Class Action Defense Blog

Federal class action defense attorneys know that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., provides debtors with a means for challenging payoff demands and determining the validity and accuracy of asserted debts. The specific statutory language of the FDCPA concerning the validation of debts is quoted below:

§ 1692g. Validation of debts

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing--

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(b) Disputed debts

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.

(c) Admission of liability

The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

In an effort to assist California class action defense attorneys anticipate claims against which they may have to defend, we provide an unofficial summary of legal categories for class actions filed in California state and federal courts from June 22 - June 29, 2006, in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that boast 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. Approximately 52 class action lawsuits were filed in California during that time period, of which 16 involved employment law claims (more than 30%). Class action defense attorneys will face 9 “dog pile” lawsuits against British Airways (17%) for alleged price fixing, and an additional 6 of the class action filings (11%) alleged securities violations. Finally, 5 of the class action cases alleged violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), California Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News

A defense lawyer in a federal class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., often confronts allegations of "unfair practices" by debt collectors. As a resource to attorneys in class actions, we here provide the statutory language of the FDCPA relevant to such claims:

§ 1692f. Unfair practices

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

(2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of the debt collector's intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.

(3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.

(4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

(5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

(6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if--

(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;

(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.

(7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

(8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

Defense attorneys often deal with class actions under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., alleging false or misleading representations made by debt collectors. As a resource for the class action defense lawyer, we set forth the language of the application statute under the FDCPA:

§ 1692e. False or misleading representations

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

(2) The false representation of--

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

(6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to--

(A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or

(B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter.

(7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

(9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.

(12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.

(13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

(14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization.

(15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.

(16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 1681a(f) of this title.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

MDL Judicial Panel Grants Defense Motion To Eliminate Duplicative Discovery, Prevent Inconsistent Rulings, and Conserve Resources of Parties and Court in Pretrial Proceedings of Class Action Cases

Three class action lawsuits were filed against Ocean Financial Corp. and its subsidiary Ocean Bank, F.S.B. alleging violations under the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) in that defendants purportedly used consumer reports "for purposes of mailing prescreened offers of credit for home equity loans to plaintiffs and potential class members." In re Ocean Financial Corp. Prescreening Litigation, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2006 WL 1737553 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit., June 21, 2006). The class actions had been filed in the Northern District of Illinois, the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and the District of Rhode Island, and the Judicial Panel found that there was overlap among the putative members of each class action. The defense filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for coordination or consolidation of the class actions for purposes of pretrial proceedings. On June 21, 2006, the MDL Judicial Panel granted the unopposed defense motion, holding that the class actions would benefit from such treatment:

On the basis of the papers filed and hearing session held, the Panel finds that these three actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization under Section 1407 in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation. . . . Centralization under Section 1407 is necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.

In re Ocean Financial Corp., at ___.

NOTE: The MDL Panel's ruling is not surprising. We summarize this case to provide an example of consolidation/coordination motions and orders for attorneys unfamiliar with the procedure.

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Class Action Court Decisions

Second Circuit Reaffirms SEC’s Authority SEC Authority to Create Exemptions to Security Exchange Act's Proxy Statement Requirements and Upholds Exemption For Foreign Private Issuers - Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Affirmed

On June 1, 2006, in Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second Circuit addressed a “novel” challenge to exemptions for foreign private issuers to the proxy statement requirements of the Securities Exchange Act (“the Act”). The challenge came in the form of a putative class action premised on the allegation that a proxy statement issued by Tower Semiconductor “was materially misleading and therefore violated §§ 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . ., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78t, and certain regulations, including Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2004),” id., at 289. The defense moved to dismiss the class action on the grounds that Tower was a foreign private issuer (an Israeli corporation) and therefore exempt from § 14(a) by virtue of Rule 3a12-3 of the Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2004). Plaintiffs’ lawyer responded that the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) “exceeded its authority in promulgating Rule 3a12-3,” id. The District Court agreed with defense counsel and dismissed the class action.

Continue reading "Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor: Order Granting Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Alleging Violation of Security Exchange Act’s Proxy Solicitation Requirements Affirmed By Second Circuit" »

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions, PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions

As a resource for federal defense lawyer defending against class actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., we provide on this site the text of the FDCPA. Attorneys in FDCPA class action cases often concern communications from debt collectors, which is governed by the following statute:

§ 1692d. Harassment or abuse

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) of this title.

(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

The Associated Press reports that the Senate is nearing a vote on legislation that would further expand federal court jurisdiction over class action lawsuits. Last year, Congress enacted CAFA, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which in part significantly expanded access to federal courts in defense of class actions. The Senate bill would further expand such access. Because defense attorneys often remove class actions to federal court whenever possible, class action defense attorneys will be very interested in the progress of this pending legislation.

Posted In: Class Actions In The News

English Only Policy Supports Claims for Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, Intentional Discrimination and Violation of Equal Protection

After the City of Altus, Oklahoma, implemented an “English-only” policy for its employees because “other employees could not understand what was being said on the City radio” when Hispanic employees spoke in Spanish to one another, plaintiffs filed a putative class action asserting numerous discrimination-based claims. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court granted the defense motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims advanced by the class action plaintiffs. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling in part, but permitted the class action to proceed on several key grounds because it found a triable issue of fact as to the allegations of “disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII; intentional discrimination under [42 U.S.C.] § 1981; and violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Maldonado, at 1298. We provide but a cursory review of the opinion here; a link to the detailed opinion may be found at the end of the article.

Cutting to the chase, in analyzing the class action claims the Tenth Circuit explained that “disparate-impact claims[] ‘involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.’” Maldonado, at 1303 (quoting Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977) (italics added)). The Court further explained that in considering whether a plaintiff’s lawyer has established a prima facie case of disparate impacts (whether in class actions or otherwise), the Court employs a sliding scale: “The less the apparent justification for mandating English, the more reasonable it is to infer hostility toward employees whose ethnic group or nationality favors another language.” Maldonado, at 1305. Maldonado held that a prima facie case existed: “Here, the very fact that the City would forbid Hispanics from using their preferred language could reasonably be construed as an expression of hostility to Hispanics. At least that could be a reasonable inference if there was no apparent legitimate purpose for the restrictions.” Id.

Continue reading "Defense of Class Action Employment Law Issues–District Court Order Granting Defense Motion for Summary Judgment In Class Action Arising Out Of “English-Only” Policy Affirmed In Part And Reversed In Part By Tenth Circuit" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

As a resource for defense lawyer defending against class actions under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., we provide on this site the text of the FDCPA. Attorneys in FDCPA class action cases often concern communications from debt collectors, which is governed by the following statute:

§ 1692c. Communication in connection with debt collection

(a) Communication with the consumer generally

Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt--

(1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o'clock antemeridian and before 9 o'clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer's location;

(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or

(3) at the consumer's place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.

(b) Communication with third parties

Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

(c) Ceasing communication

If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except--

(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated;

(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or

(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.

If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.

(d) "Consumer" defined

For the purpose of this section, the term "consumer" includes the consumer's spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer defending against class actions under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., we provide the text of the FDCPA on this site for attorneys.

§ 1692b. Acquisition of location information

Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall--

(1) identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer;

(2) not state that such consumer owes any debt;

(3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information;

(4) not communicate by post card;

(5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt; and

(6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to communication from the debt collector.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

Despite “Significant Differences” Between Rule 23 and RCFC 23 (Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims), and Despite Rarity of Class Action Certification, Class Actions Are Not Disfavored in Court of Federal Claims

On March 31, 2006, a United States Court of Federal Claims certified a class action under Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 23. Filosa v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 609 (2006). Though RCFC 23 “is modeled largely” on class action certification under Rule 23, “‘there are significant differences.’” Id., at 610 (quoting RCFC 23, Rules Comm. Note). Though differences are outside the scope of this article. The ruling is noteworthy, however, because it represents only the second time that a class action has been certified by a Court of Federal Claims since RCFC 23 was “completely rewritten” in May 2002. Id. But while recognizing the rarity of the event, the court insisted, “class actions are not disfavored by the united States Court of Federal Claims.” Id., at 611 (citation omitted).

Filosa is a class action brought by nurse care managers employed by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Filosa, at 611. They provide services to veterans under the MHICM (Mental Health Intensive Case Management Service) Program, which requires that they “field calls that are received [from veterans] on weekends, holidays, evenings, or nights.” Id. at 612. The class action alleges that the nurses failed to receive overtime pay. The court’s opinion provides a detailed analysis of its consideration of numerosity, commonality, predominance, typicality, adequacy of representation, and superiority, and is well worth reading. Defense attorneys are reminded, however, that the discussion is under RCFC 23, not Rule 23. See Filosa, at 611 n.1 (summarizing some of the differences between the rules).

Posted In: Class Actions In The News, Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

California Federal Court Grants Summary Judgment Under CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) Following Seventh Circuit Opinion In Citrin

On June 9, 2006, the federal district court for the Northern District of California granting summary judgment in favor of an employer (ViChip) against its former CEO, CFO, president, secretary, and sole director (Tsu-Chang Lee), for several wrongful acts, including violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 2006 WL 1626706 (N.D. Cal. 2006), Case No. C 04-2914 PJH. The court rejected defense arguments that Lee’s action did not fall within the class of conduct intended to be covered by CFAA because his actions were “authorized.” Slip Opn., at 11-12.

The case arose out of a 2002 joint venture entered into by ViVoDa (through its president Lee) with two other companies; the joint venture created ViChip to “research, develop, and outsource the production of a particular type of integrated circuit.” Slip Opn., at 1. All ViChip employees, including Lee, signed employment agreements that, in pertinent part, assigned to the company anything the employee invented and promised to maintain in confidence any proprietary information. ViChip filed a patent application in June 2003. Id., at 2.

Continue reading "ViChip v. Lee: Employment Issues" »

Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

District Court Exercise of Discretion to Select Class Action Attorneys Best Able to Represent Absent Class Members is Generally Not Subject to Appellate Review

Class action defense attorneys may attack the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23 by challenging the qualifications, experience and ability of the plaintiff’s lawyer to represent the interests of absent class members. Because the role of lead plaintiff lawyer in class action cases directly impacts attorneys’ fees, it is not a minor matter. In Cullen v. New York State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit held that the district court’s determination that plaintiff’s lawyer was not qualified to represent absent members in the class action lawsuit and its decision to appoint an experienced lawyer to represent the absent class members was not an appealable order.

In Cullen, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification in a civil rights case, but expressed concern that plaintiffs’ lawyer did not have sufficient experience to represent adequately the interests of absent class members. Cullen, at 847. Following a hearing on the matter, the court appointed a lawyer “exceptionally well-qualified in civil rights litigation” to represent the absent members in the class action and to work “in conjunction with the named plaintiffs’ attorney,” id. Plaintiffs’ lawyer appealed.

The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal holding that the order did not “fall[] within ‘that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’” Id., at 848 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226 (1949)). “Adequate representation” is central to class action certification, not a collateral issue, and so absent “exceptional circumstances, not present here, the exercise of discretion should be left untouched by the appellate court.” Id., at 849.

NOTE: The Second Circuit noted that plaintiffs had not been denied their right to be represented by the lawyer of their choice, “They have simply been prevented from imposing their choice on the absent class members.” Cullen, at 849.

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

As a resource for attorneys defending against class actions under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., we provide the text of the FDCPA. This article sets forth for the class action defense lawyer the definitions used in the FDCPA:

>§ 1692a. Definitions

As used in this subchapter--

(1) The term "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission.

(2) The term "communication" means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.

(3) The term "consumer" means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.

(4) The term "creditor" means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.

(5) The term "debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.

(6) The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include--

(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;

(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;

(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;

(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;

(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.

(7) The term "location information" means a consumer's place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.

(8) The term "State" means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

As summarized in a separate article, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in 1978 for the purpose of establishing certain that ethical guidelines for the collection of consumer debts, and to provide debtors with a means for challenging payoff demands and determining the validity and accuracy of asserted debts. The FDCPA has been a well-spring for class action lawsuits since its inception, and the class action defense lawyer still confronts new twists to FDCPA claims. As a resource, we set forth the text of the FDCPA, beginning with 15 U.S.C. § 1692:

§ 1692. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

(a) Abusive practices

There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.

(b) Inadequacy of laws

Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.

(c) Available non-abusive collection methods

Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.

(d) Interstate commerce

Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.

(e) Purposes

It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Statutes & Rules

Class Certification Under Rule 23 – Part III

The Categories of Rule 23(b)

In addition to establishing the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality and typicality, and demonstrating that the class members will be adequately represented, a plaintiff must meet also the provisions of Rule 23(b). Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9^th Cir. 1976) (“In order for an action to be maintained as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the four requirements of rule 23(a) must be met, as well as the requirements of at least one of the subdivisions of rule 23(b).”).

Rule 23(b) provides:

An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

The requirements of Rule 23 are mandatory. Thus, class certification requires that the prospective class representative satisfy the elements set forth in Rule 23(a), and demonstrate also that the provisions of Rule 23(b) are met. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982) (reversing class certification for failure to analyze Rule 23 requirements).

Continue reading "Class Action Certification Under Rule 23 Part III: Defense of Class Actions" »

Posted In: Certification of Class Actions

Defending Class Actions: Certification Under Rule 23 Part II

The Prerequisites of Rule 23(a)

In defending a class action, the single most important motion facing a defendant is the plaintiff’s motion to certify a class. Rule 23(a) requires that the plaintiff demonstrate numerosity, commonality and typicality, and that the class members will be adequately represented, and must additionally demonstrate that the action satisfies Rule23(b).

The requirements of Rule 23 are mandatory. Thus, class certification requires that the prospective class representative satisfy the elements set forth in Rule 23(a), as well as the elements of Rule 23(b) (discussed in a separate article) be met. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982) (reversing class certification for failure to analyze Rule 23 requirements).

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Satisfying Rule 23(a)

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Posted In: Certification of Class Actions

Debt Servicer Automatically Becomes Debt Collector Under FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) If Lender Previously Declared Loan In Default Second Circuit Holds

In 1978, Congress added Title VIII to the Consumer Credit Protection Act entitled the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., as a line of defense between consumers and debt collectors. (Some states, such as California, have enacted parallel state laws, but those are outside the scope of this article.) Congress intended the FDCPA to establish certain ethical guidelines for the collection of consumer debts, and to provide debtors with a means for challenging payoff demands and determining the validity and accuracy of asserted debts. FDCPA has become fertile ground for class action lawsuits; in some of these class actions, the plaintiff’s lawyer has been so bold as to name law firms and attorneys as defendants, in addition to debt collectors. The lawyer who represents debt collectors must use care as the FDCPA has resulted in surprising rulings. One such surprising case, at least for the defense team, is Alibrandi v. Financial Outsourcing Serv., Inc., 333 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003), a New York putative class action.

By way of background, the FDCPA mandates that debt collectors include certain warnings in their first correspondence with debtors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). For example, the debt collector must inform the debtor of the name of the creditor, the amount of the debt, and the debtor’s right to challenge the validity of the debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). It is a general rule, however, that these warnings need be provided only by a “debt collector” – they need not be provided by a “debt servicer.” See Alibrandi, at 83 (“Significantly, if Financial Outsourcing were a debt service provider, its correspondence with debtors would not have to include the statutory warnings.”).

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Posted In: FDCPA Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions

“Transmission” Under CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) Includes Deleting Files From Company Laptop Computer To Hide Improper Conduct

On March 8, 2006, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an employer could pursue an action under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, against a former employee for securely erasing files from a company laptop computer before quitting and going into competition with his former employer. International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). The provision at issue states that one violates CFAA if one “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer,” which includes company laptop computers. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i); Citrin, at 419. In his defense, the employee argued that his action of simply deleting computer files did not fall within the class of acts that would constitute a “transmission” within the meaning of CFAA. The district court agreed and dismissed the employer’s lawsuit. Id., at 418-19.

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Posted In: Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions