Class Action Defense Blog

Class Action Remanded to State Court because Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion in a Different Case does not Constitute “an Amended Pleading, Motion, Order or Other Paper” Within the Meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(b) Eighth Circuit Holds

In 2003, plaintiffs filed a class action in Minnesota state court against R.J. Reynolds & Touche for fraud and violations of state consumer protection laws alleging that the company engaged in “unfair business practices and/or deceptive and unlawful conduct in connection with the manufacture, distribution, promotion, marketing, and sale” of “light” cigarettes. Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 2007). Defense attorneys removed the class action complaint to federal court but the district court remanded the class action to state court because the claims of the individual plaintiffs were less than $75,000; the state court then dismissed the class action complaint on the ground that the claims therein were preempted by federal law under the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. During the pendency of the state court appeal, the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion that held another tobacco company had established federal officer jurisdiction in a case involving the marketing of light cigarettes, id. (citing Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1055 (January 12, 2007); defense attorneys again removed the class action to federal court, arguing federal officer jurisdiction, id. Plaintiffs’ lawyer moved to remand the class action complaint to state court, arguing that the notice of removal was untimely, but the district court denied the motion. Id. The Circuit Court reversed.

Briefly, the class action complaint was filed in 2003 and timely removed to federal court; following remand, the trial court dismissed the class action and plaintiffs appealed. Dahl, at 966. On August 25, 2005, while the appeal from the dismissal of the class action complaint was pending, the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion in Watson holding that Philip Morris had established federal officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), and on September 22, 2005, defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court under § 1442(a). Id., at 967. Plaintiffs argued that the removal was untimely as it was not brought within the 30-day limit set forth in § 1442(b); the district court denied the motion, agreeing with the defense that “Watson made it clear for the first time that federal courts have jurisdiction over claims like those in this case and its receipt of that opinion recommenced the thirty day time period for removal.” Id.

Continue reading "Tobacco Class Action Defense Cases-Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds: Eighth Circuit Reverses Denial Of Motion To Remand Class Action To State Court" »

Posted In: Removal & Remand, Class Action Court Decisions

Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) does not Authorize Injunctive Relief Against Debt Collectors, FDCPA One-Year Statute of Limitations Begins to Run no later than Date Debt Collector Files Suit Against Debtor, and Debt Collector need only Establish that Notice Required by § 1692g was Sent, not Received, California Federal Court

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against debt collector and its attorneys in California state court for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and California’s equivalent statute known as the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (California’s FDCPA). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court and moved to dismiss the California state-law claims arguing that they were barred by California’s litigation privilege; the district court agreed with the defense and dismissed those portions of the class action complaint. Taylor v. Quall, 471 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1056-57 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Defense attorneys then filed a motion to strike certain portions of the class action complaint, as well as a motion for summary judgment. Id., at 1055-56. The district court granted these motions in part, and granted the request of plaintiff’s lawyer for additional time to conduct discovery as to the FDCPA § 1692e claim in the class action complaint.

The class action arose from the following facts: a Plaintiff obtained a credit card from Citibank but stopped making payments on the card in early 2002. Citibank transferred the debt to defendant Unifund CCR Partners, and Unifund retained California attorney Matthew Quall to collect the debt. Taylor, at 1056. Quall sent plaintiff a collection letter in May 2005, and filed suit against plaintiff in June 2005; that lawsuit eventually settled, and Quall filed a request for dismissal without prejudice. Id. Plaintiff’s class action complaint was filed in July 2006 (mistakenly identified as 2005 in the court order), the claims of which the district court summarized at page 1056: “Plaintiff asserts that Quall (1) failed to provide the proper notice of debt required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g when he began his collection efforts; (2) made false or misleading representations while negotiating the settlement in violation of § 1692e; (3) failed to fulfill the FDCPA's standard for “meaningful” attorney involvement; and (4) violated the FDCPA by filing the Unifund Action without complying with California statutes governing suits brought on behalf of entities with fictitious business names.”

Continue reading "FDCPA Class Action Defense Cases-Taylor v. Quall: California Federal Court Partially Grants Defense Motions To Strike And For Summary Judgment In Class Action Alleging FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Violations" »

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Proposed Intervenors in Class Action Under ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) Failed to Establish Error in Denial of Leave to Intervene Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against the State of Illinois under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) concerning “the proper way to provide care for the developmentally disabled”; specifically, whether the developmentally disabled are better served by institutionalized care or by integration into the community. Ligas v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs believed the latter, and filed suit designed “to hasten the state of Illinois down the road to community-based care,” id., at 773. Certain members of the proposed class, however, feared that they would be forced into community-based programs even if they preferred institutionalized care, so they petitioned the federal court for leave to intervene, either as of right or permissively. Id., at 773. Defense attorneys and plaintiffs in the class action opposed intervention; the district court denied leave to intervene and the proposed intervenors appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the effort to intervene in the class action.

With respect to the issue of intervention as of right, the Seventh Circuit defined the issues on appeal as “whether the action threatens to impair that interest and whether the parties fail to represent those interests adequately.” Ligas, at 774. The only possible impairment of proposed intervenors’ interests would be if they were no longer able to choose whether to receive institutionalized care, id. The district court found, however, that the class action complaint was “replete with language on choice,” id. The appellate court agreed, holding that nothing in the class action complaint would force community-based care upon those who desired institutionalized care. Id. With respect to adequate representation of their interests, the district court found proposed intervenors’ arguments to be “at best speculative, and at worst conclusory,” id. Again the Circuit Court agreed.

Continue reading "ADA Class Action Defense Cases-Ligas v. Maram: Seventh Circuit Affirms Denial Of Request To Intervene In Class Action Under Federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Class Action Plaintiffs who are Residents of Colorado and Missouri Lacked Standing to Prosecute Class Action Complaint Alleging Violations of Illinois State Statutes

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against Bally Total Fitness for violations of the state’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) and Physical Fitness Services Act (Fitness Act). Phillips v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ill.App. March 26, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss from the class action plaintiffs Aaron Stone of Colorado and Teresa Brown of Missouri on the grounds that they lacked standing as out-of-state residents to prosecute the class action, id., at 4; the trial court granted the motion and the appellate court affirmed, id., at 1. The class action complaint was not dismissed in its entirety because the defense had not challenged the standing of the two named plaintiffs who are residents of Illinois. Id.

The class action complaint alleged that the principal place of business and corporate headquarters of Bally Total Fitness is in Illinois, and that Bally has 4 million members at 420 fitness centers in 29 states as well as international locations. Phillips, at 2. Plaintiff Stone joined a Colorado facility in March 2001, agreeing to pay $1900 for 3 years; he alleged that his contract was month-to-month and could be canceled at any time, and could be transferred to another fitness center if he moved. Id. When Stone moved to Denver, he could not find a Bally facility in his area and tried to cancel his membership; Bally refused to honor the cancellation request, demanded payment in full, and then sold the debt to a collection agency. Id. Stone’s contract gave a Colorado address for the company, and Bally’s statements and correspondence with Stone gave a California address. Id., at 2-3.

Continue reading "Bally Class Action Defense Cases-Phillips v. Bally Total Fitness: Illinois State Court Affirms Dismissal Of Named Plaintiffs From Class Action Litigation Based On Lack Of Standing" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

As a resource for class action defense attorneys who defend against RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) class actions, we provide the text of Regulation X. Congress gave authority to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to promulgate regulations for RESPA, and the regulations are set forth in 24 CFR § 3500.1 et seq. The regulations concerning title companies are set forth in § 3500.16, which provides:

§ 3500.16. Title companies

No seller of property that will be purchased with the assistance of a federally related mortgage loan shall violate section 9 of RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2608). Section 3500.2 defines "required use" of a provider of a settlement service. Section 3500.19(c) explains the liability of a seller for a violation of this section.

Posted In: Statutes & Rules

To assist California defense attorneys in anticipating the claims against which they may have to defend, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. Employment law class action cases generally top the list, and this proved true yet again. This report covers the time period from March 30 – April 5, 2007, during which time approximately 53 class action lawsuits were filed in these California state and federal courts. Labor law class action filings accounted for 36% of these cases, with 19 new class action lawsuits. Next came unfair competition law (UCL) claims, which include false advertising class action cases, with 8 new class actions (15%), and class actions under the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), also with 8 new filings. The only additional category to break the 10% threshold involved 6 new antitrust class action cases (11%).

Posted In: Class Actions In The News

Judicial Panel Grants Request, Unopposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407

Four class action lawsuits (three in Massachusetts and one in California) were filed against Webloyalty.com and various other defendants alleging that they “engaged in a scheme to defraud consumers whose personal and/or credit card information was accessed by Webloyalty during online transactions (with the defendant web retailer(s) involved in each action) as part of Webloyalty's Reservation Rewards or other programs.” In re Webloyalty.com, Inc., Marketing & Sales Practices Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 549354, *1 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. February 15, 2007). Plaintiffs in the three class actions pending in Massachusetts filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class action lawsuits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the District of Massachusetts. Defense attorneys for the common defendant (Webloyalty), defense attorneys for the various individual defendants in each class action, and the California plaintiffs’ lawyer agreed that pretrial coordination was appropriate, and that the District of Massachusetts was the appropriate transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class actions. The Panel further agreed that the District of Massachusetts was the appropriate transferee court, explaining that in addition to the unanimous agreement of the parties, “Webloyalty is headquartered nearby and it is likely to be the source of a substantial number of witnesses and documents subject to discovery.” Id.

NOTE: The individual class action defendants included, among others, Fandango, Priceline.com, JustFlowers.com, GiftBasketsASAP.com and Valueclick.

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Judicial Panel Agrees with Government and Telecommunication Company Defense Attorneys that Six Additional Class Action Lawsuits Should be Transferred to Northern District of California for Pretrial Coordination or Consolidation with Class Actions Previously Transferred Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407

Several class action lawsuits were filed against the federal government challenging the government’s “surveillance of telecommunications activity and the participation in (or cooperation with) that surveillance by individual telecommunications companies.” In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 549355, *1 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. February 15, 2007). In response to a motion to centralize that litigation, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) held in part that “centralization under Section 1407 was necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings (particularly with respect to matters involving national security),” and transferred the class action cases to the Northern District of California. Id. (citing In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 444 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1334 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2006)). Plaintiffs in a class action pending in Missouri, together with defense attorneys involve in class actions pending in Connecticut, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey and Vermont, moved the Judicial Panel to vacate its orders conditionally transferring the affected class action cases to the Northern District of California for inclusion in the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings; plaintiffs in the initially centralized actions joined in the motion, opposing transfer of the additional class actions. In re NSA Telecommunications, 2007 WL 549355 at *1. The United States and telecommunication company defendants opposed the motions to vacate.

The Judicial Panel denied the motions, reaffirming that these six class actions involve common questions of fact with the class actions previously centralized in the Northern District of California. In re NSA Telecommunications, 2007 WL 549355 at *1. The Panel concluded, “Transfer of these actions is appropriate for reasons expressed by the Panel in its original order directing centralization in this docket.” The Panel explained at page *1:

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases—In re National Security Agency: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Denies Requests To Exclude Class Actions From Coordinated/Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings In The Northern District Of California" »

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Defense Motion to Strike Class Action Allegations Must be Denied Pending Further Discovery to Develop Facts Needed to Evaluate Commonality and Superiority Requirements for Class Action Certification Iowa Federal Court Holds

This class action – Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 727 (S.D. Iowa 2007) – has a tortured procedural past. The initial class action complaint was filed in Iowa state court in August 2004. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, but the federal court remanded the action to state court for failure to establish the $75,000 threshold. See Varboncoeur v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 356 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D. Iowa 2005). Plaintiffs then filed a motion to amend the complaint so as to seek certification of a nationwide class, whereas the original complaint alleged only a statewide class action. Defense attorneys again removed the class action to federal court, this time on the basis of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA); the federal court again remanded the action, holding that until the state court ruled on the motion to amend, the federal court lacked jurisdiction. Rios, at 730. Once the state court granted the motion to amend the class action complaint, defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court under CAFA. Id.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that State Farm paid homeowner's insurance policy benefits for roof repairs by paying the insured the cost of a roof “overlay” upfront, but withholding the balance of the policy benefits otherwise available to cover the cost of a roof “tear-off” until the insured had actually completed such repairs. Rios, at 731. As the district court explained at page 731, “For example, if a policyholder incurred roof damage that was covered under the policy, and the total replacement cost of the roof damage was $3,000.00, then under the standard policy, State Farm would only pay the policyholder the cost to overlay the roof (hypothetically $1,800.00) upfront, and withhold the rest of the replacement cost (hypothetically $1,200.00), i.e., tear-off costs plus depreciation, until actual repairs were made on the roof.” This provided a financial benefit to the insurer, because “[i]f the policyholder did not make the tear-off repairs within the two-year time period provided under the policy, then State Farm would not have to pay the $1,200.00 tear-off costs to the policyholder.” Id.

Continue reading "State Farm Class Action Defense Cases-Rios v. State Farm: Iowa Federal Circuit Denies Defense Motion To Strike Nationwide Class Action Allegations From Complaint" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

Maryland Federal Court Redefines Class to Address Typicality Concerns In Federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Class Action and then Certifies Class Action Alleging Illegal Kickbacks and Payment of Unearned Fees Under RESPA

Plaintiffs filed a class action in Maryland state court against various defendants alleging that they charged excessive fees in connection with mortgage brokerage, title or settlement services and would pay referral fees in violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA); defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court. Benway v. Resource Real Estate Serv., LLC, 239 F.R.D. 419, 421 (D. Md. 2006). Plaintiffs moved to certify the lawsuit as a class action; defense attorneys objected that commonality, typicality and adequacy did not exist under Rule 23(a), and that the motion failed to establish that the requirements of Rule 23(b). Id., at 422. The district court granted the motion but limited the scope of the class action. Specifically, the court certified a class action on behalf of “All borrowers who entered into mortgage loan transactions using the services of Resource Real Estate where the HUD-1 Settlement Statement, or other documents in the loan file, included a charge for or payment to Clipper City Settlement Services, Inc.” Id., at 427.

The class action complaint alleged that Resource Real Estate Services provides real estate title and mortgage loan closing services and that Millard Rubenstein is its majority owner and its Managing Member, that Access One Mortgage Group provides mortgage broker services, and that Resource and Access One formed an affiliated business arrangement (ABA) called Clipper City Settlement Services “to appear on mortgage closing documents as an entity which had performed title work or settlement services.” Benway, at 421. The class action alleged “Resource and Access One conducted a scheme to extract referral fees from borrowers using ABAs like Clipper City”; specifically, Access One would refer borrowers to Resource for title work and Resource would perform the title work, but “the loan closing documents would attribute that work to Clipper City, and the fees charged for the work would exceed the customary fees charged by Resource.” Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Resource “would channel a portion of the fees collected by Clipper City to Access One as a referral reward, without notifying the borrower.” Id.

Continue reading "RESPA Class Action Defense Cases-Benway v. Resource Real Estate Services: Maryland Federal Court Rejects Defense Arguments And Certifies Class Action Under RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act)" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions, RESPA/TILA Class Actions

Federal Court Rejects Defense Motion to Dismiss Securities Fraud Class Action Holding that Class Action Complaint Satisfied Heightened Pleading Requirements Under PSLRA and that Applicability of PSLRA’s Safe Harbor Provision Required Factual Development Through Discovery

Plaintiffs filed a securities class action against EVCI and certain officers and directors for violations of Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1924 and Rule 10b-5 alleging that defendants misstated EVCI’s financial condition and failed to accurately disclose negative information that would bear directly on EVCI’s profitability. In re EVCI Colleges Holding Corp. Securities Litig., 469 F.Supp.2d 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Defense attorneys argued that the 203-paragraph class action complaint failed to satisfy the heightened pleadings requirements of the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and had failed to adequately plead scienter. Id., at 91. The district court observed that “[i]f read too literally, the statute would appear to impose on a securities plaintiff the almost insuperable burden of having to file a complaint that is as comprehensive as his closing argument after trial.” Id. The court concluded that the allegations in the class action complaint clearly satisfied the pleadings requirements under the PSLRA and Rule 9(b), and criticized defense attorneys for filing the motion to dismiss, which it characterized as "utterly lacking in merit."

EVCI is a holding company that provides “on-campus career two year college education” through three entities. Its principal subsidiary is Interboro; this asset “generates the bulk of EVCI's revenue” which “has grown substantially, from $8.6 million in 2000 to $50.4 million in 2005.” EVCI, at 92. The class action complaint alleged “pervasive fraud in the admissions process at EVCI's Interboro College – the institution that generated nearly all of EVCI's revenue during the asserted class period. Id. In brief, Interboro is two-year college, conditionally accredited by the State of New York, that primarily served “minority students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds” who had neither a high school diploma nor a GED, id., at 93. These students were required to pass an “ability-to-benefit” exam (ATB), and required federal and state grants to pay for their education at Interboro, and Interboro limited its tuition to the amounts of the student grants, id. “In other words, Interboro's revenues derive in substantial part – 94%, to be precise – from publicly funded education grants awarded to students who are both poor and poorly prepared for higher education. And EVCI, in turn, derives nearly all its revenue from Interboro.” Interboro was subject to strict state and federal regulation, and to maintain its conditional accreditation the college had to meet several goals, id.

Continue reading "PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases-In re EVCI Colleges: New York Federal Court Holds Safe Harbor Provision In Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) Inapplicable At Pleading Stage Of Securities Fraud Class Action" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

Louisiana Federal Court Holds that Local Controversy Exception to Class Action Removal Under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) was not Established Because Two Defendants had been Named in Class Actions Alleging Similar Claims Within the Three Years Preceding the Filing of the Instant Class Action Complaint

Six property owners filed a single class action complaint in Louisiana state court against six insurers alleging violations of the state’s Valued Policy Law, breach of contract and bad faith; Allstate’s defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court asserting jurisdiction under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 364, 365-66 (E.D. La. 2007). Plaintiffs moved to remand the class action to state court based on CAFA’s “local controversy” exception to removal, id., at 366. The district court denied the motion, agreeing with defense arguments that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving the applicability of that exception.

The class action plaintiffs alleged that Hurricane Katrina caused substantial damage to their homes and they sued their homeowner’s insurance carriers to recover policy benefits. Caruso, at 365. Each plaintiff was insured by a different insurer, so the class action complaint named as defendants Allstate Insurance Company, State Farm Insurance Company, Republic Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, Auto Club Family Insurance Company, Lafayette Insurance Company and Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Id. Allstate timely removed the lawsuit to federal court under CAFA, and plaintiffs’ sought remand alleging that the “local controversy” exception applied. Id., at 366. The district court found that “the proposed class action undoubtedly satisfies the CAFA's criteria for removal,” id.; the relevant inquiry was whether the local controversy exception applied.

Continue reading "CAFA/Hurricane Katrina Class Action Defense Case-Caruso v. Allstate: Removal Of Class Action Proper Under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) And Plaintiffs Failed To Establish Local Controversy Exception To Removal" »

Posted In: Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Removal & Remand, Class Action Court Decisions

For those class action defense attorneys who defend against RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) class actions, we provide the text of Regulation X. Congress gave authority to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to promulgate regulations for RESPA, and the regulations are set forth in 24 CFR § 3500.1 et seq. The regulations concerning affiliated business arrangements are set forth in § 3500.15, which provides:

§ 3500.15. Affiliated business arrangements

(a) General. An affiliated business arrangement is defined in section 3(7) of RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2602(7)).

(b) Violation and exemption. An affiliated business arrangement is not a violation of section 8 of RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2607) and of § 3500.14 if the conditions set forth in this section are satisfied. Paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not apply to the extent it is inconsistent with section 8(c)(4)(A) of RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2607(c)(4)(A)).

(1) The person making each referral has provided to each person whose business is referred a written disclosure, in the format of the Affiliated Business Arrangement Disclosure Statement set forth in Appendix D of this part, of the nature of the relationship (explaining the ownership and financial interest) between the provider of settlement services (or business incident thereto) and the person making the referral and of an estimated charge or range of charges generally made by such provider (which describes the charge using the same terminology, as far as practical, as section L of the HUD-1 settlement statement). The disclosures must be provided on a separate piece of paper no later than the time of each referral or, if the lender requires use of a particular provider, the time of loan application, except that:

(i) Where a lender makes the referral to a borrower, the condition contained in paragraph (b)(1) of this section may be satisfied at the time that the good faith estimate or a statement under § 3500.7(d) is provided; and

(ii) Whenever an attorney or law firm requires a client to use a particular title insurance agent, the attorney or law firm shall provide the disclosures no later than the time the attorney or law firm is engaged by the client. Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of this section may be overcome if the person making a referral can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that procedures reasonably adopted to result in compliance with these conditions have been maintained and that any failure to comply with these conditions was unintentional and the result of a bona fide error. An error of legal judgment with respect to a person's obligations under RESPA is not a bona fide error. Administrative and judicial interpretations of section 130(c) of the Truth in Lending Act shall not be binding interpretations of the preceding sentence or section 8(d)(3) of RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2607(d)(3)).

Continue reading "24 CFR § 3500.15—Regulations Concerning Affiliated Business Arrangements Under Regulation X (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act-RESPA)" »

Posted In: Statutes & Rules

As a resource to California defense attorneys and to assist them in anticipating the claims against which they may have to defend, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. Employment law class action cases generally top the list, and this past week was no exception. This report covers the time period from March 23 – March 29, 2007, during which time approximately 51 class action lawsuits were filed in these California state and federal courts. Labor law class action filings accounted for almost 40% of these cases, with 20 new lawsuits (39%). Next came unfair competition law (UCL) claims, which include false advertising class action cases, with 8 new class actions (16%). A group of categories just barely broke the 10% threshold, including 6 new products liability class actions (12%), and 5 new antitrust and 5 new debt collection practices class actions (10%).

Posted In: Class Actions In The News

Judicial Panel Grants Request, Unopposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Selects Southern District of Texas as Appropriate Transferee Court for Class Actions

Several class action lawsuits were filed against MERSCORP and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. challenging mortgage loan registration fees and alleging that the fees violate the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re MERSCORP Inc., et al., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Litig., 473 F.Supp.2d 1379, 1379 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2007). Lawyers for all plaintiffs in the separate class action lawsuits filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Eastern District of Texas. Id. Defense attorneys agreed that pretrial coordination was appropriate, and agreed further that the Eastern District of Texas was the appropriate transferee court. Id. The Judicial Panel granted the motion to centralize the class actions, but noted that the Eastern District of Texas “declined the assignment due to its heavy caseload.” Id., at 1379-80. Accordingly, the Panel transferred the cases to the Southern District of Texas for pretrial proceedings. Id., at 1380.

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Defense Victory will aid Merck in Defeating Motions to Certify other Lawsuits as Class Actions in the 265 Pending Class Action Lawsuits Involving Vioxx

Bruce Japsen of the Chicago Tribune reported yesterday that a jury in plaintiff-friendly Madison County has ruled in favor of Merck in a Vioxx case, handing Merck its first win in the Midwest and 10^th defense verdict overall. Japsen notes that Merck “has pledged to defend the Vioxx cases one by one, and has so far had only five defeats.” But the fight is far from over: Merck still faces 265 class action lawsuits in addition to 27,000 individual lawsuits. The risks are substantial: in one of its losses, the jury reportedly awarded the plaintiff more than $20 million.

The Madison County victory is important because it supports Merck’s argument that each case is different and so must be tried on a case by case basis. In the Madison County case, for example, the jury found that Vioxx was not the cause of the heart attack that killed a 5’2” tall, 280-pound 52-year-old woman, whose obesity, high blood pressure and diabetes, along with other health problems, likely contributed to her death. The deceased had used Vioxx for 20 months.

In prior articles, we have noted that Merck removed Vioxx from the market in 2004 because of increased risk of heart attacks and strokes.

Bruce Japsen’s article, entitled “10th win for Merck on Vioxx - Madison County jury gives drug giant 1st Midwest victory,” may be found in the Business Section of the March 28, 2007 edition of the Chicago Tribune.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News

In a lengthy decision issued on March 26, 2007, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class action in In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litig., Case No. No. 02 Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2007). The securities class action was filed against the French company Vivendi and two of its former officers, Jean-Marie Messier (former CEO) and Guillaume Hannezo (former CFO) on behalf of securities purchasers. According to the class action complaint, beginning in October 2000 defendants made materially false and misleading statements that caused Vivendi securities to trade at artificially inflated prices and these statements included representations made in connection with the December 2000 three-way merger of Vivendi, Seagram Company Limited and Canal Plus, S.A. The class action alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, as well as Sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

We do not here summarize the court’s lengthy decision. We highlight, however, the district court’s conclusions that while class action treatment was appropriate for Dutch, English and French shareholders, it was not the “superior method” of litigation for the Austrian or German shareholders and so excluded those claimants from the class.

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

New Jersey Federal Court Holds as Matter of First Impression that Dismissal of One Claim for Relief under Federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) Requires Dismissal of Entire Complaint

Plaintiffs filed a putative securities class action against various Lord Abbett entities and numerous other defendants as “a federal class action complaint based upon the failure of defendant Lord Abbett ... to disclose excessive fees and commissions they siphoned from Lord Abbett mutual fund investors in order to improperly pay and induce brokers to steer investors into Lord Abbett mutual funds.” In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 463 F.Supp.2d 505, 506-07 (D. N.J. 2006). The class action complaint contained 10 claims for relief under both state and federal law, all premised on the allegation that Lord Abbett “compensated brokers excessively as an incentive to steer new investors into Lord Abbett mutual funds,” id., at 507. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action under Rule 12(b)(6); the district court granted the motion, ruling in part that the state law claims were preempted by the federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), but granted leave to amend with respect to two of the federal claims in the class action complaint. Id. Relying on Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir.2005), defense attorneys sought reconsideration on the ground that because the court dismissed Counts 7-10 under SLUSA, the court was required to dismiss the entire class action. Id., at 507-08. Ultimately, the district court vacated its order granting leave to amend and dismissed the class action complaint with prejudice.

The class action complaint advanced claims for relief under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) (Counts 1-4), the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 (IAA) (Count 5), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Count 6) which plaintiff later dismissed, and for unjust enrichment and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and duties of good faith, loyalty, fair dealing, due care, and/or candor (Counts 7-10). In re Lord Abbett, at 507 and n.1. The district court dismissed Counts 1-5 for failure to state a claim, and dismissed Counts 7-10 as preempted by SLUSA. Id., at 507. However, the court also concluded that Counts 3 and 4 under ICA §§ 36(b) and 48(a) failed “because no direct cause of action exists under those statutes,” and granted plaintiffs leave to amend the class action complaint so as to replead them derivatively. Id. The defense moved the district court to dismiss the class action complaint with prejudice on the ground that preemption of one class action claim under SLUSA required dismissal of the entire class action complaint. Id., at 508.

Continue reading "SLUSA Class Action Defense Cases-In re Lord Abbett: Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Complaint With Prejudice Holding SLUSA Preemption Of One Claim Requires Dismissal Of Entire Class Action" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

When District Court Finds Signatory to a Written Arbitration Agreement is Equitably Estopped from Avoiding Arbitration with a Nonsignatory, the Writing Requirement of Section 16 of the FAA (Federal Arbitration Act) is Satisfied Thereby Permitting Court of Appeals to Consider Interlocutory Appeal Second Circuit Holds

After more than twenty class action lawsuits were filed against VISA, MasterCard and their member banks alleging a conspiracy to fix fees for conversion of foreign currencies in violation of the Sherman Act, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the actions in the Southern District of New York for pretrial purposes (“the MDL Litigation”), see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F.Supp.2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration; the district court granted the motion in part, holding (1) cardholders with cardholder agreements containing arbitration clauses were bound to arbitrate their disputes, and (2) the equitable estoppel doctrine also required those cardholders to arbitrate their disputes “against non-signatory banks”; the district court rejected a claim that the illegal conspiracy allegation rendered the arbitration clauses unenforceable, see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F.Supp.2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Thereafter, a class action was filed against American Express Company, American Express Travel Related Services Company and American Express Centurion Bank (collectively “Amex”) asserting the same claims as those raised in the MDL Litigation and alleging that Amex conspired with the defendants in the MDL Litigation “to ‘impose compulsory arbitration clauses on [their] cardholders and the cardholders of [their] co-conspirators’ in order ‘to suppress competition and deprive their cardholders of a meaningful choice concerning the arbitration of disputes.’” Ross v. American Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). Though not a signatory to an arbitration agreement, Amex defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action and compel arbitration under the equitable estoppel doctrine, and to stay the class action: “[Amex] argued that the arbitration clauses contained in the cardholder agreements with the MDL Defendants bound [the class action plaintiffs] to arbitrate their dispute with [Amex].” Id. The district court agreed that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied because the claims in the class action complaint against Amex were “inextricably intertwined” with the claims in the MDL Litigation, but it refused to compel arbitration or stay the class action against Amex pending the arbitration of the MDL Litigation; the court believed that the antitrust allegations necessitated a jury trial on the issue of enforceability of the arbitration clauses in the cardholder agreements. Id. American Express appealed, asserting appellate jurisdiction under section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Second Circuit denied the motion. Id., at 98-99.

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Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

Securities Class Action Complaint Properly Dismissed for Failure to Meet Pleading Requirements Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and for Failure to Adequately Allege Loss Causation Fourth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative securities class action against Cree, Inc., a high-technology business in Durham, North Carolina, for violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1924 and Rule 10b-5 alleging it made misleading statements about its business transactions and that these misstatements were discovered when a former officer sued the company. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. February 20, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the allegations in the class action complaint failed to satisfy the heightened pleadings requirements imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), id. The district court dismissed the class action, holding that “the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support the plaintiffs' claims that Cree's statements were misleading” and that “plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that the statements were made with the requisite scienter or that plaintiffs' losses were caused by the misrepresentations and omissions of which they complained.” Id. (italics in original). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, “concluding that plaintiffs are complaining only about market risks, not particularized securities fraud.” Id., at 168.

In June 2003, Cree’s co-founder Eric Hunter filed suit against Cree and various officers and directors, including his brother and co-founder F. Neal Hunter, for violations of state and federal securities laws, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the complaint additionally sought “a preliminary injunction against Cree and Neal Hunter to prevent alleged personal harassment that appeared to have attended an ongoing family fight.” Hunter, at 168. Eric had served as Cree’s CEO from 1987 to 1994, and news of his lawsuit caused Cree's stock price to drop from $22.21 to $18.10 in a single day. Id. Eric’s lawsuit was resolved only two months later, but “the allegations in his complaint quickly spawned numerous class actions by purchasers of Cree stock who alleged securities fraud during a period beginning on August 12, 1999, when Cree filed an annual report on SEC Form 10-K, and ending on June 13, 2003, the day after Eric Hunter filed his suit, purportedly revealing the truth of Cree's fraud during the previous years.” Id. Eventually the cases were consolidated in the Middle District of North Carolina, and the court named Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana as lead plaintiff. The first amended class action complaint alleged violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (prohibiting false or misleading statements), § 20(a) (control person liability), § 18 (personal liability for making misleading statements), and Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304 (reimbursement of accounting restatement costs due to misconduct). Id., at 168-69. The specific allegations of the complaint are set forth at page 169.

The Fourth Circuit summarized the district court order granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion as follows: “The court concluded first that ‘plaintiffs adequately identif[ied] the statements [of Cree] they believe[d] to be false and the reasons why they believe[d] them to be false, but fail[ed] to state with particularity facts supporting a strong inference of fraud.’ Second, the district court concluded that plaintiffs did not adequately plead that the defendants acted with the requisite scienter because the complaint neither identified misleading statements or omissions nor alleged sufficient circumstantial evidence of scienter. Finally, the court found that ‘plaintiffs ... failed to demonstrate a direct relationship between their losses and the alleged misrepresentations and have failed, therefore, to establish the required element of loss causation.’ [¶] Having dismissed the first count alleging a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court also dismissed plaintiffs' claims under §§ 20(a) and 20A . . . because these claims depended upon the liability alleged in the first count. Similarly, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim pursuant to § 18 . . . because plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing that Cree made false statements. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim under § 304 . . . because plaintiffs did not allege that Cree was required to issue any restatement of its financial reports.” Hunter, at 169-70.

Continue reading "Class Action Defense Cases-Teachers’ Retirement v. Hunter: Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Class Action Based On Heightened Pleadings Requirements Under Federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions