Posted On: October 11, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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White v. DaimlerChrysler-Class Action Defense Cases: Defense Motion To Dismiss Consumer Fraud Class Action Granted Because Plaintiff Failed To Plead Fraud Or Damages With Requisite Specificity Illinois Court Holds

Illinois Court Affirms Dismissal of Consumer Fraud Class Action Because Fraud Allegations were Conclusory and Complaint Failed to Allege Actual Damages

A car buyer filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against DaimlerChrysler Corporation for alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., claiming that defendant concealed a “material defect” in its Jeeps; specifically, plaintiff claimed the exhaust manifold was “substandard and defective” because it was made of tubular steel rather than the more expensive (and allegedly “standard”) cast iron. White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 2739009 (Ill.App. September 26, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint on several grounds; the trial court granted the defense motion, and plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act claims. Id., at 1. The appellate court affirmed.

Continue reading "White v. DaimlerChrysler-Class Action Defense Cases: Defense Motion To Dismiss Consumer Fraud Class Action Granted Because Plaintiff Failed To Plead Fraud Or Damages With Requisite Specificity Illinois Court Holds" »

Posted On: October 10, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Cingular Class Action Defense Case-Kinkel v. Cingular: Illinois Rejects Defense Efforts To Enforce Arbitration Clause Barring Class Action Device And Refuses To Apply Arbitration Terms Effective After Class Action Plaintiff Terminated Service Contract

Court Holds that Arbitration Clause in Effect at Time Class Action Plaintiff Terminated her Service Agreement Governed in Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Class Action Waiver in Wireless Service Provider’s Arbitration Clause Held Unenforceable by Illinois Supreme Court

Plaintiff filed a class action in Illinois state court against her cellular telephone service provider, Cingular Wireless, for alleged violations of the state’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act on the ground that the early termination fee is an unlawful penalty. Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause that provided that “‘no arbitrator has the authority’ to resolve class claims.” Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2006 WL 2828664 (Ill. October 5, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The trial court refused to compel arbitration. The appellate court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable, but that the prohibition against class action arbitrations was not; accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s ruling. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected defense arguments that the class action bar was enforceable and affirmed the decision of the appellate court.

Plaintiff signed a two-year service contract with Cingular in July 2001, but terminated her service in April 2002. Cingular charged her a $150 early-termination fee, in accordance with the terms of the service agreement plaintiff signed when she became a customer. Slip Opn., at 2. Plaintiff filed a class action against Cingular, arguing that the early-termination fee was an illegal penalty and that the class action waiver in the arbitration clause “prevents her and others from ‘effectively vindicating their statutory and common law causes of action and facilitates rather than remedies Cingular’s fraudulent and unlawful conduct.’” Id. The trial court denied a defense motion to compel arbitration; the appellate court found the class-action waiver provision to be unenforceable but severable from the balance of the arbitration clause, and so reversed. Id.

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Posted On: October 9, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Koehl v. Verio-Class Action Defense Cases: Class Representatives Hit With Damages And Half-Million Dollar Attorney Fee Award By California Court After Losing Labor Law Class Action Against Former Employer

California Court Holds that Compensation Scheme Permitting Chargebacks Against Monies Advanced Against Unearned Commissions did not Violate State Labor Laws Because Such Commissions were not Wages

Four former employees filed a class action in California state court against internet service provider Verio for violations of California’s labor laws on the grounds that Verio’s compensation scheme - which provided for a base salary, plus commissions that were subject to charge backs under certain conditions - violated California Labor Code § 221 because the commissions were wages. Koehl v. Verio, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 749, 751 (Cal.App. 2006). “The complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) commission chargebacks in violation of Labor Code sections 221, 223, 225 and 400-410; (2) waiting penalties pursuant to section 203; and (3) unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.Id., at 759 (footnote omitted). Verio cross-complained against the class representatives for commissions recoverable as charge-backs under the compensation scheme, id. The trial court agreed that the commissions were not wages, awarded the employer compensatory damages (for overpayment of unearned commissions) and prejudgment interest totaling more than $250,000, and awarded the employer more than $548,000 in attorney fees. Id., at 759-60. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Continue reading "Koehl v. Verio-Class Action Defense Cases: Class Representatives Hit With Damages And Half-Million Dollar Attorney Fee Award By California Court After Losing Labor Law Class Action Against Former Employer" »

Posted On: October 8, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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15 U.S.C. § 77b-1--Swap Agreements Under The Securities Act Of 1933

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against securities class actions, we provide the text of the Securities Act of 1933. Congress defined "swap agreements" in 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1:

§ 77b-1. Swap agreements

(a) Non-security-based swap agreements

The definition of "security" in section 77b(a)(1) of this title does not include any non-security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206C of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).

(b) Security-based swap agreements

(1) The definition of "security" in section 77b(a)(1) of this title does not include any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).

(2) The Commission is prohibited from registering, or requiring, recommending, or suggesting, the registration under this subchapter of any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). If the Commission becomes aware that a registrant has filed a registration statement with respect to such a swap agreement, the Commission shall promptly so notify the registrant. Any such registration statement with respect to such a swap agreement shall be void and of no force or effect.

(3) The Commission is prohibited from--

(A) promulgating, interpreting, or enforcing rules; or

(B) issuing orders of general applicability;

under this subchapter in a manner that imposes or specifies reporting or recordkeeping requirements, procedures, or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or insider trading with respect to any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).

(4) References in this subchapter to the "purchase" or "sale" of a security-based swap agreement shall be deemed to mean the execution, termination (prior to its scheduled maturity date), assignment, exchange, or similar transfer or conveyance of, or extinguishing of rights or obligations under, a security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), as the context may require.

Posted On: October 7, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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15 U.S.C. § 77b--Definitions Applicable To Lawsuits Under The Securities Act Of 1933

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against securities class actions, we provide the text of the Securities Act of 1933. Preliminarily, Congress set forth the applicable definitions in 15 U.S.C. § 77b:

§ 77b. Definitions; promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation

(a) Definitions

When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires--

(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.

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Posted On: October 6, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Public Accommodation/ADA Class Action Lawsuits Again Seize Top Spot Of Weekly Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

The evidence suggests that the recent wave of public accommodation/ADA class action lawsuits will continue for the foreseeable future. In order to assist class action defense attorneys in California to anticipate the claims against which they may have to defend, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. At one time, employment law cases routinely headed the list, but an increasing number of class actions alleging public accommodation/Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims have been filed.

This report covers the time period from October 2 – October 5, 2006. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. Approximately 55 class action lawsuits were filed in these California state and federal courts during that time period, of which 29 – almost 53% – involved public accommodation/ADA claims. Coming in at a distant second place, 8 new employment law class actions (15%) were filed during this time period.

Posted On: October 6, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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U-Haul Class Action Defense Case-Aron v. U-Haul: Trial Court Erred In Granting Defense Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings In Class Action Alleging California CLRA And UCL Violations

California Court Holds that Class Action Complaint Adequately Alleged Violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Based on Truck Rental Company’s Refueling Practices

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against U-Haul for violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) arising out of U-Haul’s refueling charges and practices. Aron v. U-Haul Co. of California, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 2006 WL 2808074 (Cal.App. October 3, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Defense attorneys moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed. Id. The facts of the case are simple, and are concisely summarized by the appellate court at page 2 as follows:

U-Haul Company of California and U-Haul International, Inc. (“U-Haul”) rent trucks to customers. Rather than supplying those customers with fully fueled trucks, U-Haul rents its trucks partially fueled, presenting them to each succeeding customer with the fuel remaining when the previous customer returned the vehicle. The level of the fuel gauge is the exclusive means of measurement relied on. If on return, the fuel gauge is lower than at rental, U-Haul charges the customer a $20 fueling fee as well as $2 per gallon for fuel estimated to have been used, but not replaced, by the customer. U-Haul does not reimburse customers for additional fuel if a truck is returned with more fuel than initially provided.

The rental contract sets out these two options explicitly: “I confirm equipment is clean and agree to pay for all fuel used and return the truck with the same fuel gauge reading as indicated on this rental contract and will pay $20 fueling fee plus $2 per gallon for estimated fuel used. U-Haul does not reimburse for excess fuel purchased by the customer.”

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Posted On: October 5, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Farm Raised Salmon Class Action Defense Case: Class Action Preempted By Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act (FDCA) Because No State Law Private Right Of Action Exists Based On FDCA Violations California Court Holds

In Action Alleging California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Business Practices (UCL) Claims Concerning Artificially Colored Farmed Salmon, California Court of Appeal Affirms Judgment Granting Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action on Grounds of Federal Preemption

Plaintiffs filed separate class action lawsuits against various defendants for unfair competition, false advertising, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) based on the alleged sale of artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing that the salmon had been artificially colored. Farm Raised Salmon Cases, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 449, 451 (Cal.App. 2006). The class action was premised on the allegation that the flesh of farmed salmon is naturally “grayish,” so they were fed chemicals for the purpose of coloring the flesh so that it would resemble the color of wild salmon. The complaint alleged that consumers would be less inclined to purchase the salmon without the chemical coloring, and that consumers were not informed of the artificial coloring. Specifically, the class action alleged that “the FDCA and parallel state laws require food labeling to state that farmed salmon is artificially colored,” id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. The trial court dismissed the class action and the appellate court affirmed, holding that “Congress made clear its intention to preclude private enforcement of the FDCA” and that “a state law private right of action based on an FDCA violation would frustrate the purposes of exclusive federal and state governmental prosecution of the act,” id.

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Posted On: October 4, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Class Action Defense Cases-Del Campo v. Kennedy: California Federal Court Denies Defense Motion For Protective Order That Sought To Bar Third Party Precertification Discovery In FDCPA Class Action

California Federal Court Reaffirms that Scope of Precertification Discovery in Class Action Lawsuits is Within the Discretion of the Court

A putative class action alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was filed against a county district attorney and a private company (ACCS) under contract to administer the county’s Bad Check Restitution Program. Del Campo v. Kennedy, 236 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Cal. 2006). After plaintiff learned that the check she had given a store merchant (Fry’s Electronics) did not clear, she called the store and offered to make full payment: “The store declined her offer because the check had not been entered yet into the computer system.” Id., at 456. Plaintiff later received a letter from the district attorney concerning the crime of writing a bad check, and advising her that she owed not only the amount of the check ($95.02), but a returned item fee ($10), administrative fee ($35), and bad check restitution program fee ($125); plaintiff tendered only the amount of the delinquent check. Id. Upon receiving a demand threatening criminal action if she failed to pay the $170 in additional fees, plaintiff filed the FDCPA class action. Id. Eventually, the class action was consolidated with another lawsuit. Plaintiff then filed subpoenas on two stores (Safeway and Target), and defense attorneys filed a motion to quash the subpoenas or for a protective order.

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Posted On: October 3, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Class Action Defense Cases-Anchor Lighting v. SoCal Edison: California Public Utilities Commission Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over State Utilities

California Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Class Action By Commercial Electricity Customer Against Electricity Supplier

A commercial electricity customer, Anchor Lighting, filed a putative class action against electricity supplier Southern California Edison after it failed to qualify for a 10% rate reduction; the trial court agreed with defense attorneys that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims and dismissed the lawsuit. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) had “exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation and control of utilities and that jurisdiction, once assumed, cannot be hampered or second-guessed by a superior court action addressing the same issue.” Anchor Lighting v. Southern California Edison Co., ___ Cal.App.4thh ___, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 7810, 784 (Cal.App. August 30, 2006).

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Posted On: October 2, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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DirecTV Class Action Defense Case-Cohen v. DirecTV: Class Action Waiver In Arbitration Clause Unconscionable And Unenforceable California Court Holds

In Action Alleging California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Business Practices (UCL) Claims, California Court of Appeal Affirms Trial Court Order Denying Defense Motion to Compel Arbitration of Under Arbitration Clause that Prohibited Class Action Litigation

Philip Cohen filed a putative class action in California state court against DirecTV under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and unfair business practices (UCL) on the grounds that DirecTV broadcast to its HDTV customers a “below-standard signal, contrary to its advertisements.” Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1445 (Cal.App. 2006). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration; plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it prohibited class action litigation of claims, and that the arbitration clause was not binding on plaintiff because of the manner in which it had been added to DirecTV’s customer agreement. The trial court denied the defense motion on the grounds that the arbitration provision was “procedurally and substantively unconscionable, against public policy and unenforceable.” Id., at 1446. DirecTV appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

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Posted On: October 1, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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15 U.S.C. § 1681x – Corporate and Technological Circumvention Prohibited: Statutory Provisions of the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) for Class Action Defense Attorneys

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. To make it perfectly clear that Congress intended to achieve its goals for the FCRA, it specifically enacted legislation prohibiting companies from avoiding the effects of the law, providing in Section 1681x:

§ 1681x. Corporate and technological circumvention prohibited

The Commission shall prescribe regulations, to become effective not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this section, to prevent a consumer reporting agency from circumventing or evading treatment as a consumer reporting agency described in section 1681a(p) of this title for purposes of this title, including—

(1) by means of a corporate reorganization or restructuring, including a merger, acquisition, dissolution, divestiture, or asset sale of a consumer reporting agency; or

(2) by maintaining or merging public record and credit account information in a manner that is substantially equivalent to that described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1681a(p) of this title, in the manner described in section 1681a(p) of this title.

Posted On: September 30, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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NLRB Decision In Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB No. 37, Clarifies Definition Of "Supervisor" Under Section 2(11)--Class Action Defense Issues

The NLRB issued a broad and long-awaited decision on September 29, 2006 which affects the definition of "supervisor" under the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"). Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB NO. 37, and two other companion cases, impact all industries and could undermine the power of labor unions as millions of employees could potentially be re-classified as "supervisors." As "supervisors," these employees would be precluded from joining unions and would no longer be covered by collective bargaining agreements. Not surprisingly, labor unions are in an uproar over the Oakwood Healthcare decisions. They have called them "outrageous" and are threatening strikes against employers who re-classify employees under the new decisions.

Section 2(11) of the Act defines a supervisor as an employee who has the authority to perform any of 12 tasks in the interest of the employer while using independent judgment. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court provided general guidance on the definition of "supervisor" under Section 2(11) in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001). Using Kentucky River's guiding principles, the NLRB clarified the definition of "supervisor" under Section 2(11). In a well-written and thorough decision, the NLRB defines previously ambiguous terms such as "assign," "responsibly to direct," and "independent judgment" as used in Section 2(11).

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Posted On: September 30, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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15 U.S.C. § 1681w – Disposal of Records: Statutory Provisions of the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) for Class Action Defense Attorneys

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against class actions brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. Congress enacted legislation concerning the disposal of records as follows:

§ 1681w. Disposal of records

(a) Regulations

(1) In general.

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission with respect to the entities that are subject to their respective enforcement authority under section 1681s of this title, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in coordination as described in paragraph (2), shall issue final regulations requiring any person that maintains or otherwise possesses consumer information, or any compilation of consumer information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose to properly dispose of any such information or compilation.

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Posted On: September 29, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Class Action Defense Cases-Goin v. Bass Pro: Defense Removal Of Class Action To Federal Court Improper Because Lawsuit Arose Under Workers’ Compensation Law

Tennessee Federal Court Grants Motion to Remand Because 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) Prohibits Removal of Actions “Arising Under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws”

Following a work-related injury, a store manager retained a lawyer to negotiate a workers’ compensation settlement with her employer. She maintains that her employer retaliated and ultimately fired her. Her attorney filed a putative class action in state court against her employer alleging “reprisal and/or retaliatory discharge for asserting workers’ compensation rights.” Going v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 437 F.Supp.2d 762, 764 (W.D. Tenn. 2006). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on grounds of diversity; plaintiff’s lawyer moved to remand the lawsuit on the grounds that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) prohibited removal. Id. The district court rejected defense arguments and remanded the class action to state court.

The district court explained that the general rules governing removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 do not apply to actions “arising under the workmen’s compensation laws,” as such actions are specifically exempted from removal under § 1445(c). Goin, at 765-66. The question, then, is whether plaintiff’s lawsuit “‘arises under’ the [state’s] workers’ compensation laws, which in turn hinges upon the legal source of the cause of action at issue.” Id., at 766. The controlling authority for this inquiry is the Sixth Circuit opinion in Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Posted On: September 28, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Class Action Defense Cases-Glauser v. EVCI: New York Federal Court Grants Motion To Consolidated Class Action Lawsuits Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) And to Appoint Lead Plaintiff And Lead Counsel

Federal Court Grants Motion to Consolidate PSLRA Class Actions, and Pursuant to PSLRA Appoints Plaintiff With Largest Financial Investment as Lead Plaintiff and Confirms Lead Plaintiff’s Choice of Lead Counsel

Six securities fraud class action lawsuits were filed against a corporation and three of its officers and directors alleging that defendants violated §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 by making false and misleading statements concerning the corporations earnings and enrollment growth. A separate derivative action also was filed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys in five of the class actions sought consolidation of the lawsuits and appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel. Glauser v. EVCI Career Colleges Holding Corp., 236 F.R.D 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The defense apparently took no position on the motions, each of which were granted by the district court.

With respect to the consolidation motion, the federal court held that “consolidation is particularly appropriate in the context of securities class actions if the complaints are ‘based on the same “public statements and reports.”’” Glauser, at 186 (citation omitted). Because the class actions involved “common issues of law and fact” the Court consolidated those lawsuits “for all purposes,” including trial; the derivative action was consolidated for all pretrial purposes, and the Court reserved a decision on whether to consolidate it for trial as well. Id.

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Posted On: September 27, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Weekly California State And Federal Class Action Filings Predominantly Labor Law Cases

As a service to California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. This report covers the time period from September 22 – September 26, 2006. Approximately 40 class action lawsuits were filed in these California state and federal courts during that time period, of which 19 (48%) involved employment law claims. Demonstrating the predominance of labor law class actions in California, not a single other category of cases satisfied the 10% threshold requirement to be listed in this report.

Posted On: September 27, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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In re Tobacco II Cases-Class Action Defense Cases: California Court Properly Denied Class Action Of CLRA Claims Against Tobacco Companies And Properly Decertified Class As To UCL Claims

Class Action Against Tobacco Companies for Labeling Cigarettes "Light" Allegedly to Mislead Smokers Into Believing They were Less Harmful Than Regular Cigarettes was not Superior Method of Resolution Because Individual Issues Would Predominate California Court Holds

In 1997, smokers filed a putative class action against numerous tobacco companies arising out of “marketing and advertising activities in California” and seeking “to recover economic losses resulting from purchasing cigarettes.” In re Tobacco II Cases, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 917, 919 (Cal.App. September 5, 2006). Eventually, in October 2000, the sole remaining plaintiff sought class certification of his seventh amended complaint, which a Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claim, an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) claim, and a false advertising claim. Defense attorneys previously had persuaded the court to deny a motion to certify a class action on common law and CLRA claims because “individual issues of causation and injury predominate over common issues.” Id. The trial court refused to certify a class on the CLRA claim because it was an improper motion for reconsideration “and found that individual issues relating to causation, injury, reliance, materiality, exposure to the alleged misstatements, statutes of limitations, and choice of law predominate.” However, the court granted class certification as to the UCL and false advertising claims as they “do not require the individualized determinations as to reliance.” Id.

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Posted On: September 26, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Certification Of Class Action Against Tobacco Companies Hits Newspapers

New York Federal Court Order Certifying Class Action Against Tobacco Companies for Misleading Smokers into Believing that "Light" Cigarettes were Less Harmful Becomes Hot Topic of Discussion

We reported yesterday on the order by United States District Court Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York that certified a massive class action against numerous tobacco companies based on the allegation that the companies intentionally mislead smokers into believing that "light" cigarettes were less harmful than regular cigarettes. As expected, that decision is headline news. While there are undoubtedly countless competent articles on the subject, we believe a few deserve to be singled out. For those interested in reading news articles on the subject rather than the 540-page court opinion, we recommend the following reports.

An article by Wall Street Journal reporter Vanessa O'Connell, entitled, "Tobacco Firms Exposed To New $200 Billion Claim," which may be found on page A3 of the September 26, 2006 edition of the Wall Street Journal.

An article by New York Times reporters David Cay Johnston and Melanie Warner, entitled "Tobacco Makers Lose Key Ruling on Latest Suits," which may be found in Section A of the September 26, 2006 edition of the New York Times, as well as the September 26, 2006 online edition of the New York Times at nytimes.com. The link is <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/26/business/26tobacco.html>.

Posted On: September 26, 2006 by Michael J. Hassen Email This Post

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Class Action Defense Cases-McCall v. Drive Financial: Class Action Statutory Damages Under Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Can Exceed $500,000 Pennsylvania Court Holds

Pennsylvania Federal District Court Holds that Named Class Action Plaintiffs may Recover Damages Under the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Both Individually and as a Member of the Class

A class action was filed in federal court against Drive Financial Services and Drive G.P. alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in that defendants allegedly sent letters “on the ostensible letterhead” of an attorney for the purpose of collecting a debt. McCall v. Drive Fin. Serv., L.P., 440 F.Supp.2d 388, 388-89 (E.D. Pa. 2006). Plaintiff’s lawyer filed a motion in limine to determine the amount of statutory damages that would be available under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). Id. The district court rejected the argument by defense attorneys that the named class action plaintiff could not also recover as a member of the class, and held the maximum amount of statutory damages available at trial to be $501,000. Id., at 391.

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