Class Action Defense Blog

Producers Adequately Alleged Violation of Federal Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) and Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to Knowledge that Federal Government’s Published Prices for Boxed Beef were Inaccurate

For the few defense attorneys who may benefit from this information, we note that on March 30, 2006, a federal district court denied a defense motion for summary judgment in a class action filed by cattle producers against beef packers under the federal Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. The class action alleged that at the time they negotiated for the purchase of cattle, the beef packers knew that the rates for boxed beef published by the federal government were inaccurate. The district court held that the cattle producers had adequately alleged PSA claims and had raised genuine issues of fact in support of those claims. Schumacher v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 434 F.Supp.2d 748 (D. S.D. 2006).

Posted In: Class Action Court Decisions

28 U.S.C. 1407 - Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)

When multiple actions – class action or otherwise – involving the same facts are pending in different federal district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 sets forth the procedure for the transfer of the actions to a single federal court for coordination or consolidation. This is known as “multi-district litigation” (MDL). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation affects the transfer of cases under Section 1407(a). MDL and Section 1407 are discussed in a separate article. For the convenience of the reader, the full text of Section 1407 is reprinted below.

28 U.S.C. § 1407. Multidistrict litigation

(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.

(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel, a circuit judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily for service in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district court, such actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such district. The judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Continue reading "Statutory Rules for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL): Defense of Class Actions Issues" »

Posted In: Multidistrict Litigation, Statutes & Rules

Post-CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) Amendment of Complaint to Add or Substitute Named Plaintiffs Does Not “Commence” New Action Under CAFA Seventh Circuit Holds

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) became effective on February 18, 2005. Understandably, then, federal courts still confront matters of first impression under CAFA. On January 30, 2006, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed “whether amending a complaint to add or substitute named plaintiffs (class representatives) ‘commences’ a new suit” for purposes of CAFA. Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 786 (7^th Cir. 2006). The Court noted, “No appellate court has yet decided whether adding named plaintiffs to a class action suit ‘commences’ a new suit for purposes of removal under CAFA.” Id.

In Phillips, the lawsuits at issue had been filed prior to the enactment of CAFA, but new plaintiffs were added by amendment after CAFA’s effective date. The Seventh Circuit held that the amendment did not commence a new suit for purposes of CAFA. In analyzing the legal issue presented, the Court observed that state law controlled: because the question “is whether adding named plaintiffs commences a new suit in state court, the answer should depend on state procedural law.” Phillips, at 787.

Continue reading "Ford Motor Class Action Defense Case--Phillips v. Ford Motor Company " »

Posted In: Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Removal & Remand, Class Action Court Decisions

A class action defendant often benefits if it is able to remove the case to federal court whenever possible. Plaintiffs, however, know this, and often artfully draft their class action complaints with an eye toward avoiding federal court jurisdiction. "[I]n general, district courts have federal-question jurisdiction only if a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff's complaint. [Citations.] The artful pleading doctrine creates an exception to this general rule." T & E Pastorino Nursery, 268 F.Supp.2d at 1247.

"Artful pleading exists where a plaintiff articulates an inherently federal claim in state-law terms. [Citations.] A federal court may exercise removal jurisdiction under the 'artful pleading' doctrine, even if a federal question does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, in three circumstances: (1) where federal law completely preempts state law; (2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character; and (3) where the right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question." T & E Pastorino Nursery, at 1247.

If the plaintiff's right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question, then removal is proper regardless of the disguises the plaintiff utilizes to hide the true nature of his or her claims. Thus, if a plaintiffs' suit is couched in terms of state law but is founded on and wholly derivative of federal law, then removal is proper. As Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998), held:

Here, although Sparta's theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants' conduct in sus-pending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law. The viability of any cause of action founded upon NASD's conduct in delisting a stock or suspending trading depends on whether the association's rules were violated.

"To bring a case within the [federal-question removal] statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936). "Claims brought under state law may 'arise under' federal law if vindication of the state right necessarily turns upon construction of a substantial question of federal law, i.e., if federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims." Ultramar America Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990).

Continue reading "The Use by a Plaintiff's Lawyer of “Artful Pleading” to Avoid Removal: Defense of Class Actions Issues" »

Posted In: Removal & Remand, Topics of Interest

California Court Upholds Arbitration Clause With Class Action Waiver In Employment Agreement

On January 19, 2006, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District, Division 5, addressed “the enforceability of a pre-employment arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.” Gentry v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4^th 944, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 791 (Cal.App. 2006). In 1995, while employed by Circuit City, Gentry received an “Associate Issue Resolution Package” and a copy of the company’s “Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures” setting forth various procedures for resolving employment-related disputes. The documents contained an arbitration agreement that included a class action waiver provision. The company provided each employee with 30 days to opt out of the arbitration agreement, but Gentry did not elect to do so. 37 Cal.Rptr.3d at 791-92.

In 2002, Gentry filed a putative class action against Circuit City in California state court alleging that Circuit City misclassified employees in order to avoid paying overtime. Id., at 791. Circuit City moved to compel arbitration. The trial court compelled arbitration with the class action waiver, and stayed the superior court action. The appellate court stated:

The issue in this case is a narrow one: whether the class action waiver in the Circuit City arbitration agreement is an unconscionable provision that renders the provision unenforceable. We conclude the provision is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Id., at 792.

Gentry recognized that the California Supreme Court “has found pre-employment arbitration agreements is to be adhesive where the agreement is made a condition of employment.” Id., at 793 (citations omitted). This case was different, however, because “Signing the arbitration agreement was not made a condition of Gentry’s employment; he was given 30 days to decide whether or not to opt out of the agreement, and chose not to do so.” Id. The Court also rejected Gentry’s claim that Circuit City “attempted to ‘sucker unsophisticated employees into opting out’ by touting the advantages of arbitration”; the court found that Circuit City had fairly presented both the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration. Id., at 794.

Finally, the court observed that Circuit City would not preclude litigation by means of the class action waiver: “Gentry has alleged statutory violations that could result in substantial damages and penalties should he prevail on his individual claims.” Id., at 795-96. For all of these reasons, the appellate court believed that Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4^th 148 (Cal. 2005), which invalidated a class action waiver provision in a consumer contract of adhesion involving a credit card company, “does not render the class action waiver in this case unenforceable.” Id., at 791.

The opinion is well worth reading. If the case remains viable, Gentry will prove extremely useful in preventing employment law class actions. Defense attorneys and in-house counsel are well advised to keep track of the status of Gentry.

Posted In: Arbitration, Class Actions In The News, Employment Law Class Actions, Class Action Court Decisions, Topics of Interest

Michael J. Hassen
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Michael J. Hassen is a partner at Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP. For 20 years, the focus of his practice has emphasized business litigation, primarily on behalf of corporate clients, in areas such as class actions, unfair competition/unfair business practices (under section 17200 and common law), theft of trade secrets, raiding of corporate employees, interference with prospective economic advantage, libel and more.

Mr. Hassen has defended corporations successfully against numerous class actions, and often consults on class actions pending outside California. He has substantial experience representing lenders in all facets of lender litigation, ranging from class actions and unfair business practices based on alleged "predatory" lending, RESPA violations, TILA violations and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations, to claims alleging elder abuse or challenging the validity or priority of liens.

A few of the many class actions Mr. Hassen has defended include:

• Alleged unauthorized use of employee names on political flyers;
• Alleged labor law violations, including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to promptly pay and properly calculate termination wages, failure to reimburse business expenses, etc.;
• Alleged Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations;
• Alleged predatory lending practices;
• Alleged RESPA and TILA violations;
• Alleged failure to timely reconvey deeds of trust;
• Alleged improper calculation of prepayment penalties;
• Alleged improper charges associated with termination of club memberships;
• Alleged false advertising to secure club memberships;
• Alleged imposition of improper escrow charges.

Mr. Hassen also co-chairs the appellate department of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell LLP. Mr. Hassen is admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, and his experience in appellate matters includes shouldering primary responsibility for preparing almost 100 appellate briefs. Mr. Hassen's expertise in handling appeals arises from his experience serving as a law clerk at the California Supreme Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

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California Appellate Court Resolves Matter of First Impression Regarding Reattaching Liens

Under California law, a wiped out junior lien reattaches if the trustor repurchases the real property that secured the debt. The question is, if the trustor obtains a purchase-money loan to buy the property, does the reattaching lien have priority over the purchase-money loan?

This was a matter of first impression when addressed by the court in DMC, Inc. v. Downey Sav. & Loan Assn., 99 Cal.App.4th 190 (2002). As the DMC Court explained at page 195,

The issue in this case, assuming that the original owner's repurchase of the property after a nonjudicial foreclosure revives the previously-extinguished junior lien, is whether the new purchase-money deed of trust has lien priority over the revived junior lien. This court and the parties have not found any California cases addressing this specific issue.

The junior lienor, DMC, argued that its lien was "first in time" and, accordingly, was entitled to priority. "In California, lien priority is determined by the "first in time, first in right" approach. In regards to real property, liens that are recorded first have priority over any later-recorded liens." DMC, at 195-96 (footnote and citations omitted).

The new lender, Downey Savings, on the other hand, argued that purchase-money loans are entitled to "super-priority" under California law:

A purchase-money mortgage, for example, has priority over all other liens on real property. Civil Code section 2898, subdivision (a) provides: "A mortgage or deed of trust given for the price of real property, at the time of its conveyance, has priority over all other liens created against the purchaser, subject to the operation of the recording laws."

DMC, at 196 (footnote and citations omitted).

After analyzing cases from sister jurisdictions, the court held that both equity and law required that the purchase-money mortgage be given priority:

In this case, the foreclosure sale extinguished DMC's lien. Without Downey's loan, DMC would have been left holding a wiped out junior lien without any legal claim to repayment. The money advanced by Downey, therefore, afforded DMC a second bite at the apple. Regardless of whether the unexpected opportunity would be fruitful, DMC was no worse off than before the repurchase. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, when the original owner's repurchase of the property after a trustee's sale revives the junior deed of trust, that lien remains second to the purchase-money deed of trust that essentially replaced the original senior lien and made possible the repurchase, and hence, the revival of the junior lien.

DMC, at 200 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Posted In: Topics of Interest