witnesses on the issue.” Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

BLH hired plaintiffs as construction workers in February 2005 and, on the day they were hired, provided each plaintiff with an employee handbook, a form entitled “Receipt of Handbook and Acknowledgement of At-Will Employment,” and a form entitled “Mutually Binding Arbitration Agreement.” Aguilar, at *1. “Each form had lines for the employee's signature and the date of signing.” Id. As part of the petition to compel arbitration, defense attorneys submitted signed copies of the “Mutually Binding Arbitration Agreement.” Id. Plaintiffs, however, insisted that they had not signed this document and by declaration claimed that their signatures had been forged, id. In response, defense attorneys submitted (1) the declaration of a supervisor stating that he had given plaintiffs the employee documents referenced above and that plaintiffs “signed and dated the two signature pages contained within the Employee Handbook,” (2) the declaration of BLH’s chief operations officer stating that plaintiffs had signed the mutually binding arbitration agreement, and (3) the declaration of BLH’s counsel stating that the signed documents had been obtained from the BLH custodian of records, “and that it was BLH's custom and practice to have each employee sign the arbitration agreement.” Id.

Continue reading "Arbitration Class Action Defense Cases-Aguilar v. BLH Construction: California Court Affirms Trial Court Order Denying Petition To Compel Arbitration Of Class Action Thereby Permitting Labor Law Class Action To Proceed In State Court" »

Posted In: Arbitration, Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Supported by Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Agrees with Defense Attorneys that District of New Jersey is Appropriate Transferee Court

Three class action lawsuits (and subsequent tag-along lawsuits) were filed against Mercedes-Benz “relating to (1) the impact of the conversion of the cellular network from an analog/digital network to a digital-only network in early 2008, and (2) the availability of Tele Aid service in certain Mercedes vehicles thereafter.” In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. February 26, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class action litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the District of New Jersey; plaintiffs’ lawyers in the various class actions and in the tag-along lawsuits supported the motion, though they suggested alternate districts as the appropriate transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class action lawsuits and agreed with the defense that the District of New Jersey was the proper forum because that class action is the most advanced and because Mercedes is headquartered in New Jersey. Id. Accordingly, the Panel ordered the class actions transferred to the District of New Jersey, id., at 2.

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions