Class Action Defense Blog

California Federal District Court Holds Arbitration Clause Requiring Arbitration at Customers’ Expense and Waiving Right to Class Action Device to be Unconscionable and Unenforceable

In November 2004, plaintiff signed a service agreement with AT&T Wireless, and received a booklet entitled “Important Information and Service Agreement” that contained in part an arbitration clause governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and a class action waiver. Cingular Wireless thereafter acquired AT&T Wireless; its customers also signed service agreements that contained arbitration clauses, but Cingular’s agreement provided that the company would pay the cost of the arbitration unless the customer’s action is frivolous, and that the company would pay the customer’s attorney fees if the arbitrator awarded the amount the customer demanded or more. In December 2005, plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in California federal court against AT&T and Cingular for violations of the Federal Communications Act, declaratory relief, breach of contract, violations of California’s unfair competition law (UCL), and violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), based on the allegation that defendants charged customers for services that the customers had not authorized, totaling approximately $9 per month. Stern v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 453 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1141-43 and 1149 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2006). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration and stay the litigation; plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. The district court denied the defense motion, concluding that the class action waiver was unconscionable.

Continue reading "Cingular Class Action Defense Case-Stern v. Cingular Wireless: Arbitration Provision Waiving Class Action Remedy Unenforceable California Federal Court Holds" »

Posted In: Arbitration, Class Action Court Decisions

Louisiana Federal Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to Certify Class Action Against Exxon Because Individual Issues Predominated over Common Issues and Superiority Requirement was not Met

In 1994, smoke from an oil fire at an Exxon Mobil chemical plant drifted into neighboring communities: “Hundreds of suits were filed against Exxon Mobil, alleging various causes of action including personal injury, personal discomfort and annoyance, emotional distress resulting from knowledge of exposure to hazardous substances, fear of future unauthorized exposures, and economic harm including damage to business and property, among others.” Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2006). The lawsuits were consolidated in a Louisiana federal court, and plaintiffs proposed that the action proceed as a class action and moved for class certification. Defense attorneys opposed the motion, and filed summary judgment motions as to certain categories of claims against Exxon. Id. The district court first decided the summary judgment motions, granting summary judgment “on all claims for physical injuries and non-intentional emotional distress brought by individual plaintiffs who were located outside the geographic area that the air modeling experts agreed was affected by the [smoke] plume,” and “on all claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id., at 600-01. The court then denied the motion to proceed as a class action, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish typicality or adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a), and predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). Id., at 601. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Continue reading "Exxon Mobil Class Action Defense Case-Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil: District Court Properly Refused To Certify Class Action Based On Personal Injuries Arising From Chemical Fire Fifth Circuit Holds" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Illinois Court Affirms Dismissal of Consumer Fraud Class Action Because Fraud Allegations were Conclusory and Complaint Failed to Allege Actual Damages

A car buyer filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against DaimlerChrysler Corporation for alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., claiming that defendant concealed a “material defect” in its Jeeps; specifically, plaintiff claimed the exhaust manifold was “substandard and defective” because it was made of tubular steel rather than the more expensive (and allegedly “standard”) cast iron. White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 2739009 (Ill.App. September 26, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint on several grounds; the trial court granted the defense motion, and plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act claims. Id., at 1. The appellate court affirmed.

Continue reading "White v. DaimlerChrysler-Class Action Defense Cases: Defense Motion To Dismiss Consumer Fraud Class Action Granted Because Plaintiff Failed To Plead Fraud Or Damages With Requisite Specificity Illinois Court Holds" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Court Holds that Arbitration Clause in Effect at Time Class Action Plaintiff Terminated her Service Agreement Governed in Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Class Action Waiver in Wireless Service Provider’s Arbitration Clause Held Unenforceable by Illinois Supreme Court

Plaintiff filed a class action in Illinois state court against her cellular telephone service provider, Cingular Wireless, for alleged violations of the state’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act on the ground that the early termination fee is an unlawful penalty. Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause that provided that “‘no arbitrator has the authority’ to resolve class claims.” Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 2828664 (Ill. October 5, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The trial court refused to compel arbitration. The appellate court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable, but that the prohibition against class action arbitrations was not; accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s ruling. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected defense arguments that the class action bar was enforceable and affirmed the decision of the appellate court.

Plaintiff signed a two-year service contract with Cingular in July 2001, but terminated her service in April 2002. Cingular charged her a $150 early-termination fee, in accordance with the terms of the service agreement plaintiff signed when she became a customer. Slip Opn., at 2. Plaintiff filed a class action against Cingular, arguing that the early-termination fee was an illegal penalty and that the class action waiver in the arbitration clause “prevents her and others from ‘effectively vindicating their statutory and common law causes of action and facilitates rather than remedies Cingular’s fraudulent and unlawful conduct.’” Id. The trial court denied a defense motion to compel arbitration; the appellate court found the class-action waiver provision to be unenforceable but severable from the balance of the arbitration clause, and so reversed. Id.

Continue reading "Cingular Class Action Defense Case-Kinkel v. Cingular: Illinois Rejects Defense Efforts To Enforce Arbitration Clause Barring Class Action Device And Refuses To Apply Arbitration Terms Effective After Class Action Plaintiff Terminated Service Contract " »

Posted In: Arbitration, Class Action Court Decisions

California Court Holds that Compensation Scheme Permitting Chargebacks Against Monies Advanced Against Unearned Commissions did not Violate State Labor Laws Because Such Commissions were not Wages

Four former employees filed a class action in California state court against internet service provider Verio for violations of California’s labor laws on the grounds that Verio’s compensation scheme - which provided for a base salary, plus commissions that were subject to charge backs under certain conditions - violated California Labor Code § 221 because the commissions were wages. Koehl v. Verio, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 749, 751 (Cal.App. 2006). “The complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) commission chargebacks in violation of Labor Code sections 221, 223, 225 and 400-410; (2) waiting penalties pursuant to section 203; and (3) unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.” Id., at 759 (footnote omitted). Verio cross-complained against the class representatives for commissions recoverable as charge-backs under the compensation scheme, id. The trial court agreed that the commissions were not wages, awarded the employer compensatory damages (for overpayment of unearned commissions) and prejudgment interest totaling more than $250,000, and awarded the employer more than $548,000 in attorney fees. Id., at 759-60. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Continue reading "Koehl v. Verio-Class Action Defense Cases: Class Representatives Hit With Damages And Half-Million Dollar Attorney Fee Award By California Court After Losing Labor Law Class Action Against Former Employer" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

California Court Holds that Class Action Complaint Adequately Alleged Violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Based on Truck Rental Company’s Refueling Practices

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against U-Haul for violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) arising out of U-Haul’s refueling charges and practices. Aron v. U-Haul Co. of California, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 2006 WL 2808074 (Cal.App. October 3, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Defense attorneys moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed. Id. The facts of the case are simple, and are concisely summarized by the appellate court at page 2 as follows:

U-Haul Company of California and U-Haul International, Inc. (“U-Haul”) rent trucks to customers. Rather than supplying those customers with fully fueled trucks, U-Haul rents its trucks partially fueled, presenting them to each succeeding customer with the fuel remaining when the previous customer returned the vehicle. The level of the fuel gauge is the exclusive means of measurement relied on. If on return, the fuel gauge is lower than at rental, U-Haul charges the customer a $20 fueling fee as well as $2 per gallon for fuel estimated to have been used, but not replaced, by the customer. U-Haul does not reimburse customers for additional fuel if a truck is returned with more fuel than initially provided.

The rental contract sets out these two options explicitly: “I confirm equipment is clean and agree to pay for all fuel used and return the truck with the same fuel gauge reading as indicated on this rental contract and will pay $20 fueling fee plus $2 per gallon for estimated fuel used. U-Haul does not reimburse for excess fuel purchased by the customer.”

Continue reading "U-Haul Class Action Defense Case-Aron v. U-Haul: Trial Court Erred In Granting Defense Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings In Class Action Alleging California CLRA And UCL Violations" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

In Action Alleging California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Business Practices (UCL) Claims Concerning Artificially Colored Farmed Salmon, California Court of Appeal Affirms Judgment Granting Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action on Grounds of Federal Preemption

Plaintiffs filed separate class action lawsuits against various defendants for unfair competition, false advertising, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) based on the alleged sale of artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing that the salmon had been artificially colored. Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 449, 451 (Cal.App. 2006). The class action was premised on the allegation that the flesh of farmed salmon is naturally “grayish,” so they were fed chemicals for the purpose of coloring the flesh so that it would resemble the color of wild salmon. The complaint alleged that consumers would be less inclined to purchase the salmon without the chemical coloring, and that consumers were not informed of the artificial coloring. Specifically, the class action alleged that “the FDCA and parallel state laws require food labeling to state that farmed salmon is artificially colored,” id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. The trial court dismissed the class action and the appellate court affirmed, holding that “Congress made clear its intention to preclude private enforcement of the FDCA” and that “a state law private right of action based on an FDCA violation would frustrate the purposes of exclusive federal and state governmental prosecution of the act,” id.

Continue reading "Farm Raised Salmon Class Action Defense Case: Class Action Preempted By Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act (FDCA) Because No State Law Private Right Of Action Exists Based On FDCA Violations California Court Holds" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

California Federal Court Reaffirms that Scope of Precertification Discovery in Class Action Lawsuits is Within the Discretion of the Court

A putative class action alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was filed against a county district attorney and a private company (ACCS) under contract to administer the county’s Bad Check Restitution Program. Del Campo v. Kennedy, 236 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Cal. 2006). After plaintiff learned that the check she had given a store merchant (Fry’s Electronics) did not clear, she called the store and offered to make full payment: “The store declined her offer because the check had not been entered yet into the computer system.” Id., at 456. Plaintiff later received a letter from the district attorney concerning the crime of writing a bad check, and advising her that she owed not only the amount of the check ($95.02), but a returned item fee ($10), administrative fee ($35), and bad check restitution program fee ($125); plaintiff tendered only the amount of the delinquent check. Id. Upon receiving a demand threatening criminal action if she failed to pay the $170 in additional fees, plaintiff filed the FDCPA class action. Id. Eventually, the class action was consolidated with another lawsuit. Plaintiff then filed subpoenas on two stores (Safeway and Target), and defense attorneys filed a motion to quash the subpoenas or for a protective order.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Del Campo v. Kennedy: California Federal Court Denies Defense Motion For Protective Order That Sought To Bar Third Party Precertification Discovery In FDCPA Class Action" »

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

California Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Class Action By Commercial Electricity Customer Against Electricity Supplier

A commercial electricity customer, Anchor Lighting, filed a putative class action against electricity supplier Southern California Edison after it failed to qualify for a 10% rate reduction; the trial court agreed with defense attorneys that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims and dismissed the lawsuit. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) had “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation and control of utilities and that jurisdiction, once assumed, cannot be hampered or second-guessed by a superior court action addressing the same issue.” Anchor Lighting v. Southern California Edison Co., ___ Cal.App.4thh ___, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 7810, 784 (Cal.App. August 30, 2006).

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Anchor Lighting v. SoCal Edison: California Public Utilities Commission Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over State Utilities" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

In Action Alleging California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Business Practices (UCL) Claims, California Court of Appeal Affirms Trial Court Order Denying Defense Motion to Compel Arbitration of Under Arbitration Clause that Prohibited Class Action Litigation

Philip Cohen filed a putative class action in California state court against DirecTV under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and unfair business practices (UCL) on the grounds that DirecTV broadcast to its HDTV customers a “below-standard signal, contrary to its advertisements.” Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1445 (Cal.App. 2006). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration; plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it prohibited class action litigation of claims, and that the arbitration clause was not binding on plaintiff because of the manner in which it had been added to DirecTV’s customer agreement. The trial court denied the defense motion on the grounds that the arbitration provision was “procedurally and substantively unconscionable, against public policy and unenforceable.” Id., at 1446. DirecTV appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

Continue reading "DirecTV Class Action Defense Case-Cohen v. DirecTV: Class Action Waiver In Arbitration Clause Unconscionable And Unenforceable California Court Holds" »

Posted In: Arbitration, Class Action Court Decisions

The NLRB issued a broad and long-awaited decision on September 29, 2006 which affects the definition of "supervisor" under the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"). Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB NO. 37, and two other companion cases, impact all industries and could undermine the power of labor unions as millions of employees could potentially be re-classified as "supervisors." As "supervisors," these employees would be precluded from joining unions and would no longer be covered by collective bargaining agreements. Not surprisingly, labor unions are in an uproar over the Oakwood Healthcare decisions. They have called them "outrageous" and are threatening strikes against employers who re-classify employees under the new decisions.

Section 2(11) of the Act defines a supervisor as an employee who has the authority to perform any of 12 tasks in the interest of the employer while using independent judgment. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court provided general guidance on the definition of "supervisor" under Section 2(11) in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). Using Kentucky River's guiding principles, the NLRB clarified the definition of "supervisor" under Section 2(11). In a well-written and thorough decision, the NLRB defines previously ambiguous terms such as "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judgment" as used in Section 2(11).

Continue reading "NLRB Decision In Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37, Clarifies Definition Of "Supervisor" Under Section 2(11)--Class Action Defense Issues" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Federal Court Grants Motion to Consolidate PSLRA Class Actions, and Pursuant to PSLRA Appoints Plaintiff With Largest Financial Investment as Lead Plaintiff and Confirms Lead Plaintiff’s Choice of Lead Counsel

Six securities fraud class action lawsuits were filed against a corporation and three of its officers and directors alleging that defendants violated §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 by making false and misleading statements concerning the corporations earnings and enrollment growth. A separate derivative action also was filed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys in five of the class actions sought consolidation of the lawsuits and appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel. Glauser v. EVCI Career Colleges Holding Corp., 236 F.R.D 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The defense apparently took no position on the motions, each of which were granted by the district court.

With respect to the consolidation motion, the federal court held that “consolidation is particularly appropriate in the context of securities class actions if the complaints are ‘based on the same “public statements and reports.”’” Glauser, at 186 (citation omitted). Because the class actions involved “common issues of law and fact” the Court consolidated those lawsuits “for all purposes,” including trial; the derivative action was consolidated for all pretrial purposes, and the Court reserved a decision on whether to consolidate it for trial as well. Id.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Glauser v. EVCI: New York Federal Court Grants Motion To Consolidated Class Action Lawsuits Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) And to Appoint Lead Plaintiff And Lead Counsel" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

Class Action Against Tobacco Companies for Labeling Cigarettes "Light" Allegedly to Mislead Smokers Into Believing They were Less Harmful Than Regular Cigarettes was not Superior Method of Resolution Because Individual Issues Would Predominate California Court Holds

In 1997, smokers filed a putative class action against numerous tobacco companies arising out of “marketing and advertising activities in California” and seeking “to recover economic losses resulting from purchasing cigarettes.” In re Tobacco II Cases, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 917, 919 (Cal.App. September 5, 2006). Eventually, in October 2000, the sole remaining plaintiff sought class certification of his seventh amended complaint, which a Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claim, an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) claim, and a false advertising claim. Defense attorneys previously had persuaded the court to deny a motion to certify a class action on common law and CLRA claims because “individual issues of causation and injury predominate over common issues.” Id. The trial court refused to certify a class on the CLRA claim because it was an improper motion for reconsideration “and found that individual issues relating to causation, injury, reliance, materiality, exposure to the alleged misstatements, statutes of limitations, and choice of law predominate.” However, the court granted class certification as to the UCL and false advertising claims as they “do not require the individualized determinations as to reliance.” Id.

Continue reading "In re Tobacco II Cases-Class Action Defense Cases: California Court Properly Denied Class Action Of CLRA Claims Against Tobacco Companies And Properly Decertified Class As To UCL Claims" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Pennsylvania Federal District Court Holds that Named Class Action Plaintiffs may Recover Damages Under the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Both Individually and as a Member of the Class

A class action was filed in federal court against Drive Financial Services and Drive G.P. alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in that defendants allegedly sent letters “on the ostensible letterhead” of an attorney for the purpose of collecting a debt. McCall v. Drive Fin. Serv., L.P., 440 F.Supp.2d 388, 388-89 (E.D. Pa. 2006). Plaintiff’s lawyer filed a motion in limine to determine the amount of statutory damages that would be available under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). Id. The district court rejected the argument by defense attorneys that the named class action plaintiff could not also recover as a member of the class, and held the maximum amount of statutory damages available at trial to be $501,000. Id., at 391.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-McCall v. Drive Financial: Class Action Statutory Damages Under Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Can Exceed $500,000 Pennsylvania Court Holds" »

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Smokers Duped Into Believing that “Light” Cigarettes were Less Harmful New York Court Holds

As anticipated, Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued his ruling this morning on the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class action against Philip Morris USA, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Ligget Group, American Tobacco Co., Altria Group, and British American Tobacco, in a case that alleged the tobacco companies duped smokers into believing that “light” cigarettes were less harmful to them. Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The court summarized the theory of the case at page 1018 as follows:

Continue reading "Schwab v. Phillip Morris-Class Action Defense Cases: New York Federal Court Certifies Class Action Against Tobacco Companies For Selling "Light" Cigarettes" »

Posted In: Class Actions In The News, Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Federal Securities Claims Without Fraud Element Must Still be Pled with Particularity if Nonfraud Securities Claim is Part of Defendant’s Alleged Fraudulent Conduct Under the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action under the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., alleging that defendant “employed a fraudulent scheme to control the revenue growth; defense attorneys filed a motion to dismiss for failure to meet the pleading requirements of FRCP Rule 9(b) and the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). The federal court granted the motion to dismiss, and required that plaintiffs pay defense costs and fees incurred in connection with the motion to dismiss as a prerequisite to plaintiffs’ filing a motion to amend their class action complaint. Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2006). Rather than pay these defense costs, plaintiffs allowed the complaint to be dismissed and then appealed. Id., at 1276.

The Eleventh Circuit first observed that Section 11 of the Securities Act creates “virtually absolute [liability], even for innocent misstatements,” as does Section 12(a)(2); thus, “neither allegations of fraud nor scienter are necessarily part of either of these claims.” Wagner, at 1277. The Circuit Court therefore characterized claims under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) as “nonfraud” claims, and noted: “The question presented . . . [is] whether there are circumstances when [Rule 9(b)] would require nonfraud securities claims to be pled with particularity.” Id. While noting that sister circuits are split on this issue, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the conclusion of the majority of the circuits that have addressed the question and held “Rule 9(b) applies when the misrepresentation justifying relief under the Securities Act is also alleged to support a claim for Fraud under the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)-5, id. The Circuit Court explained its holding at page 1278 as follows:

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Wagner v. First Horizon: Eleventh Circuit Holds As A Matter Of First Impression That If Nonfraud Securities Claim Is Part Of Allegedly Fraudulent Conduct Then It Must Be Pleaded With Particularity" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

California Court Holds as Matter of First Impression that RESPA Prohibits Lender from Marking Up Costs of Another Provider's Services Without Providing Additional Services of its Own

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Washington Mutual Bank in California state court alleging inter alia violations of California’s unfair competition laws (UCL), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and breach of contract. “The basis of all causes of action was defendants’ overcharging plaintiffs for underwriting, tax services, and wire transfer fees in conjunction with home loans. Defendants charged plaintiffs more for these services than defendants paid the service providers.” McKell v. Washington Mutual Bank, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 2006 WL 2664130 (Cal.App. September 18, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim was premised upon alleged violations of the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (CRMLA) and the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Regulations X, among other state and federal laws. Slip Opn., at 5. The trial court granted a defense motion to dismiss the class action complaint, presumably on the ground that the claims “turn on the alleged existence of an agreement requiring Washington Mutual to charge no more than pass-through costs for underwriting, tax services, and wire transfers,” id., at 3, which plaintiffs could not do. The California Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. We do not here discuss those aspects of the trial court’s ruling that the divided appellate court opinion affirmed. Rather, we focus on the Court of Appeal’s holdings that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded UCL and breach of contract claims.

The appellate court first held that the trial court did not err “in requiring plaintiffs to plead a factual basis for implying an agreement by [the Bank] to charge only pass-though costs,” Slip Opn., at 8. But in analyzing the UCL claims, the Court of Appeal explained at page 10,

Continue reading "McKell v. Washington Mutual-Class Action Defense Cases: Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Improperly Granted As To Breach of Contract And UCL Claims Based On Federal RESPA Violations California Court Holds" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

Illinois Federal Court Grants in Part Motion to Certify Class Action but Dismisses FCRA § 1681m Disclosure Violation Claim

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Home Loan Center alleging that it violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., by accessing their credit. Cavin v. Home Loan Center, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The plaintiffs’ lawyer filed a motion for class certification, together with a motion to compel discovery; defense lawyers argued inter alia that FCRA does not permit private rights of action for alleged violations of the disclosure requirements imposed by FCRA § 1681m. The district court granted in part and denied in part both motions. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1681m claim, agreeing with defense attorneys that no such claim could be maintained.

The lawsuit arose out of three letters sent to plaintiffs by Home Loan Center concerning a “‘prescreened’ offer of credit [that] is based on information in your credit report indicating that you meet certain criteria.” Unless authorized by the consumer, the FCRA prohibits credit reporting agencies from disclosing consumer information unless “the request is in connection with a ‘firm offer of credit.’” Cavin, at 390 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)). Plaintiffs alleged that the letters were not “firm offers of credit” and, accordingly, the lender violated § 1681n, and they alleged further that the letters violated the disclosure requirements contained in § 1681m. Id. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which the district court granted for reasons summarized in the Note below.

Continue reading "Cavin v. Home Loan Center-Class Action Defense Cases: Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) Prohibits Private Right Of Action For Violations Of § 1681m’s Disclosure Requirement Illinois District Court Holds" »

Posted In: FCRA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Maine Federal Court Denies Joint Motion for “Preliminary Approval” of Proposed Settlement of Class Action Finding that it Lacked Authority Under Rule 23 to Grant the Motion or to Make a “Preliminary Fairness Determination”

In connection with class action lawsuits against General Motors, Toyota, and other car companies, transferred to the District of Maine by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for pretrial purposes, the defense and plaintiff attorneys in the Toyota lawsuit requested that the federal court preliminarily approve a proposed settlement of the class action. In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Maine 2006). The district court denied the request, holding that “Rule 23 does not provide for ‘preliminary approval’ or a ‘preliminary fairness determination.’” Id. The court acknowledged that the Complex Litigation Manual uses that phrase to describe “what a court does in deciding to order notice to the class of a settlement,” but explained that while “it makes sense for a judge to say that a particular settlement has no chance of approval . . . there is criticism of calling this ‘preliminary approval.’” Id., at 55-56 (citations omitted).

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-In re New Motor Vehicles: Federal Court Lacks Authority To Give “Preliminary Approval” To Proposed Settlement Of Class Action Maine District Court Holds" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Carrier’s Contract Limited Liability for Late Package Deliveries to Another Free Delivery Justify Trial Court Order Granting Defense Motion for Summary Judgment in Putative Class Action

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Airborne Express for failing to deliver packages on time, and sought as damages the difference between the value of the service he requested and the value of the service he received. Hicks v. Airborne Express, Inc., ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 2105657 (Ill.App. July 25, 2006). The defense moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the contract limited the customers’ damages for the carrier’s breach of its promise to deliver a package on time to another delivery free of charge, and that Airborne had provided plaintiff with that remedy. Slip Opn., at 2-3. The trial court agreed with the defense, “finding that the parties had agreed to an exclusive remedy, i.e., another Flight-Ready envelope, for Airborne’s breach of the contract to deliver [plaintiff’s] package by noon the next day.” Id., at 3. The appellate court affirmed.

Continue reading "Airborne Express Class Action Defense Case-Hicks v. Airborne Express: Illinois Appellate Court Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In Breach Of Contract Class Action" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions